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The main purpose of this study is to explore the potential of supply chain 
accounting (SCA) for promoting both economic and social upgrading. In pursuit of 
this aim, this study examined the SCA practices used by a case study focal 
organisation in the textiles industry in Brazil and across its supply chain. SCA refers 
to the domain of management accounting and controls in inter-organisational 
settings. Drawing on institutional theory, this study investigated the impact of the 
SCA practices used across the case study supply chain on the wider economic and 
social context in which the organisations operated. The analysis is based on an in-
depth case study. Sources of data included in-depth interviews with senior and 
middle managers within the focal organisation and five of their main suppliers, and 
within other organisations that represented the wider Brazilian institutional 
context (national and regional industry federations, trade unions, and a 
development bank), totalling 32 interviews across 11 organisations. The evidence 
shows that the SCA practices used across the case study supply chain impacted 
upon their external social and economic environment. Thus, this study argues that 
SCA has the potential to promote both economic and social upgrading. Although 
the intention of this study was to find best practices, the findings revealed instances 
in which the SCA practices impacted upon the external environment both in 
positive and in negative ways. Nonetheless, the evidence of the impact of SCA on 
the economic and social environment imply that SCA has the potential to promote 
both economic and social upgrading. This study contributes to the literature of 
management accounting in developing countries, and to research of accounting as 
a mechanism for development. This research has implications for policy and 
practice. Firstly, by examining the impact of SCA on the wider economic 
environment in which the organisations operated, this study has elucidated some 
of the factors that impacted upon the low competitiveness of the textiles industry 
in Brazil. Therefore, these findings may help inform policy and organisational 
practices aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the industry. Secondly, the 
findings in this study suggest that SCA had the potential to promote better social 
practices across supply chains. Considering both the moral and the business cases 
for managing social issues, these findings may also influence companies’ practices, 
policies and codes of conduct. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background and purpose of the study 
 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the potential of supply chain 
accounting to promote both economic and social upgrading. It has been argued 
that economic upgrading (the move to higher value activities) does not necessarily 
lead to social upgrading (improvements in the rights and entitlements of workers) 
(Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Rossi, 2013; Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, 2011). This study 
explores the potential of supply chain accounting to promote both economic and 
social upgrading across the supply chain. In pursuit of this aim, this research 
explored the supply chain accounting practices used by a focal organisation in the 
textiles industry in Brazil and across its supply chain and examined the impact of 
these practices on the external economic and social environment in which the 
organisations operated. Economic upgrading has been argued to be a key process 
to promote development (Rossi, 2013). Thus, by achieving its main purpose this 
study contributes both to empirical research of supply chain accounting and to the 
emerging literature of accounting as a cog mechanism for development (Hopper, 
Lassou & Soobaroyen, 2017; Hopper & Bui, 2016; Hopper et al., 2012). 
 
Research on management accounting and controls that transcended the traditional 
organisational boundaries has been called for over two decades ago by Hopwood 
(1996), and since then many researchers have contributed to the growing 
literatures on management accounting and management controls in inter-
organisational settings. Many different terms have been used to refer to this 
emerging literature, including (but not limited to): inter-firm management 
accounting (Dekker, 2016); inter-organisational management accounting (Caglio & 
Ditillo, 2012), inter-organisational cost management (Fayard et al., 2012; Windolph 
& Moeller, 2012; Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Agndal & Nilsson, 2009; Coad 
& Cullen, 2006; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004) and supply chain accounting (Cullen & 
Meira, 2010; Free, 2007, 2008; Seal, Berry, & Cullen, 2004). This thesis uses the 
term supply chain accounting to refer to the domain of management accounting 
and controls in inter-organisational settings. This term has been chosen in order to 




Supply chain accounting (SCA) involves the use of management accounting 
techniques beyond organisational boundaries, promoting cooperative actions 
between buyers and suppliers. It has been argued that SCA has emerged as a means 
of managing inter-firm relationships (Dekker, 2016; Cullen & Meira, 2010; Caglio & 
Ditillo, 2008). In other words, SCA can be a means of managing control problems in 
inter-firm relationships by, for example, promoting trust between buyers and 
suppliers (Ruel, Shaaban, & Wu, 2017; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 
2005). Others have argued that firms engage in SCA primarily aimed at achieving 
costs reductions, processes improvements, value creation and increased 
competitiveness which would not be possible if firms worked independently 
(Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Agndal & Nilsson, 2009; Coad & Cullen, 2006; 
Dekker, 2003). Therefore, it can be argued that the use of SCA practices has the 
potential to increase competitiveness of a firm and across its supply chain (both in 
terms of quality and of costs) and, in turn, to increase economic gains across the 
supply chain. 
 
On the other hand, another strand of literature argues that economic upgrading 
does not necessarily lead to social upgrading (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011; 
Hale & Wills, 2007; Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004). For example, Hale & Wills (2007) 
argue that the growing competition between retailers for cheap and flexible 
production combined with the development of new technology leads to a shift in 
power from supplier to buyer and in turn degrades work conditions in the 
subcontracted firms. Relatedly, some authors argue that the work conditions are 
likely to be better in the factory of preferred suppliers that are regularly audited 
than in subcontracted firms which are not closely monitored (Barrientos, Gereffi, & 
Rossi, 2011; Locke et al., 2007). Therefore, there seems to be a potential for inter-
firm collaborations to promote social upgrading across supply chains. This study 
contributes to this debate by exploring the potential of SCA to promote both 
economic and social upgrading.  
 
Social accounting and social issues in supply chains are areas in much need of 
research. Yawar & Seuring (2017) made an important contribution to the 
advancement of this area in a recent literature review at the intersection of Supply 
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Chain Management and of Corporate Social Responsibility. The authors identified 
a range of social issues that firms encounter across their supply chains, and some 
of the “responsible supply chain actions” taken up by firms in managing those issues 
(Yawar & Seuring, 2017, p. 622). This research also adds to this debate by examining 
the impact of SCA on the social context in which an organisation operates and 
exploring the potential of SCA as a means to promote social upgrading. 
 
This research is based on an in-depth case study in the textiles industry in Brazil. 
Data collection includes in-depth interviews with senior and middle managers 
within the focal organisation and five of their main suppliers (three in Brazil and 
two in Europe), and within other organisations that represent the wider Brazilian 
institutional context (industry federations, trade unions, and a development bank), 
totalling 32 interviews across 11 organisations. The case study focal organisation 
(CarpetCo) operated in the textiles industry in Brazil in the household segment, 
specialising in floor covering products (mainly carpets). CarpetCo was part of an 
international group (TexCorp) and the owner of the group had family links with 
another international group (DutexCorp). The plant in Brazil, which had 
approximately 100 employees, manufactured products in-house and sold its 
products to the Brazilian market (99%) as well as to other countries in South 
America (1%). CarpetCo bought its raw materials from both the internal (Brazilian) 
market and the external market, and the supplier base included third party firms, 
firms from within TexCorp, and firms with family links. Therefore, CarpetCo formed 
a complex supply chain that went beyond country and industry boundaries. By 
using a case study in the textiles industry in Brazil, this research contributes to the 
literature by providing empirical evidence of the SCA practices in an emerging 
economy. Furthermore, by collecting data in a focal organisation and in other 
organisations across its supply chain, this research contributes to limited research 
that studies a whole supply chain (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008, p. 882). 
  
The textiles industry is an important sector in Brazil both in terms of production 
value (economic context) and in terms of employment generation (social context) 
(ABIT, 2015, 2016). Nevertheless, the Brazilian textiles industry was struggling to 
compete in the global market, both in terms of quality and price (Costa & Rocha, 
2009). In other words, the textiles industry in Brazil seemed to be “stuck in the 
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middle”, struggling to compete with high-end technology countries in terms of 
quality and with low-cost countries in terms of price. This research explores the 
potential of SCA practices to increase the competitiveness of the textiles industry 
in Brazil. This research also examines the impact of the SCA practices used across 
the case study supply chain on the broader social context in which the organisations 
operated, and explores the potential of these SCA practices to promote social 
upgrading across the supply chain. By achieving these objectives, this research 
aspires to shed light into social and economic upgrading opportunities for the 
textiles industry in Brazil.  
 
This research uses the lens of institutional theory to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of the rules and routines in terms of SCA practices within the case 
study focal organisation and across its supply chain. The conceptual framework of 
this study combines concepts of both Old Institutional Theory (OIE) and New 
Institutional Sociology (NIS), allowing an exploration of all the core elements that 
shape (or have shaped) these rules and routines, including the internal and external 
pressures, and intra-organisational dynamics. 
 
1.2 Research objectives 
 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the potential of supply chain 
accounting (SCA) to promote both economic and social upgrading. More specifically, 
the following research objectives have been developed: 
 
1. Identify the SCA practices used by a case study focal organisation in Brazil and 
across its supply chain, contributing to empirical research of SCA in developing 
countries; 
2. Investigate the factors that shaped the SCA practices used across the case study 
supply chain using the lens of institutional theory; 
3. Examine the impact of the SCA practices used across the case study supply 
chain on the external economic environment in which the organisations 





4. Examine the impact of the SCA practices used across the case study supply 
chain on the broader social context in which the organisations operate, 
exploring the potential of these practices to promote social upgrading. 
 
The first objective has been developed aimed at identifying the SCA practices used 
in Brazil, using a case study in the textiles industry. This study refers to SCA as the 
domain of management accounting and controls in inter-firm settings. In this 
context, SCA practices encompass control archetypes, management control 
mechanisms and cost and accounting controls (see Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). In order 
to achieve this objective, semi-structured interviews were conducted within the 
focal organisation and with some of its suppliers, and the questions were developed 
in a way that allowed me to identify the SCA practices used by the firms in the 
supply chain even when interviewees were not familiar with the terms and 
technicalities of the practices found in the literature. By achieving this objective, 
this study contributes to the SCA literature, providing empirical research of SCA in 
a developing country. 
 
The second objective refers to using the lens of institutional theory to investigate 
the factors that shape (or have shaped) the use (or not) of SCA in Brazil. In order to 
achieve this objective, a conceptual framework using the concepts of institutional 
theory was devised and utilized as an auxiliary to obtain an in-depth understanding 
of the factors that influenced the embedded rules and routines in terms of SCA 
practices within the case study focal organisation and across its supply chain, 
including the external (external environment), internal (intra-organisational 
dynamics) and inter-organisational (supply chain related) factors. 
 
The third and fourth objectives refer to this study’s aim of exploring the potential 
of SCA to promote both economic and social upgrading. In order to achieve these 
objectives, this study explored the impact of the SCA practices used by the case 
study organisation and across its supply chain on the external social and economic 
environment in which the organisations operated, using the lens of institutional 
theory. By achieving this objective, to some extent this study also contributes to 




1.3 Situating the study’s intended contributions to knowledge 
 
With the purpose of helping management accounting researchers to situate their 
study’s contribution to knowledge, Lukka & Vinnari (2014) proposed the distinction 
between domain theory and method theory. The authors define domain theory as 
“a particular set of knowledge on a substantive topic area situated in a field or 
domain such as management accounting” and method theory as “a meta-level 
conceptual system for studying the substantive issue(s) of the domain theory at 
hand” (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014, p. 1309). Lukka & Vinnari (2014) propose that 
method theories can help advance knowledge in a particular domain theory even 
when the method theory is applied as an instrument and does not change itself. 
For example, the authors argue that various method theories used in previous 
management accounting research have contributed to shape our understanding of 
what management accounting is and, in turn, “management accounting knowledge 
has gradually become what it previously was not” (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014, p. 1310). 
The concepts put forward by Lukka & Vinnari (2014) have been criticised by Lowe, 
De Loo & Nama (2016), provoking an interesting debate around what constitutes 
theoretical contribution in management accounting research. For example, Lowe, 
De Loo & Nama (2016) challenge the viability of distinguishing between domain 
theory and method theory, arguing that they are intertwined in nature. Lukka & 
Vinnari (2016) responded by arguing that domain theory and method theory are 
mostly marginally intertwined, and the authors maintained that making a 
distinction between them is both feasible and helpful. I find the concepts of domain 
theory and method theory proposed by Lukka & Vinnari (2014, 2016) helpful to 
enable me to locate my contributions to knowledge. 
 
This study is located within the domain of supply chain accounting (SCA). A domain 
of research is a result of many factors, including debates within a research 
community as well as “the choices made by individual researchers when positioning 
their studies” (Lukka & Vinnari, 2016, p.318). The chosen positioning of this study 
is the domain of supply chain accounting (SCA) which, in the context of this study, 
encompasses research on management accounting and controls in inter-
organisational settings. This study contributes to the domain theory of SCA in three 
ways. Firstly, this study empirically explores the use of SCA in Brazil and, in turn, 
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contributes to the under-researched area of management accounting practices in 
developing countries (Hopper & Bui, 2016; Hopper et al., 2012). Secondly, by 
exploring the impact of the SCA practices used across the case study supply chain 
on the broader social context in which the organisations operated, this study also 
addresses calls for accounting research that deal with social issues (Hopper & Bui, 
2016). Thirdly, by studying the potential of SCA to promote both economic and 
social upgrading across a specific supply chain in Brazil, this study also addresses 
calls for accounting research that contributes to development and developing 
countries (Hopper, Lassou, & Soobaroyen, 2017; Hopper & Bui, 2016). 
 
The method theory utilised in this study is institutional theory. In other words, 
institutional theory is used as an auxiliary to enable this study’s contributions to the 
domain theory of SCA. Lukka & Vinnari (2014) argue that, although both domain 
theory and method theory tend to be moving fields, domain theories tend to 
change more often than method theories. Moreover, method theories can help 
advance knowledge in a particular domain theory even when the method theory is 
applied as an instrument and does not change itself (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014). 
Accordingly, this study uses institutional theory as an instrument to advance 
knowledge in the domain theory of SCA. 
 
Finally, this study also has practical implications. By exploring the potential of SCA 
to increase competitiveness of the textiles industry in Brazil, this research aspires 
to shed light into social and economic upgrading opportunities for the textiles 
industry in Brazil. As explained above, contribution to practice entails a continuous 
process of dissemination of research findings and business engagement. For 
example, the research preliminary findings were presented to the case study focal 
organisation at the end of the second phase of data collection, aiming at influencing 
organisational practices. Moreover, to some extent, this study may have influenced 
the organisational practices by presenting interviewees with thought provoking 







1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter (Chapter 2) 
provides a literature review of supply chain accounting (SCA), the domain theory in 
which this study is positioned, with a particular focus on the practices SCA that were 
more relevant to the case study. The chapter also highlights the gap(s) in the SCA 
literature which are addressed in this study. The following chapter (Chapter 3) 
offers a review of institutional theory in management accounting research, which 
is the chosen theoretical lens to underpin this research. The chapter ends with a 
conceptual framework designed to analyse the SCA practices studied in this 
research. Chapter 4 describes the research methods employed to achieve the 
objectives of the study. Chapters 5 and 6 describe the context of the case study 
based on the findings from the fieldwork. Chapter 5 presents the textiles industry 
in Brazil, exploring the institutions that influence the SCA practices and the social 
issues across the industry’s supply chain. Chapter 6 introduces the case study focal 
organisation and its supply chain. The following four chapters discuss the 
management accounting and control mechanisms (or SCA practices) used across 
the case study supply, addressing the research objectives proposed for this study. 
Chapter 7 discusses Inter-firm governance mechanisms observed across the case 
study supply chain. Chapter 8 discusses the Make-or-buy decision process observed 
in the case study. Chapter 9 discusses the Customer accounting practices used by 
the case study focal organisation and their impacts across the entire supply chain. 
Chapter 10 discusses the Open Book Accounting practices across the entire supply 
chain. Finally, the final chapter provides conclusions and summarises the 
contributions of the study. Figure 1.1 summarises the structure of the thesis 









CHAPTER 2: SUPPLY CHAIN ACCOUNTING: PRESENT AND 
FUTURE 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, the main purpose of this study is to explore 
the potential of supply chain accounting (SCA) to promote both economic and social 
upgrading. In pursuit of this aim, this study explores the SCA practices used by a 
focal organisation in the textiles industry in Brazil and across its supply chain. 
Research on management accounting and controls that transcends the traditional 
organisational boundaries has been called for over two decades ago by Hopwood 
(1996), and since then many researchers have contributed to the growing 
literatures on management accounting and management controls in inter-
organisational settings (Hopper & Bui, 2016). Many different terms have been used 
to refer to this emerging literature, including (but not limited to): inter-
organisational/inter-firm management accounting (Caglio & Ditillo, 2012; Dekker, 
2004), inter-organisational cost management (Fayard et al., 2012; Windolph & 
Moeller, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2009; Coad & Cullen, 2006; Cooper & Slagmulder, 
2004); and supply chain accounting (Cullen & Meira, 2010; Free, 2007, 2008; Seal, 
Berry, & Cullen, 2004). 
 
As a result of a review of the main contributions to the literature of management 
controls in inter-organisational settings, Caglio & Ditillio (2008) proposed a 
categorisation of this emerging literature according to the breadth of the control 
solutions studied. Caglio & Ditillio (2008) suggest three categories of controls in 
inter-organisational settings: control archetypes, management control 
mechanisms, and cost and accounting controls. In Caglio & Ditillio’s (2008) model, 
control archetypes refer to inter-firm arrangements encompassing a mix of 
different types of market-based, hierarchical/bureaucratic or alternative control 
mechanisms. Examples of control archetypes include competitive biddings 
(Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), 
comprehensive and detailed contracts (Sartorius & Kirsten, 2005; Langfield-Smith 
& Smith, 2003; Speklé, 2001; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), and 
information on partners’ reputations (Speklé, 2001; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000). Management control mechanisms refer to individually specified 
mechanisms, such as information systems for collaborative planning (Tomkins, 
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2001), performance monitoring and rewarding (Dekker, 2004), and socialisation 
processes (Mahama, 2006). Finally, cost and accounting controls refer to control 
mechanisms based on cost and accounting information, such as open book 
accounting (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005), value chain analysis (Coad & Cullen, 2006; 
Dekker, 2003), and inter-organizational cost management (Cooper & Slagmulder, 
2004). This thesis uses the term supply chain accounting (SCA) to refer to the 
domain of management accounting and management control in inter-
organisational settings. In other words, in this thesis the term SCA encompasses all 
forms of controls in inter-organisational settings, including control archetypes, 
management control mechanisms and cost and accounting controls.  
 
Supply chain accounting (SCA) involves the use of management accounting 
techniques beyond organisational boundaries, promoting cooperative actions 
between buyers and suppliers. It has been argued that SCA has emerged as a means 
of managing (new) inter-organisational arrangements (Dekker, 2016; Cullen & 
Meira, 2010; Tsamenyi & Cullen, 2010; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). In other words, SCA 
can be a means of managing control problems in inter-firm relationships by, for 
example, promoting trust between buyers and suppliers (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; 
Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). Other authors argue that firms build collaborative 
relationships with their partners in search for lower costs, processes improvements, 
value creation, and increased competitiveness, which would not be possible if firms 
worked independently (Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Meira et al., 2010; 
Agndal & Nilsson, 2009; Coad & Cullen, 2006; Dekker, 2003). The SCA practices can 
vary depending on the type of relationship between buyers and suppliers. In arm’s 
length relationships, where the main focus is on low cost, the use of traditional 
management accounting techniques such as target costing is commonly observed, 
while in more collaborative relationships, more sophisticated techniques are 
adopted, such as open book accounting (Cullen & Meira, 2010). It has been argued 
that competition is no longer between companies, but between networks of 
interconnected organisations (Ruel, Shaaban, & Wu, 2017; Christopher, 2016; 
Tejpal, Garg, & Sachdeva, 2013; Meira et al., 2010); and that supply chain relations 
are firms’ assets that can enhance their competitive position (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & 
Kawai, 2013). Therefore, it can be argued that the use of SCA practices has the 
potential to increase competitiveness of a firm and its supply chain (both in terms 
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of quality and of costs) and, in turn, to contribute to the economic upgrading of an 
industry’s supply chain. 
 
On the other hand, it has been argued that economic upgrading does not 
necessarily lead to social upgrading (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011; Hale & Wills, 
2007; Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004). Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi (2011) argue that 
there are different types of economic upgrading, and that these may have different 
implications for workers (and therefore for social upgrading). For example, 
economic upgrading may involve the introduction of more advanced products 
(product upgrading), and therefore it may require more skilled labour (Barrientos, 
Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011). Economic upgrading may involve production process 
improvements (process upgrading) which may be achieved by automation (e.g. 
substituting capital for labour), and therefore it may reduce work for skilled and/or 
unskilled labour (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011). This study explores the 
potential of SCA as a means for promoting both economic and social upgrading.  
 
Hale & Wills (2007) argue that the growing competition between retailers for cheap 
and flexible production combined with the development of new technology leads 
to a shift in power from supplier to buyer and in turn degrades work conditions in 
the subcontracted firms. Relatedly, some authors argue that the work conditions 
are likely to be better in the factory of preferred suppliers that are regularly audited 
than in subcontracted firms which are not closely monitored (Barrientos, Gereffi, & 
Rossi, 2011; Locke et al., 2007). Therefore, there seems to be a potential for inter-
firm collaborations to promote social upgrading across supply chains. This chapter 
provides a literature review of SCA, with a particular focus on the SCA practices that 
were more relevant to the case study. The chapter also highlights the gap(s) in the 
SCA literature which are addressed in this study. 
 
2.1 Inter-firm governance 
 
It has been argued that effective governance and control mechanisms in inter-firm 
relationships are important strategic decisions (Dekker, 2008) and that they can be 
a source of corporate and inter-organisational competitive advantage (Estampe et 
al., 2013; Cullen & Meira, 2010; Dekker, 2004). Therefore, it can be argued that 
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inter-firm governance is a key area for emerging economies striving to achieve 
increased competitiveness, particularly for the Brazilian textiles industry. Inter-firm 
governance involves both the initiation and maintenance of inter-firm relationships. 
Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath (2002) argue that firms ought to choose an appropriate 
partner after deciding to seek collaboration with an external supplier rather than 
producing internally. It could, therefore, be argued that firms may engage in make-
or-buy decisions as an alternative mechanism for coping with control problems in 
inter-firm relationships. A review of the literature on make-or-buy decisions is given 
later in this chapter. The next sub-sections will provide a review of the literature on 
the control mechanisms used to cope with control problems, namely governance 
structure (or relationship arrangements), partner selection, and alternative 
informal controls. 
 
2.1.1 Antecedents of inter-firm governance 
 
Studies that examine the antecedents for selecting a partner and choosing an 
appropriate governance structure tend to focus on the control problems related to 
the characteristics of the transactions and/or of the tasks involved in the inter-firm 
relationship. For example, many studies propose that the key determinants of 
inter-firm governance choices are related to the transaction risks, which include: 
asset specificity, uncertainty, transaction size, and frequency of transactions 
(Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010; Dekker, 2008). Dekker (2008) proposed a model that conceptualises the 
control problems that determine the design of inter-firm governance (which he 
refers to as control solutions) which includes issues of appropriation concerns, 
coordination requirements, and dependence in inter-firm relationships. In his 
model, appropriation concerns refer to control problems arising from transaction 
characteristics, such as asset specificity and uncertainty; coordination 
requirements refer to problems associated to task characteristics, such as task 
interdependence; and dependence relates to the overall economic relationship 
between the partners, which may involve both current and future transactions. The 
next sub-sections explore the factors that shape the control mechanisms used to 
manage inter-firm relationships, including inter-organisational factors, such as the 
characteristics of the transaction and of the social relationships between buyers 
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and suppliers, and the external factors, such as the economic environment and 
government initiatives. 
 
2.1.1.1 Transaction characteristics  
 
As explained above, many studies suggest that the characteristics of the transaction 
between two or more partners in the supply chain are key factors that shape inter-
firm governance. Transaction characteristics include, among others, asset 
specificity and uncertainty (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010; Dekker, 2008). Asset specificity relates to significant investments in assets 
dedicated to a specific transaction, and the extent to which these investments can 
be used in other transactions without loss of value or incurring high cost (Dekker, 
Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008). These 
investments may be in physical assets, such as tools, computer systems and 
machinery acquired specifically to satisfy the demands of a particular buyer, as well 
as in human assets, such as specific skills, knowledge and experience of individuals 
in the firm (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010).  
 
Uncertainties may arise particularly when the product is critical to the buyer, 
whereby failures in quality and delivery, for example, may have significant 
consequences for the buyer (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010). Uncertainties may involve both behavioural (relational) and environmental 
(external) uncertainties. Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai (2013) propose a distinction 
between three different types of uncertainty that may affect inter-firm 
relationships: environmental variability (concerned with changes in market and 
technology), technological development unpredictability, and behavioural 
(monitoring problems) (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013). Behavioural uncertainty 
refers to the lack of predictability and control over how the transaction partner will 
behave (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). These may occur when the exchange involves high 
levels of supplier dependence and high switching costs and where there are few 
alternative suppliers (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). Environmental uncertainty refers to 
the lack of predictability and control over the wider environment in which the 
transaction occurs (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Noordewier, John, & Nevin, 1990). 
Examples of environmental uncertainties include complexity and technological 
uncertainty (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), thus these may arguably be particularly 
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relevant within emerging economies. What is more, environmental uncertainty 
may increase behavioural uncertainties. For example, Caglio (2017) argues that in 
times of recession behavioural uncertainty in inter-firm relationships increases. 
 
2.1.1.2 Partner experience and social embeddedness 
 
Economic transactions are inevitably embedded in social relationships (Xie, Liang, 
& Zhou, 2016), thus the social relationships developed between the individuals 
within the organisations involved in the transaction may affect the inter-firm 
governance mechanisms. Many authors found that another important factor that 
shaped inter-firm governance is the social embeddedness (or partner experience) 
involved in the inter-firm relationship (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Ding, Dekker, & 
Groot, 2013; Dekker, 2008; Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie, 2003). Partner 
experience refers to the experience between the buyer and the supplier developed 
during pervious transactions (Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). The term social 
embeddedness can be used more broadly to refer to information held by the buyer 
acquired from the buyer’s own previous experience with the supplier and/or from 
the supplier’s previous experience with other partners (Buskens, Batenburg, & 
Weesie, 2003).  
 
In terms of partner selection, Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie (2003) argue that after 
controlling for standard decision criteria such as price, quality, and service, an 
important factor that influences the supplier selection process is the social 
embeddedness between the buyer and the supplier. Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie 
(2003) further argue that social embeddedness is particularly relevant when the 
product supplied is critical to the buyer. Previous partner experience may also play 
a role in reducing behavioural uncertainty in exchange transaction. For example, 
selecting suppliers from prior social relationships enables the buyer to collect 
important information such as the suppliers’ capabilities, trustworthiness, and 
reliability; and to reduce potential opportunism (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016). Dekker 
(2008) argues that previous experience and/or familiarity with the exchange 




2.1.1.3 Regulations and government initiatives 
 
Government initiatives may be another factor that influences inter-firm 
governance (Scapens & Varoutsa, 2010; Seal, Berry, & Cullen, 2004). For example, 
Seal, Berry, & Cullen (2004) conducted a case study on inter-firm accounting within 
a UK manufacturer and they show that the case company extended its range of 
supply chain relationships aided by governmental initiatives. They observed that 
the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI) policy for regional growth and 
development, which encouraged the creation of regional networks of entities, 
enabled a broader scope for the supply chain relationships. 
 
In a more recent study, Meng et al. (2018) explored the impact of the (Chinese) 
government’s introduction of carbon tax (CT) on the make-or-buy decisions. In their 
paper, they developed a supply chain model whereby the government is portrayed 
as the third player in the supply chain (alongside the manufacturer and the supplier). 
Chiwamit, Modell, & Scapens (2015) have recently conducted a study exploring the 
role of regulations in shaping the adoption of management accounting innovation 
(MAI) in general. This study investigates the extent to which the local and national 
(Brazilian) regulations and government initiatives impacted upon the SCA practices 
in the textiles industry in Brazil. 
  
2.1.2 Control mechanisms 
 
Control mechanisms in inter-firm settings are the mechanisms used mitigate 
control problems arising from inter-firm relationships across supply chains. Inter-
firm governance involves both the initiation and maintenance of inter-firm 
relationships; therefore, control mechanisms involve both governance structure 
design and partner selection. While partner selection focuses on reducing control 
problems in inter-firm relationships by finding a reliable and competent supplier, 
the choice of governance structure (or relationship arrangement) focuses on both 
reducing and managing control problems (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Dekker, 2008). 
Although partner selection and the choice of governance structure (or relationship 
arrangement) are considered the key control mechanisms in inter-firm 
relationships, inter-firm governance may involve a wide range of control 
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mechanisms, including contractual and non-contractual arrangements and controls. 
For example, control mechanisms may involve contractual contingency planning, 
performance target setting, information sharing, process reviews and joint problem 
solving, regulating suppliers' behaviour incentives, monitoring and rewarding 
outcomes and behaviour (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 
2013; Dekker, 2008). This section explores the control mechanisms observed across 
the case study supply chain, including the relationship arrangement, supplier 
selection and the alternative, informal controls. 
 
2.1.2.1 Relationship arrangements (governance structure) 
 
The relationship arrangement between buyers and suppliers can range from 
interactions that are close to a pure market perspective, where external suppliers 
sell standard products to multiple customers (i.e. where asset specificities are low), 
to strategic partnerships, in which firms show their desire to work together over 
the longer term (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Cullen & Meira, 2010; Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 2004). When firms outsource more significant items (i.e. when a 
product is critical to the buyer), they may choose to engage in inter-organisational 
cost management efforts and develop hybrid forms of relationships. Hybrid 
organisations involve a broad range of decisions about the location of the firms’ 
boundaries and the governance structure that controls the relationships (Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 2004). 
 
Many studies on inter-firm governance suggest that the relationship arrangements 
are based on the characteristics of the transactions and/or of the tasks involved 
(Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). For 
example, Cooper & Slagmulder (2004) argue that the inter-firm relationship 
governance structure is based on partners’ responsibilities for product design and 
specifications. While exploring hybrid forms of relationships in a Japanese 
manufacturing enterprise, Cooper & Slagmulder (2004) identified four different 
types of relationship between buyers and suppliers based on their respective 
responsibilities for product design and specifications: (1) family members; (2) major 
suppliers, (3) subcontractors, and (4) common suppliers. In their model, family 
member suppliers reflected a relationship with a high level of design dependence, 
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where the responsibility for predominant specifications and design were shared by 
buyers and suppliers. Major suppliers were responsible for the product design, but 
the responsibility for the product specifications remained with the buyer. 
Subcontractors were only responsible for manufacturing, whereas responsibility for 
establishing specifications and designing the products remained with the buyer. 
Finally, common suppliers were those that sold standard products for multiple 
customers; therefore, they took responsibility for all aspects of design and 
manufacture of the parts. 
 
Agndal & Nilsson (2010) argue that inter-firm relationship arrangements are based 
on the purchasing strategy, which deals with asset specificities and levels of 
uncertainty. Agndal & Nilsson (2010) propose two different categories of 
purchasing strategy: (1) a transactional purchasing strategy, which is characterised 
by a pure market perspective; and (2) a relational purchasing strategy, which 
involves hybrid arrangements between firms. A relational purchasing strategy 
usually involves significant supplier-specific investments, which can include 
investments in physical assets, such as tools, computer systems and machinery 
acquired specifically to satisfy the demands of a particular buyer as well as 
investments in human assets, such as specific skills, knowledge and experience of 
individuals in the firm (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). Therefore, it can be argued that the 
notion of the employment practices across the supply chain may be crucial when 
inter-firm relationships involve a relational purchasing strategy. Agndal & Nilsson 
(2010) further argue that a relational strategy can help to deal with high levels of 
uncertainty. Uncertainties can arise when a product is critical to the buyer and 
there are high levels of dependence, with few alternative suppliers and high 
switching costs. Unknown suppliers can also lead to behavioural uncertainties, thus 
the purchase strategy for critical products involves repeat purchases, often with the 
same favoured suppliers. Correspondingly, Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson (2012) argue 
that long-term relationships are usually formed when the product is critical to the 
buyer. For example, when delivery and quality issues have significant consequences 
to the buyer. In other words, when the product is associated with significant 
behavioural and environmental uncertainties. A transactional purchasing strategy, 
on the other hand, is associated with market procurement, where the buyer looks 
for alternative suppliers and selects the lowest bidder (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; 
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Cullen & Meira, 2010). Levels of specificity and uncertainties in transactional 
purchasing strategy are low, and repeat purchases do not reduce behavioural 
uncertainty sufficiently to offset the potential benefits of market procurement. 
Therefore, transactional purchasing arrangements can be described as arm’s length 
relationships, where the buyer and supplier take on “adversarial” roles. 
 
Another important aspect of inter-firm relationships is the level of supply chain 
maturity, which identifies different types of relationship, starting with autonomous 
firms, and then moving into different stages of cooperation (Cullen & Meira, 2010). 
Cullen & Meira (2010) used the supply chain maturity model to identify the 
different management accounting techniques used in each stage of the 
development of inter-firm relationships, specifically: (1) arm's length relationships; 
(2) serial dependence; (3) reciprocal dependence and (4) mutual dependence. The 
arm’s length stage reflects adversarial relationships between buyers and suppliers, 
where the focus tends to be on low cost, and the techniques that are often used 
are tendering and ‘one off’ supplies. During the serial dependence stage, 
organisations share a limited amount of accounting information in order to improve 
information exchange and production flexibility. The development of the 
relationship to the reciprocal dependence stage involves more information sharing 
and more collaborative initiatives. In mutual dependence relationships, firms fully 
engage in open book accounting, aiming to achieve mutual benefits from cost 
reduction and improved quality. A review of the literature on open book accounting 
is given later in this chapter. 
 
2.1.2.2 Partner selection 
 
Partner selection focuses on reducing control problems by finding a reliable and 
qualified supplier (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Dekker, 2008). Although some authors 
argue that selecting an appropriate partner reduces the need for formal 
governance (Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie, 2003), others argue that partner 
selection and formal governance are complementary to each other rather than 
substitutes (Dekker, 2008). Early literature on partner selection suggests that the 
choice of suppliers is mainly driven by attributes related to the products, such as 
quality and cost, and to supplier service such as delivery performance and flexibility 
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(Verma & Pullman, 1998). Later, many authors (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Dekker & 
Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie, 2003) have 
explored other relevant criteria in the supplier selection process. Other relevant 
supplier selection criteria, which are arguably aimed at reducing the uncertainties 
that arise in the transaction, include social relationships between the buyer and the 
supplier, preferences for known partners, familiarity and trust (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 
2016; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Buskens, Batenburg, & 
Weesie, 2003). For example, Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie (2003) argue that after 
controlling for standard decision criteria such as price, quality, and service, an 
important factor that influences the supplier selection process is the social 
embeddedness between the buyer and the supplier, which the authors define as 
the buyer’s own past experience with the supplier and the information held by the 
buyer about the supplier’s past experience with other partners. Buskens, Batenburg, 
& Weesie (2003) further argue that social embeddedness is particularly relevant 
when the product supplied is critical to the buyer.  
 
Xie, Liang, & Zhou (2016) suggest that social relationships between buyers and 
suppliers play a key role on partner selection, arguing that economic transactions 
are “embedded in social relationships” (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016, p. 157). Xie, Liang, 
& Zhou (2016) further argue that selecting suppliers from prior social relationships 
enables the buyer to collect important information such as the suppliers’ 
capabilities, trustworthiness, and reliability, and that previous ties also play a role 
in reducing potential opportunisms (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016, p. 157). Thus, it could 
be argued that these studies suggest that partner selection may indeed be used as 
a control mechanism for reducing uncertainties in inter-firm relationships. 
 
2.1.2.3 Informal control mechanisms 
 
Inter-firm governance may comprise not only formal controls but also informal 
mechanisms. Informal mechanisms may be used both during the partner selection 
and partner control phases in an inter-firm relationship (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016). 
For example, informal mechanisms for selecting suppliers include social selection, 
which can be generally defined as partner selection based on social relationships 
(Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016). Alternative controls may involve experiences and trust 
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from prior ties with the exchange partner (Dekker, 2008). Informal controls are 
arguably particularly relevant for managing inter-firm relationships within 
developing countries. For example, many researchers have argued that informal 
governance prevailed in China (Li et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2003). In a more recent 
study Xie, Liang, & Zhou (2016) found that China has been adopting both formal 
and informal controls.  
 
An important area of debate is around whether formal and informal controls work 
as substitutes or complements (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016). Trust is generally 
considered a significant factor in reducing uncertainty in inter-firm transactions 
(Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Vosselman & Meer-Kooistra, 2009; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; 
Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003) and arguably reducing the need for formal controls. 
Xie, Liang, & Zhou (2016) found that in China using both formal and informal 
controls is the preferable approach for managing inter-firm relationships. This 
study explores the extent of use of informal controls to manage inter-firm 
relationships in a focal organisation in Brazil and across its supply chain. 
 
2.2 Make-or-buy decisions 
 
Make-or-buy decisions refer to the decision-making process for determining 
whether to produce a material (or perform an activity) internally or to purchase the 
material from (or contract an activity out to) external suppliers (Meira et al., 2010; 
Du, Lu, & Tao, 2009). Outsourcing refers the process in which a firm contracts 
outside companies to perform activities that have traditionally been undertaken 
internally (Espino-Rodríguez, Chun-Lai, & Gil-Padilla, 2017; Meira et al., 2010; Du, 
Lu, & Tao, 2009; Lamminmaki, 2008). It has been argued that make-or-buy are 
strategic decisions, which allow firms to identify their core and non-core 
competencies in order to determine which functions to outsource and which to 
keep in-house (Meira et al., 2010). 
 
Some authors argue that outsourcing and subcontracting are merely used in the 
search for cheap labour (e.g. Pearson, 2007). Others argue that the main motivation 
for firms engaging in outsourcing is that this strategy allows firms to focus on their 
core competence and gain access to specialised services (Lamminmaki, 2008; 
Sartorius & Kirsten, 2005; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). For example, Langfield-
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Smith & Smith (2003) conducted a case study at Central Energy, an Australian 
company in the electricity industry, which outsourced their Information Technology 
and Telecommunications (IT&T) function motivated by increased competition 
following the privatisation of the industry. The company determined that they 
needed to focus on their core competence and seek a partner whose core business 
was IT. 
 
Make-or-buy decisions are the first step in the initiation of an inter-firm relationship 
(Dekker, 2003; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Seal et al., 1999). 
Accordingly, it has been argued that make-or-buy decisions should include 
considerations of the coordination and control costs associated to the inter-firm 
relationship (Espino-Rodríguez, Chun-Lai, & Gil-Padilla, 2017; Meira et al., 2010; van 
der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), and transaction characteristics such as 
asset specificity (Espino-Rodríguez, Chun-Lai, & Gil-Padilla, 2017; Lamminmaki, 
2008). Lamminmaki (2008) argue that when the level of asset specify are high, the 
degree of outsourcing is lower. Other reasons for outsourcing may include 
economies of scale, capacity pooling, environment cost and government's 
regulation (Meng et al., 2018). For example, Meng et al. (2018) found that a 
government’s carbon tax affected the make-or-buy decision of manufacturers in 
China. 
 
Literature on make-or-buy decisions tend to revolve around outsourcing. In more 
recent years, some researchers have been studying the process of insourcing 
(Hartman, Ogden, & Hazen, 2017; Sundquist, Hulthén, & Gadde, 2015; Drauz, 2014). 
However, this area of research tends to focus on the process of re-insourcing. In 
other words, insourcing activities that had been previously outsourced (Hartman, 
Ogden, & Hazen, 2017; Sundquist, Hulthén, & Gadde, 2015; Drauz, 2014). Studies 
on first time insourcing seem to have been neglected so far. 
 
Hartman, Ogden, & Hazen (2017) conducted a study exploring the reasons for firms 
to engage in (re)insourcing drawing on the literature of outsourcing, given the 
limited literature on (re)insourcing to date. Hartman, Ogden, & Hazen (2017) found 
that the reasons for insourcing are generally the same as the reasons for 
outsourcing, such as to cost reduction, quality improvement, and increased 
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productivity and performance. The difference appears to lie on the fact that while 
outsourcing decisions are often a proactive strategic decision, (re)insourcing are 
often a reaction to a specific, external trigger event, such as cost increase imposed 
by the supplier (Hartman, Ogden, & Hazen, 2017). Drauz (2014) argue that 
underutilized capacities are one of the main reasons for re-insourcing. 
 
Another area of research in the literature of make-or-buy decisions relates to bi-
sourcing (Du, Lu, & Tao, 2009). Bi-sourcing is a strategy that contains both 
outsourcing and insourcing (Du, Lu, & Tao, 2009). In other words, it is a strategy 
whereby firms opt to acquire the same material by both purchasing from external 
suppliers (outsourcing) and by producing in-house (insourcing). For example, 
Mattel, a toy manufacturer, adopted this strategy for the production of one of its 
moulds, which were both produced at their own facility in Malaysia and outsourced 
to firms in Hong Kong (Du, Lu, & Tao, 2009). Another example is the American 
conglomerate DuPont, which combines several service providers with their own 
internal resources to perform their Information Technology (IT) functions (Du, Lu, 
& Tao, 2009). An organisation may also engage in bi-sourcing in order to learn best 
practices from an external supplier to be adopted in the internal production, and/or 
due to in-house production capacity constraints (Du, Lu, & Tao, 2009). Du, Lu, & 
Tao (2009) further argue that firms engaging in bi-sourcing in the global economy 
tend to use this strategy in order to use the payoff from both high waged developed 
countries and low-waged developing (or less developed) countries. Du, Lu, & Tao 
(2009) further suggest that firms may also choose to engage in bi-sourcing when 
the manufacturer faces more problems of unionisation when compared to the 
external supplier (thereby reducing risks of shortage in the event of strikes). 
  
Previous studies have studied the impact of outsourcing on workers (Geishecker, 
2006, 2008; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). For example, in the study conducted 
by Langfield-Smith & Smith (2003) in which a company in the electricity industry 
outsourced its Information Technology and Telecommunications (IT&T) function, 
amongst the criteria for the choice of the supplier was the way in which the staff 
transition issues would be treated. The IT&T members of staff were allowed to 
choose to take voluntary redundancy, to be transferred to the supplier or to 
continue working for the company in a different department. According to a 
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manager of Central Energy, the benefits of the new partnership included access to 
the supplier’s expertise and enhanced services, increased cost consciousness within 
the organisation and a greater discipline in IT&T planning. The new relationship 
took an open book approach to the sharing of information, and a committee 
consisting of managers from both firms developed performance indicators to 
support areas such as growth, delivery time and cost. Langfield-Smith & Smith 
(2003) study shows the potential for combining a focus on competitiveness while 
also considering social issues. 
 
2.3 Performance measurement across supply chains and the Balanced Scorecard 
 
Given the strategic dimension of supply chains, it is crucial to measure their 
performance (Estampe et al., 2013). A performance measurement system that is 
often used by management accountants is the Balanced Scorecard (BSC). The BSC 
was developed by Kaplan & Norton (1992) as a performance measurement system 
which combines financial and non-financial indicators. The original BSC framework 
introduced by Kaplan & Norton (1992) complemented traditional financial 
performance measurement through the addition of three other perspectives: 
customer; business processes; and learning and growth (or continuous 
improvement). These additional perspectives allow firms to evaluate if positive 
performance in one area, such as profits, is being achieved at the expense of 
another, such as low product quality, which could lead to losses in the long term. 
Later studies also defined the BSC as a system to implement strategy, as it allows 
firms to break their strategy into achievable performance indicators (Hoque, 2014; 
Fernandes, Raja, & Whalley, 2006; Braam & Nijssen, 2004; Kaplan & Norton, 1996). 
Many authors argue that the BSC assumption that customer and shareholder values 
are linked by cause and effect do not necessarily exist. For example, Norreklit (2000) 
argues that companies cannot prove that better non-financial performance, such 
as customer satisfaction, leads to improved financial result, as customers may be 
satisfied but may yet not be profitable. 
 
Despite the criticisms, there are many studies providing evidence of organisations 
using the BSC as a tool to implement strategy and to measure performance in the 
organisation (Hoque, 2014). For example, Kaplan & Norton (2008) presented a case 
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of success on the use of BSC by the UK based retailer Tesco, who used BSC to 
disseminate its strategy throughout the organisation. The retailer went beyond the 
original four perspectives of the BSC and includes Community as the fifth 
perspective, aimed to achieve its goals related to social issues in the communities 
within which they operate (Kaplan & Norton, 2008). Although their BSC does not 
include a specific perspective for controlling the achievement of goals related to 
‘equality’ per se, the organisation recognises the need to embrace diversity in terms 
of factors such as age, disability, gender, race and sexual orientation (Kaplan & 
Norton, 2008). The firm suggests that in order to protect their reputation and brand 
in terms of ethical, legal or moral issues that could lead to a loss of trust and of their 
ability to recruit and retain good people, it makes use of mechanisms such as a code 
of business conduct, which guides behaviour in dealing with customers, employees 
and suppliers; supplier auditing and product inspection programmes, aimed at 
minimising risks related to labour standards and product integrity; and governance 
committees, including Social Responsibility.  
 
Many researchers have studied the reasons for failure in the implementation of BSC. 
For example, Norreklit (2000) argues that for the BSC to be successful, the 
employees must be committed. Fernandes, Raja, & Whalley (2006) argue that 
organisations implementing the BSC face more behavioural challenges than 
technical ones. Therefore, the involvement of and communication to employees 
seems to be key successful implementation of the BSC in an organisation. 
 
2.4 Cost management and Activity-Based Costing beyond the organisational 
boundaries 
 
Activity-Based Costing (ABC) was first introduced by Cooper & Kaplan (1988) as a 
cost system that measures more accurate product costs and enables a better 
understanding of product profitability. ABC proposes the identification of the costs 
incurred in all activities within the company, and the allocation of the overhead 
costs to product costs accordingly. In other words, focusing on the cost of all the 
activities necessary to produce a product, including support activities (Cooper & 
Kaplan, 1988). ABC is grounded on Activity-Based management, which is based on 
the idea that activities incur costs and, therefore, in order to manage costs, it is 
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necessary to manage activities (Coad & Cullen, 2006). Activity-Based Management 
encompasses activity analysis, analysis of business processes and analysis of value 
and non-value-added activities (Soin, Seal, & Cullen, 2002). Therefore, ABC is an 
approach to eliminate non-value-added activities. 
 
Some studies show that the implementation of ABC allows the elimination of non-
value-added activities beyond the organisational boundaries. For example, Coad & 
Cullen (2006) conducted a research in School Trends, a UK manufacturer of school 
wear, and found that the manufacturer identified that their supplier performed a 
process of folding and packing garments which, when delivered to their plant, were 
unpacked and unfolded. Eliminating this process at the supplier-end resulted in cost 
savings for both parts (Coad and Cullen, 2006). 
 
2.5 Customer accounting 
 
Customer accounting can be broadly defined as a firm’s internal practices used to 
measure and manage their customer relationships (Caker & Strömsten, 2010). 
Customer accounting plays a role in providing information to inform firms’ 
decisions in relation to, for example, which customers to prioritise (Kraus, 
Håkansson, & Lind, 2015; Lind & Strömsten, 2006). In other words, customer 
accounting is a means for organisations to focus on particular customers or 
customer segments, rather than focusing on customers in general (Boyce, 2000). 
Bahri-Ammari & Soliman (2016) argue that customer relationship management is 
an important means for developing a close and long-term relationship with 
customers. Therefore, customer accounting has the potential to shape inter-firm 
relationships across supply chains. 
 
Customer accounting involves the use of accounting techniques to measure 
customers’ performance in terms of profit contribution (Lind & Strömsten, 2006; 
Guilding & McManus, 2002). Therefore, customer accounting shifts the focus on 
product profitability to customer profitability (Caker & Strömsten, 2010), increasing 
the scope of management accounting to include a customer focus (Cäker, 2007). 
This implies that products may be sold to a customer at a loss as long as the 
customer is profitable to the organisation (Caker & Strömsten, 2010). Therefore, 
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customer accounting is arguably a key determinant of the relationship arrangement 
between an organisation and its customers. In other words, customer accounting 
may be an antecedent for building long-term and collaborative relationships. 
 
Customer accounting techniques are generally based on the firm’s technical and 
organisational interface with its customers (Lind & Strömsten, 2006). These include 
customer profitability analysis, customer segment profitability analysis, lifetime 
customer profitability analysis, and customer valuation analysis (Lind & Strömsten, 
2006). Customer profitability analysis is the most commonly adopted by 
organisations (Fish et al., 2017; Guilding & McManus, 2002). However, it seems that 
implementation of customer accounting by firms has yet to mature. For example, 
in a study examining the implementation of customer accounting in a case study 
organisation, Fish et al.(2017) found that despite the implementation of customer 
accounting techniques, managers tended to rely on their intituition in relation to 
customer profitability analysis rather than on data.  
 
Little attention has been given to customer accounting in management accounting 
research (Fish et al., 2017; Caker & Strömsten, 2010; McManus & Guilding, 2008). 
Moreover, existing literature on customer accounting tends to focus on what 
techniques to use to generate customer accounting information; and research on 
how to use customer accounting information and on the effects of using these 
information are scarce (Caker & Strömsten, 2010). This study contributes to this 
gap in the literature, by exploring how the customer accounting practices within 
the focal organisation shaped the inter-firm relationships across its supply chain. 
 
2.6 Open Book Accounting 
 
Open book accounting (OBA) can be generally defined as the disclosure of 
management accounting information beyond organisational boundaries (Caglio, 
2017; Alenius, Lind, & Strömsten, 2015; Caglio & Ditillo, 2012; Windolph & Moeller, 
2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005, 2010). Literature on OBA is 
still developing, and a consistent definition of what characterises OBA practice has 
not yet emerged. While some authors define OBA as the disclosure of cost 
information between buyers and suppliers (Lamming et al., 2005; Lamming, 1996), 
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others define OBA more widely as the exchange of both financial and non-financial 
information in inter-organisational settings (Caglio, 2017; Ellström & Hoshi Larsson, 
2017; Alenius, Lind, & Strömsten, 2015; Caglio & Ditillo, 2012; Windolph & Moeller, 
2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005, 2010). For example, 
Windolph & Moeller (2012) argue that OBA can be defined as the exchange of cost 
information as well as ‘cost-relevant’ information such as sales forecasts and 
technical and operating data. This study takes the perspective of the latter. In other 
words, this research uses the term OBA to refer to the exchange of both financial 
and non-financial information across the supply chain.  
 
The debate around what constitutes an OBA practice includes other considerations 
such as the confidentially of the information disclosed and the frequency of the 
exchange. For example, some authors argue that for the exchange of information 
between buyers and suppliers to be considered as an OBA practice, the exchange 
must be regular and systematic (Caglio, 2017; Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011). 
In terms of confidentiality, some authors argue that the exchange of information 
can only be characterised as an OBA practice if the data disclosed is confidential, 
that is, information that would have otherwise been kept secret (Caglio, 2017; 
Caglio & Ditillo, 2012). This study takes a broad perspective of what constitutes OBA 
practices. In other words, this study refers to OBA as the exchange of information 
between buyers and suppliers across the supply chain irrespective of the type and 
confidentiality of information disclosed; the frequency of the information exchange 
(e.g. regular or occasional); the extent of disclosure (e.g. data fully or partially 
disclosed); the form in which the information disclosure took place (e.g. formal 
and/or informal disclosure); and the direction of information disclosure (e.g. one-
sided or two-sided). Given the limited research on the use of OBA in Brazil to date, 
taking a broad perspective of OBA enables this study to explore the OBA practices 
in the case study supply chain and within the Brazilian context. Moreover, given this 
study’s aim of exploring the potential of SCA to promote social upgrading, in 
addition to financial information such as accounting and costs, and non-financial 
information such as technical and procedural, this study also explores the extent to 




In terms of industry sector, previous studies on OBA practice have so far focused 
on industry sectors which are more likely to adopt new accounting methods and 
implement sophisticated cost accounting systems, such as the automotive industry 
(Windolph & Moeller, 2012; Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the information 
technology and telecommunications industry (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 
2008; Mouritsen, Hansen, & Hansen, 2001), and the mechanical engineering 
industry (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; Mouritsen, Hansen, & Hansen, 2001; Seal et al., 
1999). Furthermore, empirical studies on OBA practice so far have largely focused 
in developed countries, such as Japan (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the UK (Seal et 
al., 1999), and northern European countries such as Germany (Windolph & Moeller, 
2012; Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005), Denmark 
(Mouritsen, Hansen, & Hansen, 2001), Sweden (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), and 
Finland (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). Empirical evidence addressing the use of OBA in 
emerging economies to date is limited and, where existent, they tend to focus on 
those industries which are more likely to adopt sophisticated accounting systems, 
such the information technology services industry and mechanical engineering 
industry (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012). This research addresses this gap in the 
literature, by exploring the extent of and potential for OBA use in emerging 
economies and in less advanced industry sectors, through a case study in the 
textiles industry in Brazil. By doing so, this study also contributes to the still 
developing literature of OBA. The next sub-sections offer a review of studies on 
OBA practices to date.  
 
2.6.1 OBA implementation: achievements and impediments 
 
One of the primary objectives for firms to engage in OBA practices is its potential 
for identifying cost reduction and process improvement opportunities (Möller, 
Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Cullen & Meira, 2010; Cooper 
& Slagmulder, 2004). It has been argued that the identification of cost reduction 
opportunities requires cost transparency between buyers and suppliers (Kajuter & 
Kulmala, 2005; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Kulmala, Paranko, & Uusi-Rauva, 2002; 
Mouritsen, Hansen, & Hansen, 2001). OBA can reveal cost reduction opportunities 
that can be achieved by changing the buyers’ own processes and/or requirements 
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(Coad & Cullen, 2006; Seal et al., 1999), which can only be identified through cost 
transparency. In other words, some activities which generate cost might not 
generate value and therefore may be dispensable. For example, Coad & Cullen 
(2006) conducted a research within a UK manufacturer of school wear whereby the 
buyer identified that the supplier performed a process of folding and packing 
garments which, when delivered to the buyer’s plant, were unpacked and unfolded. 
Eliminating this process at the supplier-end resulted in cost savings for both parties 
(Coad & Cullen, 2006). In terms of process improvement, OBA reveals opportunities 
by promoting joint efforts of more than one organisation (Möller, Windolph, & 
Isbruch, 2011). For example, Cullen & Meira (2010) argue that companies in mature 
relationships open their books to each other in order to facilitate the identification 
of areas to be improved. Moreover, OBA reveals cost reduction and process 
improvement opportunities through sharing best practices across the supply chain 
(Dekker, 2003). 
 
Other objectives of OBA include its potential for enabling interorganizational 
learning (Ellström & Hoshi Larsson, 2017; Kulmala, Paranko, & Uusi-Rauva, 2002) 
and the identification of potential synergies (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005) which, in 
turn, results in cost efficiency of entire supply chains. Kajuter & Kulmala (2005) 
conducted a case study in a German car manufacturing network and found that the 
comprehensive disclosure of cost information, combined with the investigation of 
the costs drivers, resulted in the identification of cost savings opportunities for all 
partners in the network. OBA has also been put forward as a means for managing 
interdependencies in inter-firm relationships (Alenius, Lind, & Strömsten, 2015; 
Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2010). For example, Alenius, Lind, & 
Strömsten (2015) found that OBA was used to influence indirect relationships, 
arguing that OBA plays a key role in both forming and managing embedded 
relationships between buyers and supplier. 
 
Many studies argue that OBA also plays a role for building trust in inter-firm 
relationships (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; Seal et al., 1999) 
and, in turn, OBA plays a role in reducing uncertainties associated to inter-firm 
transactions (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). For example, Seal et al. (1999) showed that 
sharing costs played a key role in negotiations between buyers and suppliers, as 
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both sides understood and respected each other’s financial and commercial 
constraints. Trust is generally considered a significant factor in managing 
uncertainty in inter-firm transactions (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Vosselman & Meer-
Kooistra, 2009; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). Therefore, 
by promoting trust between buyers and suppliers, OBA also enables the reduction 
of uncertainty in inter-firm relationships.  
 
In fact, trust has been argued to be both a result of OBA practices and a factor that 
influences OBA implementation (Suomala et al., 2010; Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006; 
Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2003, 2004). In an 
empirical work exploring the potential achievements and reasons for failure of OBA 
implementation, Kajuter & Kulmala (2005) found that lack of trust was one of the 
main obstacles impeding firms from sharing data. Other reasons for failure of OBA 
implementation included scepticism about sharing accounting information and fear 
of opportunistic behaviour from their counterpart (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). 
Moreover, Kajuter & Kulmala (2005) found that OBA implementation projects failed 
in circumstances in which the buyer did not offer extra benefits to the suppliers, 
and the lack of agreement on how OBA should be implemented. Indeed, many 
studies suggest that the sharing of information is mostly one-sided, where a strong 
customer requires their suppliers to disclose information, allowing the customer to 
get involved in improving the supplier’s costs (Windolph & Moeller, 2012; Cullen & 
Meira, 2010; Lamming et al., 2005). However, studies show that suppliers will only 
share accounting information with buyers if they trust that the data will not be used 
to their disadvantage (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; Dekker, 
2004). Therefore, it could be argued that trust can be both a result of OBA practices 
and an enabler of OBA implementation. 
 
Another impediment of OBA practice is the lack of sound cost accounting systems 
and reliable cost data (Caglio, 2017; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005, 2010; Seal et al., 1999). 
For example, in a cross-case analysis in three Finnish manufacturing networks, 
Kajuter & Kulmala (2005) found that the inability of suppliers to produce accurate 
cost information combined with the lack of support from the buyer for developing 
the necessary accounting systems were among the main reasons for failure in OBA 
implementation. Caglio (2017) conducted quantitative analyses on OBA practices 
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and, using survey data from a sample of European companies, the author found a 
positive association between OBA practice and the degree of advancement of a 
firm’s cost accounting system. Caglio (2017) argues that, alongside a firm’s 
willingness to work with their partners in the long-term, a certain level of 
sophistication of the internal accounting system is prerequisite for the 
implementation of OBA practices. Arguably relatedly, it has been argued that firm 
size is another factor that influences the use of OBA (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). The 
reasoning being that large companies tend to use cost accounting systems that are 
more advanced than those of small companies, and that larger companies tend to 
be more willing to adopt new accounting techniques, given their greater ability to 
commit resources on their management accounting and control systems (Kajuter & 
Kulmala, 2005).  
 
2.6.2 Factors that shape OBA practice 
 
Agndal & Nilsson (2010) argue that OBA can be linked to the purchasing strategy 
involved in the inter-firm relationship. The authors argue that within a transactional 
purchasing strategy, where levels of asset specificity and uncertainty are low, cost 
data is primarily used to reduce purchase price, thus data disclosure is limited. 
Within a relational purchasing strategy, levels of asset specificity and uncertainty 
are usually high, and data disclosure is broadly used in order to support cost 
reduction through joint efforts (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). 
 
Cullen & Meira (2010) suggest that the extent to which firms engage in OBA 
depends on the level of supply chain maturity. The authors identified the different 
management accounting techniques used in each stage of the development of 
inter-firm relationships, namely: (1) arm's length relationships; (2) serial 
dependence; (3) reciprocal dependence and (4) mutual dependence. While the 
arm’s length stage reflects adversarial relationships between buyers and suppliers, 
where the focus tends to be on low cost, and the techniques that are often used 
are tendering and ‘one off’ supplies, during the serial dependence stage 
organisations share a limited amount of accounting information in order to improve 
information exchange and production flexibility. As the relationship develops into 
the reciprocal and mutual dependence stages, the scope for OBA increases and 
two-way information disclosure is observed. The authors argue that the 
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development of the relationship to the reciprocal dependence stage involves more 
information sharing and more collaborative initiatives, and in mutual dependence 
relationships, firms fully engage in open book accounting, aiming to achieve mutual 
benefits from cost reduction and improved quality. 
 
Kajuter & Kulmala (2005) propose three types of factors that promote the 
disclosure of cost data in networks: exogenous environmental factors, endogenous 
firm-specific factors, and network-specific factors. Exogenous environmental 
factors include economic trend and degree of competition. Network-specific 
factors include the type of network, type of product, infrastructure and social 
nature of network. Lastly, endogenous firm-specific factors include firm size, 
capability of cost accounting systems, competitive policy and long-term view. 
 
Building on the model developed by Kajuter & Kulmala (2005), Caglio (2017) 
propose a framework for identifying the antecedents of OBA which encompasses: 
environmental factors; relational factors; and technical and procedural factors. In 
the author’s framework, environmental factors include both cost-based 
competition (the intensity of the market pressure to reduce costs) and the overall 
economic trend of the markets and/or countries in which the companies operate. 
Relational factors include the firms’ long-term orientation as well as the firm’s 
propensity to collaborate, defined as its attitude towards achieving mutual benefits 
with its counterparts. Finally, technical and procedural factors include the existence 
of an advanced cost accounting system and of shared infrastructures for the OBA 
process. Caglio (2017) tested her framework by surveying a sample of European 
companies. Her empirical results found only two positive associations between the 
use of OBA in the firms surveyed and the influencing factors of OBA practice 
predicted in her model. These factors were long-term orientation (a relational 
factor) and the presence of a sophisticated management accounting systems (a 
technical and procedural factor).  
 
While some empirical studies did not find an association between the 
environmental factors and the use of OBA  (Caglio, 2017), previous studies argue 
otherwise. For example, Cooper and Slagmulder (2004) argued that when firms face 
high cost pressure the extent of OBA use is larger. Furthermore, as explained above, 
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Caglio (2017) tested her model using a sample of European companies. Therefore, 
the environmental factors predicted in Caglio’s (2017) model and in previous 
studies could be key for firms operating in different environments that have not 
been studied so far, particularly the textiles industry in Brazil which faced fierce 
competition both in terms of quality and costs. 
 
2.7 SCA for promoting social and economic upgrading 
 
Economic upgrading can be defined as the move to higher value activities (Gereffi 
& Lee, 2016; Rossi, 2013; Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, 2011). Economic upgrading 
can refer to process upgrading (e.g. the move to more efficient production 
processes); product upgrading (e.g. change in type of product); functional 
upgrading (e.g. change in the mix of activities performed by the firm); and chain 
upgrading (e.g. move to more technologically advanced chains) (Rossi, 2013). It has 
been argued that SCA promotes processes improvements, value creation and 
increased competitiveness (Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2009; Coad & Cullen, 2006; Dekker, 2003), thus SCA can promote economic 
upgrading, particularly in terms of process upgrading.  
 
Social upgrading can be defined as the process of improvements in the rights and 
entitlements of workers (Gereffi & Lee, 2016; Rossi, 2013; Barrientos, Gereffi & 
Rossi, 2011). It has been argued that economic upgrading does not necessarily lead 
to social upgrading (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011; Hale & Wills, 2007; 
Barrientos & Kritzinger, 2004). For example, Hale & Wills (2007) argue that the 
growing competition between retailers for cheap and flexible production combined 
with the development of new technology leads to a shift in power from supplier to 
buyer and in turn degrades work conditions in the subcontracted firms. Relatedly, 
some authors argue that the work conditions are likely to be better in the factory 
of preferred suppliers that are regularly audited than in subcontracted firms which 
are not closely monitored (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011; Locke et al., 2007). 
Therefore, there seems to be a potential for SCA to promote social upgrading across 
supply chains. This study contributes to this debate by exploring the potential of 




Despite the limited attention given to social issues in accounting research to date 
(Yawar & Seuring, 2017; Hopper & Bui, 2016), in a recently conducted literature 
review exploring the intersection of the literatures of Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Supply Chain Management, Yawar & Seuring (2017) found that 
the management of social issues in supply chains has been gaining importance 
among researchers. However, previous research suggest that organisations are 
generally more concerned with managing social issues in supply chains that have 
an immediate effect in their performance, ignoring issues that can have long term 
implications for the society (Yawar & Seuring, 2017). By examining the impact of 
the SCA practices used across the case study supply chain on the broader social 
context in which the organisations operate and exploring the potential of these 
practices to promote social upgrading, this study also contributes to accounting 
research that addresses social issues.  
 
Besides the moral case, managing social issues across supply chains may arguably 
play an important role in dealing with issues of uncertainty within inter-firm 
relationships. For example, where an exchange transaction involves high levels of 
human asset specificities (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010; Dekker, 2008), disclosure of information related to employment practices 
such as training and employment security may be essential to increase reliability 
across the supply chain and ensure availability of the specific skills required for 
making the products. Inter-firm transactions uncertainties may involve behavioural 
uncertainty, which is concerned with whether or not suppliers will act responsibly 
(Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). Irresponsible 
employment practices throughout the supply chain may result in suppliers or 
subcontractors shutting down and, where there are few alternative suppliers, to 
uncertainty of supply in the future. Moreover, concerns about reputation should 
arguably drive organisations to take responsibility for social practices across their 
entire supply chain. 
 
2.7.1 Developing countries 
 
Given this study’s aim of contributing to calls for accounting research as a 
mechanism for “development and developing countries” (Hopper & Bui, 2016, p. 
10), this section offers the definition of developing countries adopted in this study. 
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There is not an established convention for the designation of developing countries, 
and the classification of countries by their level of development varies according to 
indices and/or sources used. This section does not seek to provide a definite 
designation of what constitutes a developing country; but rather to situate this 
study’s position. 
 
The World Bank (WB) classifies countries by level of development into four 
categories based on their Gross National Income (GNI): high income countries, 
upper middle-income countries, lower middle-income countries and low-income 
countries (United Nations, 2018; Hopper, Lassou, & Soobaroyen, 2017). Another 
reputable country classification is the one published by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN/DESA) in their annual World 
Economic Situation and Prospects (WESP) report, whereby countries are classified 
into three broad categories based on their economic conditions: developed 
economies, economies in transition and developing economies (United Nations, 
2018). Under the WB’s countries classification, Brazil has been categorised as an 
upper middle-income country (based on GNI per capita in June 2017) (United 
Nations, 2018). On the other hand, under the WESP 2018 report (which is based on 
a set of aggregate data for a period of 15 years), Brazil has been categorised as a 
developing country. UN’s WESP report also uses the term ‘emerging economies’ to 
refer to middle-income developing countries and economies in transition which are 
integrated into global financial systems, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Therefore, although the term in not a formal definition, Brazil can also be 
referred to as an emerging economy. This study mainly uses UN’s classification of 
countries into developed economies, economies in transition and developing 
economies. Therefore, this study refers to Brazil as a developing country; and, at 
times, this study also refers to Brazil as an emerging economy. 
 
2.7.2 Social issues in supply chains 
 
Given that this study examines the potential impact of SCA on the broader social 
and economic context in which an organisation operates, this section offers a brief 
overview of the social issues that organisations may encounter across supply chains. 
It is important to note that the focus of this study is to explore the potential of SCA 
to promote social upgrading, but not to identify the social issues encountered in 
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supply chains as such. In other words, this study does not provide a comprehensive 
account of the social issues faced by organisations in the case study supply chain, 
but rather this study provides an examination of the impact of SCA on those social 
issues that emerged from the fieldwork. 
 
A specific definition of what constitutes social issues in supply chains may vary 
depending on many aspects, including the domain of research and the context in 
which firms operate. Klassen & Vereecke (2012) proposed that social issues in 
supply chains should include aspects of organisations’ operations that affect human 
safety, welfare and community development. Yawar & Seuring (2017) have recently 
conducted a comprehensive literature review exploring the intersection of the 
literatures of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Supply Chain Management 
(SCM), and the authors found that the main social issues in supply chains discussed 
in the literatures of CSR and SCM encompass: labour conditions, health and safety, 
human rights, child labour, gender, disabled and marginalised people inclusion, and 
minority development. In their work, Yawar & Seuring (2017) have also identified 
some of the ‘responsible supply chain actions’ taken by firms to managing those 
issues. Yawar & Seuring (2017, p. 637) note that despite the growing attention given 
to social issues in supply chains there is a need for further research exploring ways 
of managing social issues in supply chains by, for example, “building the capacities 
of supply chain partners through technical and financial investments taken up by 
the buying firms”. By exploring the potential of SCA to promote social upgrading, 
this study also contributes to the debate raised by Yawar & Seuring’s (2017) work 
by identifying further ‘responsible supply chain actions’ for managing social issues 
in supply chains.  
 
Labour conditions followed by health and safety were found to be the most 
commonly debated social issues in supply chains in previous literature of CSR and 
SCM (Yawar & Seuring, 2017). For labour conditions, Yawar & Seuring (2017) use a 
definition that includes employees’ wages, hours of work, the right to form unions, 
and exploitation. In relation to health and safety, Yawar & Seuring (2017) refer to 
hazardous working conditions, and physical and mental health issues that are 
directly related to safety and hygiene conditions at the workplace. The authors 
argue that the focus in these two particular social issues in supply chains may be 
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explained by the belief that ensuring labour rights and providing safe conditions 
and a healthy workplace can help firms to attract and retain skilled labour in the 
long run which, in turn, may influence firms’ reputation and economic performance 
(Yawar & Seuring, 2017). In other words, besides the moral reasons for firms to 
tackle these social issues in supply chains, there seems to be a business case for 
managing labour conditions and health and safety across a firm’s supply chain. 
Human rights were found to be the next most common social issue is supply chains 
referred to in the previous literature Yawar & Seuring (2017). However, Yawar & 
Seuring (2017, p. 631) observed that rather than using the term ‘‘human rights’’ 
most publications referred to international standards such as fair trade, ethical 
trade and the “social accountability 8000 standard” (Social Accountability 
International, 2014).   
 
Child labour was discussed in a large number of papers in Yawar & Seuring’s (2017) 
review, representing 51% of their sample. Based on the ILO definitions, the authors 
refer to child labour as “work by children under the age of 15 that prevents school 
attendance and work by children under the age of 18 that is hazardous to the 
physical or mental health of the child” (Yawar & Seuring, 2017, p. 625). The authors 
noted that there was an increase in the number of codes of conduct addressing 
child labour over the years, suggesting an increased awareness among firms. 
However, Yawar & Seuring (2017) called for further research addressing these 
issues, reasoning that there were few recent studies on the topic (Yawar & Seuring, 
2017). By exploring the impact of SCA on these issues and exploring the potential 
of SCA to promote social upgrading, this study also contributes to this call for 
research. 
 
Yawar & Seuring (2017) also identified that a large number of papers discussed 
gender issues (39% of their sample).  Based on ILO definitions, the authors define 
gender equality as “the equal treatment of women and transgender, catering to 
their special needs and assigning equal rights at the work place” (Yawar & Seuring, 
2017, p. 625). Many authors argue that women are more vulnerable to abuse in 
terms of levels of pay and insecurity of employment because female workers are 
more concentrated in informal and unskilled labour (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 
2011; Pearson, 2007; Barrientos, Dolan, & Tallontire, 2003; Newsome, 2003). In 
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addition to experiencing lower employment security and earning lower wages, 
other women’s needs are frequently neglected, such as health support, work 
conditions, safe commuting, child benefits, and subsidised schooling. Some studies 
show that women are also frequently discriminated against in terms of career 
progression, mobility and job tenure as a result of existing gender bias (Cook & 
Glass, 2014; Koskina, 2009). 
 
Two areas that are of particular relevance to developing countries are pay and 
benefits and employment security. Low pay is frequent in emerging countries, both 
in relative terms (when compared to pay in more advanced countries) and in 
absolute terms, which relates to the minimum level of income that a worker would 
need for survival or for a decent living (Lee & Sobeck, 2012). Moreover, low-paid 
work may pose challenges for a country’s social and economic development (Fontes, 
Pero, & Berg, 2012) thus it is an issue of much needed attention to emerging 
economies. Employment security is usually rare in emerging countries, arguably as 
a consequence of the high levels of informal work. Informal work is typically not 
regulated by the state or subject to established institutional norms; therefore, 
informal workers lack employment security, benefits, and standard labour 
protection (Biles, 2009; International Labour Office, 2002). Other forms of 
contingent work used by firms in search for greater flexibility in employment 
include part-time jobs, temporary agency work and fixed-term contracts (Cazes & 
Laiglesia, 2014; Kalleberg, 2000). In the same way as informal work, temporary jobs 
are characterised by less favourable conditions than formal jobs on open-ended 
contracts (Cazes & Laiglesia, 2014). Moreover, even those workers who have formal 
jobs in these countries do not necessarily experience job stability, as employment 
protection legislation and enforcement procedures may be weak in less developed 
economies (Venn, 2009). On the other hand, many authors argue that strict 
employment protection regulations have the opposite effect on job stability. 
Barriers such as excessive government regulations, high taxes on employment and 
high firing costs on permanent jobs may be an incentive for employers to use 
informal work and temporary jobs (Venn, 2009; Saracoğlu, 2008; Cahuc & Postel-




As discussed earlier in this chapter, previous studies show that the relationship 
arrangement between buyers and suppliers influences the accounting techniques 
used to manage the inter-firm relationship. The relationship arrangement between 
buyers and suppliers is also likely to influence the social issues across the supply 
chain. For example, in arm’s length relationships, where tendering and one-off 
supplies are frequently used, suppliers may be likely to use informal and/or 
temporary work with little employment security in order to reduce costs and 
achieve target costs. In more advanced stages of the supply chain maturity, firms 
may be more likely to use permanent work which offers job security and better pay 
in order to retain skills and knowledge, facilitating joint efforts across the supply 
chain that might in turn achieve cost effectiveness. Ultimately, as argued by Yawar 
& Seuring (2017), collaborative efforts between buyers and suppliers are essential 




This chapter explored previous empirical and theoretical studies on supply chain 
accounting (SCA), which is the term used in this study to refer to the domain of 
management accounting and management control in inter-organisational settings. 
Accordingly, in this thesis the term SCA encompasses all forms of controls in inter-
organisational settings, including control archetypes, management control 
mechanisms and cost and accounting controls (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). SCA involves 
the use of management accounting techniques and controls mechanisms beyond 
organisational boundaries, aimed at promoting cooperative actions between 
buyers and suppliers. Although the line that separate these techniques and/or 
mechanisms is sometimes blurred, this chapter distinguished between six SCA 
practices, and offered a review of previous literature that studied each of these 
practices, namely: inter-firm governance; make-or-buy decisions; performance 
measurement and balanced scorecard; cost management and activity-based 
costing; customer accounting; and open book accounting. As explained in previous 
chapters, in order to achieve this study’s main purpose of exploring the potential 
of SCA to promote both economic and social upgrading, this study explores the SCA 
practices used by a focal organisation in the textiles industry in Brazil and across its 
supply chain. Initially, a wider range of SCA practices were explored and, after 
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preliminary analysis of data collected, greater focus was given to the SCA practices 
that were more relevant to the case study and that offered richer empirics to 
achieve this study’s purpose and objectives. Thus, in common with previous 
exploratory case study studies (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the preliminary case 
analysis helped to identify the SCA practices to focus on in the course of the 
research. The range of SCA practices initially explored during the data collection 
was informed by the literature review offered in this chapter. After the initial data 
analysis, focused on four SCA practices: 1) inter-firm governance; 2) make-or-buy 
decisions; 3) customer accounting, and 4) open book accounting. This chapter also 
offered a definition of the terms ‘developing countries’ and emerging economies’, 
explaining how Brazil is located within both. Finally, given this study’s objective of 
exploring the influence of SCA practices on the social context in which an 
organisation operates, this chapter also offered a brief review of the literature on 





CHAPTER 3: INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THESIS 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This study’s conceptual framework draws on the concepts of institutional theory. 
In other words, institutional theory is the method theory that underpins the 
conceptual framework used as an auxiliary (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014) to enable the 
achievement of this study’s aims and contributions. Many different method 
theories have been used in management accounting research to date. Early 
management accounting research tended to use neo-classical economics theories, 
whereby researchers were more concerned with developing sophisticated decision 
models which generally remained untested in practice (Bromwich & Scapens, 2016). 
Since the 1980s, management accounting researchers have started to study 
management accounting practice, and a wide range of social and organisational 
theories have been adopted in management accounting research (Bromwich & 
Scapens, 2016). Institutional theory has become a common theoretical approach in 
studies of management accounting for several years now (Carlsson-Wall, Kraus, & 
Messner, 2016; Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012; Johansson & Siverbo, 2009; 
Coad & Cullen, 2006; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006; Hassan, 2005; Soin, Seal, 
& Cullen, 2002; Burns & Scapens, 2000). Other method theories that have been 
used in management accounting research to date include, but are not limited to, 
Transaction Cost Economics (Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), Actor Network Theory (Qu & Cooper, 2011; 
Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006; Briers, Wai, & Chua, 2001), structuration theory (Busco 
& Scapens, 2011; Moilanen, 2008; Jack, 2005) and strong structuration theory 
(Feeney & Pierce, 2016; Makrygiannakis & Jack, 2016; Moore & McPhail, 2016; Jack 
& Kholeif, 2008). This chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides a 
brief overview of some of the different theoretical approaches used in previous 
management accounting studies, leading to the justification for the choice of 
institutional theory as method theory to underpin this study’s conceptual 
framework. The second section provides a review of the use of institutional theory 
in management accounting research to date, exploring the key concepts of and 
main developments in institutional theory within management accounting research. 
The last section explains the conceptual framework developed to provide the lens 
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for this study and used as an auxiliary to enable the achievement of this study’s 
aims and contributions.  
 
3.1 Theoretical approaches in management accounting research 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has been adopted by previous studies of 
management accounting and controls in inter-organisational relationships (Dekker, 
2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). 
TCE predicts that the governance structure with the lowest transaction costs will 
be chosen to control the inter-organisational relationship (Dekker, 2004; 
Williamson, 1985, 1991). Therefore, TCE focuses on the notion transaction cost 
minimization and opportunism, ignoring many other factors that may influence the 
type of inter-organisational relationships. For example, TCE also fails to recognise 
the variety in inter-firm relationship goals (e.g. the choice of a reliable partner with 
the purpose of ensuring stability and continuity) (Dekker, 2004). Other important 
factors that shape the type of inter-firm relationships that are not taken into 
account by TCE include the social context in which the relationship occurs (Meira 
et al., 2010; Dekker, 2004); the issues of power and trust (van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000), and the interplay between firms in order to take advantage of 
their capabilities (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). Thus, TCE has been argued to be 
insufficient to explain complexities of the inter-organisational environment (Meira 
et al., 2010; Coad & Cullen, 2006; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004; 
Håkansson & Lind, 2004). Given this study’s objective of investigating the factors 
that influence the use of SCA practices in Brazil, including the intra- and inter-
organisational factors and the external environment context, TCE seemed to be of 
limited value for this study’s conceptual framework.  
 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) is a research approach that focuses on the relationship 
between human and non-human actors (Lukka & Vinnari, 2017; Modell, Vinnari, & 
Lukka, 2017; Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011; Meira et al., 2010). Although ANT has 
been applied in studies within a wide variety of fields, including management 
accounting and organisational studies, ANT has its origins in science and technology 
studies, particularly in the work of Latour (1987, 2005). Accordingly, ANT focusses 
on understanding how scientific knowledge and innovations are created (Lukka & 
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Vinnari, 2017). ANT assumes that the process of construction (such as the 
construction of knowledge and of innovations) involve both human and non-human 
actors (Lukka & Vinnari, 2017). In other words, ANT attributes agency to non-
human actors (Justesen & Mouritsen, 2011), whereby an actor is “anything that has 
an effect on another thing” (Latour, 2005, p. 71). Within management accounting 
research, ANT has largely been applied to studying management accounting change 
including the emergence and/or implementation of innovations and/or new 
processes such as activity based costing (Briers, Wai, & Chua, 2001), balanced 
scorecard (Qu & Cooper, 2011), and transfer price and inter-organisational 
arrangements (Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006). Management accounting research 
using ANT regard accounting as non-human actors that play a role in the emergence 
of, for example, new processes (Lukka & Vinnari, 2017; Modell, Vinnari, & Lukka, 
2017). For example, accounting figures, reports, and information systems may play 
a role in legitimising the implementation of a new process. ANT criticises studies 
that explain the emergence of new routines by reference to the social structures 
and pre-existing institutions (Lukka & Vinnari, 2017; Modell, Vinnari, & Lukka, 2017). 
Given this study’s objective of investigating factors that influence the use of SCA 
practices in Brazil, this study explores both the external and internal forces that 
shape actors’ behaviour, including the actors’ the pre-existing conceptions and 
both the economic and social structures in which they are embedded. Therefore, 
ANT did not seem to be a suitable approach to address the aims of this study. 
Moreover, in rejecting the pre-existing institutions, ANT does not suit the social 
constructivist ontological assumption that underpins this study, as will be explained 
in chapter 4. 
 
Structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) is concerned with the relationship between 
human actions and the structuring of social systems. For Giddens, systems 
encompass social practices which are reproduced over time through human actions 
(Burns & Scapens, 2000). In other words, structuration theory explains how the 
interplay between social structures and human agency shape society (Jack, 2017).  
Giddens’ structuration theory introduced the notion of the duality of structure and 
agency, whereby agents and structures cannot be seen as two independent 
phenomena (Englund, Gerdin, & Burns, 2011).  In other words, where one cannot 
exist without the other (Jack, 2017). Structuration theory contributed to accounting 
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research by helping to “pave the way for viewing and understanding accounting as 
an organizational and social phenomenon” (Englund, Gerdin, & Burns, 2011, p. 503), 
and it has been used by many researchers to study management accounting 
practices implementation and/or triggers of management accounting change 
(Busco & Scapens, 2011; Moilanen, 2008; Jack, 2005). However, structuration 
theory has been argued to be unsuitable for studying complex networks 
relationships (Jack, 2017; Conrad, 2014). 
 
Strong structuration theory has emerged from the work by Stones (2005), and is 
regarded as an important development (or strengthened version) of Gidden’s (1984) 
structuration theory  (Jack, 2017; Coad, Jack, & Kholeif, 2015, 2016; Harris et al., 
2016). Strong structuration theory retains the notion of duality of structure, but it 
proposes that such duality should be analysed through a quadripartite framework 
of related components, encompassing external structures, internal structures, 
agency and outcomes (Coad, Jack, & Kholeif, 2016). Stones sees his work as a basis 
for working out concepts to builds new theoretical ideas (Coad, Jack, & Kholeif, 
2016; Stones & Jack, 2016). This study’s main purpose is to explore the potential of 
SCA to promote economic upgrading whilst also promoting social upgrading, using 
the lens of a method theory as an auxiliary to achieve its objectives. Therefore, 
despite the potential of strong structuration theory for the study of management 
accounting, this study necessitated a more widely tested framework within 
management accounting qualitative research (it is important to note that this study 
was designed in 2013). At the time of the design of this study, strong structuration 
theory was arguably at an experimentation phase, in need of further research that 
used case study to build the theory (Jack & Kholeif, 2007). As explained above, this 
study offers a contribution to knowledge by contributing to the domain theory of 
SCA, rather than contributing to the development of a new theory. In fact, Jack 
(2017, p. 212) observes that strong structuration theory has so far been used mostly 
as “a framing or sensitising device, often in conjunction with other social theories”. 
Therefore, strong structuration theory did not seem to be the most suitable 
theoretical lens for this study. 
 
Finally, after looking at the different theories used in previous management 
accounting research, institutional theory was the chosen theoretical lens to 
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underpin this study. Institutional theory has become a common theoretical 
approach within management accounting research, particularly in studies of 
management accounting change (Carlsson-Wall, Kraus, & Messner, 2016; Smets, 
Morris, & Greenwood, 2012; Johansson & Siverbo, 2009; Coad & Cullen, 2006; 
Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006; Hassan, 2005; Soin, Seal, & Cullen, 2002; Burns 
& Scapens, 2000). Many researchers studying management accounting change 
using institutional theory draw on the work by Burns & Scapens (2000), whereby 
management accounting practices are assumed to be a set of rules and routines 
(institutions) within organisations. Burns & Scapens (2000) developed a framework 
to explain the process of institutionalisation of rules and routines through a four-
stage process. In fact, it has been argued that Burns & Scapens’ (2000) framework 
draws on structuration theory, by adding a time dimension to explain the process 
of institutionalisation (Scapens & Varoutsa, 2010). Although rules and routines are 
shaped by institutions, rules and routines can become institutionalised themselves 
(Burns & Scapens, 2000). Therefore, it can be argued that while management 
accounting practices are shaped by the wider institutional environment in which an 
organisation operates, management accounting practices can become part of their 
wider institutional environment. Given that this study aimed to explore how 
management accounting practices may influence social practices across supply 
chains, Burns & Scapens’ (2000) framework provided useful insights for the 
development of the conceptual framework to underpin this study. Burns & Scapens’ 
(2000) framework explains how previous institutions (e.g. embedded SCA practices) 
may influence the emergence of new institutions (e.g. new organisational practices). 
Moreover, institutional theory within management accounting research has helped 
researchers to understand how rules and routines (e.g. management accounting 
practices) become institutionalised which, in turn, may enable researchers to 
understand how rules and routines can be changed. Given that this study aimed to 
explore the role of SCA as a means of managing social issues across supply chains, 
this study challenges the traditional role of SCA (e.g. SCA as a means of managing 
inter-firm relationships in search of costs reduction and processes optimisation). 
Therefore, institutional theory in management accounting research is a suitable 
instrument to provide the lens for understanding how SCA practices have become 
institutionalised (or not) and how these institutions may influence the 
institutionalisation of new organisational practices (e.g. managing social issues). 
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Moreover, in terms of ontology, institutional theory is grounded on a social 
constructivist view of the world (Modell, Vinnari, & Lukka, 2017), which suits the 
ontological assumption that underpins this study, as will be explained in chapter 4. 
Having decided upon using institutional theory as theoretical lens for this study, the 
next section provides a more comprehensive review of the use of institutional 
theory in previous management accounting research. 
 
3.2 Institutional theory in management accounting research 
 
Although there is not one single definition of what constitutes institutions, 
institutions can be generally defined as the deeply ingrained social structures that 
shape behaviour within a particular social context (Hiebl, 2017). In other words, 
institutions are the “taken-for-granted assumptions about the way of doing things” 
(Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 11) which shape the rules and routines within a 
particular social context. Institutional theory has become a common theoretical 
approach for studying management accounting, whereby management accounting 
practices are assumed to be a set of rules and routines within an organisational 
context (Burns & Scapens, 2000). Different strands of institutional theory have been 
used in management accounting research throughout the past decades. Early 
institutional research tended to revolve around three different strands of the 
theory: old institutional economics (ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014; Siti-Nabiha & 
Scapens, 2005; Burns & Scapens, 2000), new institutional economics and new 
institutional sociology (Ball & Craig, 2010; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006). 
Although they all deal with institutions, there are some significant differences in 
some of their main underlying assumptions.  Old institutional theory assumes that 
social behaviour is shaped by existing institutions, thereby assuming that individual 
actors play a central role in the development of and changes in institutions (Hiebl, 
2017). In contrast, new (or neo-) institutional theory assumes that social behaviour 
is shaped by external social structures and that individual actors adapt to 
institutions (Hiebl, 2017). Despite the variations in some of their underlying 
assumptions, it is noticeable that many aspects of the different strands of 
institutional theory have begun to merge in recent years (Scapens & Varoutsa, 
2010). This section explores the different strands of institutional theory used in 
previous research in management accounting. The main underlying assumptions of 
each strand of (early) institutional theory as well as the contemporary 
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developments of institutional theory are explored. Throughout the section, the 
concepts that underpin this study’s conceptual framework are indicated. The 
conceptual framework proposed is then explained in the next section.  
 
3.2.1 Old institutional economics (OIE) 
 
Many researchers studying management accounting practices through the lens of 
old institutional economics have drawn on the work by Burns & Scapens (2000) (e.g. 
ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014; Coad & Cullen, 2006; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005). 
Building on old institutional economics (OIE), Burns & Scapens (2000) developed a 
framework that explains the process of institutionalisation of rules and routines 
within organisations. Management accounting practices are assumed to be a set of 
routines within an organisational context (Burns & Scapens, 2000), therefore the 
framework developed by Burns & Scapens (2000) provided meaningful insights to 
studying how management accounting practices are implemented and developed, 
and it has become a common choice of theoretical approach to the study of 
management accounting change (Ma & Tayles, 2009). 
 
The framework developed by Burns & Scapens’ (2000) explains the 
institutionalisation of rules and routines through a process that entails four stages: 
encoding, enacting, reproduction and institutionalisation. The first stage represents 
the encoding of institutions into rules and routines. The second stage, the process 
of enactment, represents the actors operating according to these rules and routines. 
The third process shows that repetition of action leads to changes in the rules and 
routines. Finally, the last process shows that changes in the rules and routines may 
lead to changes in institutions or, in other words, to the institutionalisation of rules 
and routines (Burns & Scapens, 2000). Therefore, management accounting 
practices are regarded as a set of rules and routines (codes) that can become 
institutionalised (regarded as the normal way of doing things) through the 
implementation and execution (enacting and reproduction) of these rules over time. 
 
Burns & Scapens (2000) used their framework to analyse two case studies involving 
organisational change. In the first case, the authors studied the implementation of 
a new management accounting practice in an organisation. The authors observed 
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that the managers of various areas of the company viewed accounting as the main 
focus of their activity (i.e. accounting was institutionalised in the organisation), 
leading to a fairly smooth implementation of the new routine. In the second case 
study, the authors studied the implementation of a project in the engineering 
division aimed at improving accounting information. However, the engineering 
managers did not have an accounting-based view of the business (i.e. accounting 
was not institutionalised), and the project was not successful. It can be argued that 
this example showed that there was a limitation in Burns & Scapens’ (2000) original 
framework to explain the process of institutionalisation, given that there are many 
other factors that influence the institutionalisation of rules and routines in 
organisations in addition to the previous institutions.  
 
Some of the other factors that influence the institutionalisation of rules and 
routines which were not taken into account in Burns & Scapens’ (2000) framework 
are the external environment factors. Soin, Seal and Cullen (2002) have drawn 
attention to the limitation of Burns & Scapens’ (2000) framework due to its lack of 
consideration of the wider institutional context in which the organisation operates. 
Soin, Seal and Cullen (2002) studied the implementation of a new cost management 
system in a UK based multinational bank using the framework, and they identified 
the need to consider the wider institutional dimensions in order to understand the 
institutionalisation of organisational practices. Many other researchers have noted 
the limitations of OIE for giving little attention to environmental pressures and 
focusing primarily on the micro level (Yazdifar et al., 2008; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & 
González, 2006; Scapens, 2006; Ribeiro & Scapens, 2006; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 
2005; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004; Soin, Seal, & Cullen, 2002). For example, 
Tsamenyi, Cullen and González (2006) argue that, due to its lack of consideration of 
exogenous factors, OIE is not appropriate for analysing organisations which face 
uncertainties and that compete for market position as well as political and 
institutional legitimacy. Some authors have sought to address this limitation of OIE 
by developing frameworks to explain institutionalisation of rules and routines that 
built on OIE though adding the element of external influences (see, for example, 




Tsamenyi, Cullen and González (2006) argue that researchers using OIE tend to 
ignore not only the external factors that influence organisational change, but also 
the other internal influences besides the existing institutions. Other internal factors 
that can influence the institutionalisation of rules and routines in organisations 
include power and politics (Coad & Cullen, 2006; Burns, 2000), trust (Scapens, 2006), 
and organisational culture (Busco & Scapens, 2011). Scapens (2006) further 
developed the Burns & Scapens’ (2000) framework so that the new framework 
included the interplay of external and internal pressures; the role of agency; and 
the issues of power and trust. Later, Hopper and Major (2007) suggest that power 
and trust are only two of many other factors that shape the intra-organisational 
dynamics.  
 
Another important concept introduced by Burns & Scapens (2000) and which was 
subsequently taken forward by other researchers is the notion of ceremonial versus 
instrumental institutionalisation. Burns & Scapens (2000) argued that management 
accounting practices can become institutionalised ceremonially or instrumentally. 
Management accounting practices are said to be ceremonially institutionalised 
when they are adopted as rituals used to maintain the “status quo” rather than to 
influence decision making (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005, p.47), and which have no 
impact on the way of thinking within the organisation (Scapens, 2006). In contrast, 
management accounting practices can be said to be instrumentally institutionalised 
when they effectively influence decision making and the ways of thinking within an 
organisation. On the other hand, Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005) argue that 
ceremonial institutionalisation of routines can facilitate instrumental 
institutionalisation of these routines. For example, in their empirical study Siti-
Nabiha and Scapens (2005) observed that although organisation had implemented 
new accounting practices imposed by their parent company in a ceremonial way, 
this implementation enabled instrumental changes later. 
 
The notion of ceremonial institutionalisation can arguably be particularly relevant 
for developing countries, and therefore to this study. For example, affiliates of 
multinationals operating in developing countries may adopt practices imposed by 
the headquarters, but the adoption may be only in ceremonial way (Kostova & Roth, 
2002). Arguably, local firms in developing countries may imitate practices of 
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multinational firms operating in the same country in search for legitimacy (e.g. to 
appear professional), but the adoption of such practices may be only ceremonial, 
with no impact on the way of thinking within the organisation (Scapens, 2006). 
 
3.2.2 New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
 
Another strand of institutional theory is New Institutional Economics (NIE). This 
strand of institutional theory builds on the concepts of neoclassical economics. 
Scapens and Varoutsa (2010) argue that NIE is an adaptation which brings 
institutions to neoclassical economics. NIE defines institutions as rules and norms 
of behaviour which determine the kind of activities that will come into existence 
(Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006). In other words, while OIE assumes that institutions 
are the “taken-for-granted” assumptions of the way of doing things, NIE assumes 
that institutions are the external rules that shape behaviour (Scapens & Varoutsa, 
2010). NIE researchers argue that institutions come into existence as a result of 
rational and optimising behaviour (Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006; Lindenberg, 1998). 
In other words, NIE assumes that individuals are always rational, ignoring the 
influence of their wider institutional and social setting. Therefore, while OIE 
assumes that institutions are shaped by existing embedded institutions, NIE 
researchers assume that institutions only exist where their benefits exceed their 
costs (Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006). 
  
Many authors have criticised NIE’s assumption of rationality (Burns & Scapens, 
2000; Rutherford, 1994; Scapens, 1994). For example, Rutherford (1994) argues 
that individuals do not always behave perfectly and that they rarely have access to 
all information, thus their understanding about reality is not always sufficiently 
accurate in order to enable them to make optimising decisions. Taking into 
consideration this study’s objective to examine the factors that shaped the SCA 
rules and routines in the case study organisation and across its supply chain, NIE 
will not be drawn on heavily in this study due to its apparent limitations in focusing 





3.2.3 New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
 
A further strand of institutional theory is New Institutional Sociology (NIS). In 
contrast to early OIE, NIS assumes that organisational practices are shaped by their 
external environment (Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006). NIS recognises that, in order to 
survive, organisations need to interact with their wider external environment in 
ways that are perceived as acceptable in that environment (Dillard, Rigsby, & 
Goodman, 2004). Thus, according to NIS organisations seek to conform to external 
pressures in order to achieve legitimacy and access to resources (Ball & Craig, 2010; 
Scapens & Varoutsa, 2010). Many authors have used NIS to explain the process of 
institutionalisation of rules and routines within organisations. In other words, NIS 
has been used to explain how organisational practices are shaped by their external 
environment (Kostova & Roth, 2002). 
 
In contrast to NIE, NIS assumes that individuals within organisations do not always 
make rational decisions environment (Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006). On the contrary, 
NIS assumes that individuals within organisations respond to social pressures by 
unconsciously behaving in ways that are “normal”, in order to ‘‘fit in’’ and appear 
‘‘appropriate’’ (Bebbington, Higgins, & Frame, 2009, p. 592). Moreover, NIS 
researchers argue that the management control systems within an organisation are 
mainly driven by institutional factors rather than efficiency motives (Dambrin, 
Lambert, & Sponem, 2007; Granlund, 2001). Therefore, NIS assumes that firms 
operating in similar organisational fields adopt similar behaviours, including 
internal structures and procedures.  
 
This phenomenon can be explained by the process of isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) outlined three processes of 
isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative. Simply defined, coercive 
isomorphism is the process by which an organisation adopts certain procedures 
resulting from the pressures of external forces, such as government regulations, 
supplier or customer impositions (Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006), credit markets 
(Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006), and head office markets (Tsamenyi, Cullen, 
& González, 2006). Mimetic isomorphism occurs when an organisation imitates the 
systems in use by other organisations perceived to be more successful (Brandau et 
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al., 2013; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006; Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Normative isomorphism relates to the adoption of 
internal structure and procedures encouraged by influential actors, such as 
consultants and professional bodies (Brandau et al., 2013; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & 
González, 2006; Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
Although DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and early NIS research focused on the 
process of isomorphism within an organisational field, some authors pointed out 
that a firm’s external environment may comprise other elements (Kostova & Roth, 
2002; Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000). For example, Kostova and Roth (2002) 
showed that multinational corporations operating in different countries need to 
conform with the environment within each country where they operate. 
Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000) suggest that institutional research should go 
beyond the narrow view of the field, and look at the social and cognitive means 
underlying rules and routines. Looking at the broader institutional environment 
enables the analysis to detect organisational practices that are industry wide, 
national or international (Ball and Craig, 2010). This study explores the influence of 
the external environment in the SCA practices used by a focal organisation in the 
textiles industry in Brazil and across its supply chain and, in doing so, this study 
considers the external environment as comprising both the organisational field 
(industry) and the national (and under researched) context of Brazil.  
 
Many authors have criticised NIS for its dominant focus on the macro level of the 
institutional environment, ignoring the influence of intra-organisational aspects 
and of individual actors on the institutionalisation of rules and routines within an 
organisation (Hopper & Major, 2007; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006; Moll, 
Burns, & Major, 2006; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005; Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000). 
It has been argued that NIS is not capable of explaining accounting change due to 
the lack of consideration of internal institutions (Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 
2006; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005). For example, Tsamenyi, Cullen & González 
(2006) suggest that NIS fails to capture the intra-organisational power relation 
dynamics of change. Other previous criticisms of NIS include lack of appreciation 
that market and legitimacy pressures are intertwined and that economic pressures 




The gap between the macro and micro influences in NIS research has been 
addressed by many authors (ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014; Ma & Tayles, 2009; Yazdifar 
et al., 2008; Hopper & Major, 2007; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006; Burns & 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004; Modell, 2003). For example, 
Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman (2004) developed a framework for explaining the 
institutionalisation of organisational practices which recognises the influence of 
both the external factors (organisational field level) and the human agents 
(organisational level). Building on the framework developed by Dillard, Rigsby and 
Goodman (2004), Hopper and Major (2007) proposed a model that expanded NIS 
and its “treatment of the public interest, boundary spanners, intra-organizational 
factors and how technologies like ABC acquire characteristics through translation 
and praxis” (Hopper and Major, 2007, p.61). Tsamenyi, Cullen and González (2006) 
developed a framework to analyse the changes in the accounting system of a 
Spanish electricity company following the deregulation of the sector. The 
framework developed by Tsamenyi, Cullen and González (2006) combines core 
elements of NIS (institutional/regulatory forces and market pressures) with intra-




This section explored the use of institutional theory in management accounting 
research. The section provided a review of the main strands of institutional theory 
used in accounting research to date including OIE, NIE and NIS. The main underlying 
assumptions of each of these strands of theory are summarised in Table 3.1. The 
section has shown that, although there are variations in some of their main 
assumptions, accounting research using these different strands of institutional 
theory have begun to merge in recent years. For example, OIE researchers drawing 
on the work by Burns & Scapens (2000) noted that the authors’ original framework 
designed to explain the institutionalisation of rules and routines lacked 
consideration of the external pressures. In response to this limitation, many 
researchers have adapted Burns & Scapens’ (2000) work by incorporating external 
factors in their conceptual framework (ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014; Yazdifar et al., 
2008; Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005; Modell, 2003; 
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Collier, 2001). Therefore, these developments combine concepts of both OIE and 
NIS to explain institutionalisation of rules and routines within organisations. 
Similarly, NIS researchers have acknowledged the limitation of NIS’s focus on the 
macro level, and have incorporated intra-organisational factors in their framework 
to explain institutionalisation of rules and routines (Ma & Tayles, 2009; Hopper & 
Major, 2007; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 
2004). 
 
After examining each of these strands of institutional theory and their later 
developments, it seemed necessary to combine concepts from both OIE and NIS in 
order to enable this study’s aim of understanding all the external and internal 
factors that shaped the rules and routines in the case study focal organisation and 
across its supply chain. Therefore, the conceptual framework designed to underpin 
this research uses concepts from both OIE and NIS. In a way, this study selectively 
applies notions from different strands of institutional theory. Although some 
authors have criticised the use of selected concepts from different theories (Lowe, 
De Loo, & Nama, 2016), other authors have supported such approach (Lukka & 
Vinnari, 2016). For example, Lowe, De Loo and Nama (2016) argue that the work by 
Chua (1995) cannot be labelled an ANT study because she renounced ANT’s notions 
of non-human agency. Lukka and Vinnari (2016) argued instead that Chua’s (1995) 
work should be labelled as an ANT study even though it may be a partial application 
of ANT, given that the study still features many other key elements from the theory. 
Moreover, Lukka and Vinnari (2016, p.320) highlight that “the academic community 
has not reached a definitive conclusion regarding whether or not one should 
remain completely faithful to a method theory’s original formulation only” (Lukka 
and Vinnari, 2016, p.320).  
 
This study conceptual framework draws on the OIE framework by Burns & Scapens 
(2000) and on its later developments, particularly on studies that developed hybrid 
frameworks which combined OIE and NIS (ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014; Ma & Tayles, 
2009; Yazdifar et al., 2008; Hopper & Major, 2007; Scapens, 2006; Burns & 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005; Modell, 2003; Collier, 2001). 
Building on these later developments allowed this study to explore all the core 
elements that shape (or have shaped) the rules and routines in the case study 
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organisation and across its supply chain, including the external environment factors 
such as the external pressures and the inter- and intra-organisational factors such 
as the previous individuals’ and organisations’ institutions (taken-for-granted ways 
of doing things). This study considers NIS’s process of isomorphism for 
understanding how the external institutions are institutionalised within the 
organisational practices. Drawing on OIE (Burns & Scapens, 2000), this study 
distinguishes between ceremonial and instrumental institutionalisation of routines. 
The next section presents this study’s conceptual framework and explains the 
concepts that underpin the framework. 
  








Institutions are a way of 
thought or action of 
some prevalence and 
permanence, which is 
embedded in the habits 
of a group or the 
customs of a people 
(Moll, Burns, & Major, 
2006, p. 184) 
Institutions are 
composed of rules and 
norms of behaviour, and 
provide the opportunity 
set in an economy which 
determines the kind of 
activity embodied in 
organisations that will 
come into existence 
(Moll, Burns, & Major, 
2006, p. 186) 




activities that provide 
stability and meaning 
to social behaviour 
(Moll, Burns, & Major, 
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3.3 Thesis conceptual framework 
 
This study’s conceptual framework draws on institutional theory, using concepts of 
both OIE and NIS. This study adopts the definition of institutions as the “taken-for-
granted assumptions about the way of doing things” and which shape the 
organisational rules and routines (Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 11). Consistently, this 
study adopts Burns & Scapens’ (2000) view that management accounting practices 
(and therefore SCA practices) are a set of rules as routines within organisations, 
which can become institutionalised through their implementation and execution 
over time. In relation to OIE, this study draws on the work by Burns & Scapens (2000) 
and on its later developments (ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014; Hopper & Major, 2007; 
Coad & Cullen, 2006; Scapens, 2006; Burns, 2000). In their original work, Burns & 
Scapens (2000) developed a framework to explain the process of 
institutionalisation of rules and routines within organisations. Burns & Scapens’ 
(2000) framework provide valuable concepts to the study of the institutionalisation 
of rules and routines within organisations. However, a significant limitation of Burns 
& Scapens’ (2000) original framework is the lack of acknowledgement of the many 
other factors that influence the institutionalisation of rules and routines within 
organisations, such as the external factors (the wider institutional context) (ter Bogt 
& Scapens, 2014; Ma & Tayles, 2009; Yazdifar et al., 2008; Hopper & Major, 2007; 
Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006; Scapens, 2006; Ribeiro & Scapens, 2006; Siti-
Nabiha & Scapens, 2005; Dillard, Rigsby, & Goodman, 2004). In order to overcome 
this limitation, and similarly to previous studies (ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014; Ma & 
Tayles, 2009; Hopper & Major, 2007; Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005), this study draws 
on the concepts of both OIE and NIS. In relation to NIS, this study draws on the 
concepts of early NIS research (Collier, 2001; Brignall & Modell, 2000; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Drawing on both old and new institutional (sociology) theory allowed 
this study to explore all the core elements that shape (or have shaped) the rules 
and routines in the case study organisation. The core elements that influence the 
institutionalisation of rules and routines include the external environment, the 
inter- and intra-organisational dynamics, such as the previous institutions, power, 
trust, politics, and organisational culture (e.g. Hopper & Major, 2007). Each of these 
elements will be conceptualised below, with reference to previous studies and to 




The conceptual framework that underpins this study is shown in Figure 3.1. The 
three boxes to the leftmost in Figure 3.1 show the factors that influence the 
institutionalisation of SCA practices. These factors have been divided into three 
main groups: internal factors (including previous institutions and the intra-
organisational dynamics), inter-organisational factors (inter-firm relationships 
dynamics), and external factors (external environment). Each of these groups are 
depicted in a different box in Figure 3.1. The central box in Figure 3.1 shows the 
SCA practices. In other words, the rules and routines in terms of SCA. The arrows 
that link the boxes to the leftmost (institutional factors) to the central box (rules 
and routines) show that those institutional factors shape these rules and routines. 
Management accounting practices both shape and are shaped by other institutions 
(e.g. Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005).  This study explores the influence of SCA on both 
social and economic context. The institutions within the social and economic 
environment in which an organisation operates and which are likely to be 
influenced by an organisation’s SCA practices are depicted in Figure 3.1 in the two 
boxes to the rightmost. The arrows that link the central box (SCA rules and routines) 
to the rightmost boxes (social and economic institutions) show that the SCA shape 
the social and economic institutional environment. 
 
Although the framework seems to portrait the SCA practices as a linear process, 
starting from the factors that shaped the SCA practices in the case study leading to 
the characteristics of these practices and then to the effects of these practices 
(represented by the arrows pointing towards right in Figure 3.1) it is important to 
note that the institutionalisation of rules and routines is not a linear but rather a 
complex process. While rules and routines are influenced by institutional factors, 
rules and routines can become institutionalised themselves (Burns & Scapens, 
2000). For example, Burns & Scapens (2000) argued that management accounting 
practices can become institutionalised through their encoding, enacting and 
reproduction over time. In other words, management accounting practices are 
regarded as a set of rules and routines that can become institutionalised through 
their implementation and execution over time. This study argues that an 
organisation’s SCA practices can influence rules and routines beyond the 
organisational boundaries. Therefore, the rules and routines that have been shaped 
by an organisation’s SCA practices can also become institutionalised over time. For 
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example, SCA practices can influence social practices of other firms across its supply 
chain, and these social practices can become institutionalised over time. This notion 
is represented in the conceptual framework by the arrows pointing towards left in 
Figure 3.1. In other words, these arrows show that the effects of the SCA practices 
can become institutionalised rules and routines and, once these rules and routines 
become institutionalised, they become part of the institutional environment in 
































































































































































































































CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
As explained in previous chapters, the main purpose of this study is to explore the 
potential of SCA to promote both economic and social upgrading and, in pursuit of 
this aim, this study conducts a case study examining the SCA practices used within 
a focal organisation in the textiles industry in Brazil and across its supply chain. This 
chapter starts with a brief account of my personal journey towards the design of 
this study, and then moves on to explain the research methodology applied for 
achieving this study’s objectives. 
 
4.1. A personal journey towards the research design 
 
This study is part of a wider ESRC funded project that investigates ‘supply chain 
accounting and employment practices in the rising economies: global commodity 
chains, cost effectiveness and competitiveness’. Therefore, the broad focus of this 
study on SCA practices in an emerging economy had been defined upon by the 
scope of the ESRC project of which this study forms part. However, the specific 
objectives of this study were defined based on my own interests and background.  
 
I came onboard this project as one of the two PhD students selected to be part of 
the project team. The multidisciplinary, international and co-productive ESRC 
project was designed to focus on SCA and employment practices in emerging 
economies, and the countries to be studied had already been defined to be Brazil 
and South Africa. As a Brazilian with background in accounting, this project caught 
my attention immediately. At the time of the PhD scholarship selection, I had 
recently completed my MBA studies from the University of Sheffield, and had 
subsequently returned to work for the organisation I worked before which had 
given me a study leave to pursue my MBA studies. During my MBA studies, I learned 
to develop a more critical thinking towards the role of accounting in society. I 
realised that for as long as I was working as an accountant in Brazil, I was feeding 
the very system that I now questioned. As a Brazilian brought up and educated in 
Brazil, I have always heard that Brazil was the country of future. However, the 
future seemed to never arrive for Brazil. I wanted to make a contribution to the 




Once I came onboard the project, I first familiarised myself with the ESRC project 
overall purpose. Subsequently, I carried out my own independent review of the 
literature on SCA, employment practices and institutional theory. This helped me 
to narrow down the areas that I wished to focus upon, and develop my overall aim 
and objectives. Subsequently, a specific approach to data collection for this study 
was defined, including the design of a specific case study, the choice of the focal 
organisation and the development of specific interview questions. Moreover, the 
specific approach to data analysis and the conceptual framework used as an 
auxiliary to achieve the objectives of this study were developed based on my own 
philosophical assumptions.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section provides an 
account of the research philosophy, accounting for both the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions underpinning this study’s philosophical position. The 
second section explains the research approach designed for achieving this study’s 
objectives and describes the research methods used for conducting this study. 
Subsequently, considerations to the issues of positionality are discussed. The fourth 
section explains the research strategy in relation to language decisions and the 
translation process. Finally, this study’s ethical considerations are discussed. 
 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
 
Designing a methodological approach inevitably involves considerations to our 
philosophical assumptions (Duberley, Johnson, & Cassell, 2012). Our philosophical 
assumptions shape our approach to data collection, data analysis and findings 
write-up (Duberley, Johnson, & Cassell, 2012), and, therefore, these assumptions 
are particularly relevant for qualitative research (Duberley, Johnson, & Cassell, 
2012; Johnson et al., 2006). The research philosophy can be described through 
explaining a researcher’s ontological and epistemological assumptions. Broadly 
defined, ontology refers to the assumptions regarding the nature of reality, while 
epistemology refers to the nature of scientific knowledge and how such knowledge 
can be justified (Modell, Vinnari, & Lukka, 2017). The next sub-sections explain my 




4.2.1 Ontological Assumptions 
  
Ontological assumptions deal with the nature of the existence of a certain 
phenomenon. In other words, ontology examines whether a phenomenon exists 
independent of our knowing and perceiving it (Duberley, Johnson, & Cassell, 2012). 
Ontological views of social reality can be characterised as either realist or social 
constructivist (Duberley, Johnson, & Cassell, 2012). A realist (or objectivist) view of 
the world assumes that a phenomenon exists independent of our knowing and 
perceiving it, and that it is out there waiting for our discovering it (Duberley, 
Johnson, & Cassell, 2012). A social constructivist (or subjectivist) view of the world 
assumes that social reality is a construction of our consciousness and cognition, and 
that what we assume to be out there has no existence separate from our knowing 
it (Duberley, Johnson, & Cassell, 2012). Nevertheless, as acknowledged by Duberley, 
Johnson, & Cassell (2012), the line between these approaches may sometimes be 
blurred. The authors propose that, rather than trying to fit their ontological position 
into one of these categories, researchers should be concerned with ensuring self-
reflexivity and an awareness of the various ways in which their philosophical 
assumptions have influenced their research (Duberley, Johnson, & Cassell, 2012). 
 
The ontological position of this study can be better explained by the notion of 
differentiated realities proposed by Llewellyn (2007). Challenging the idea of a 
single social reality (as either objective or subjective), Llewellyn (2007) proposes 
that reality can be differentiated into five realms: physical, structural, agential, 
cultural and mental. She argues that each of these differentiated realities have 
different “modes of existence” (Llewellyn, 2007, p.59). Simply defined, the physical 
world is the realm that humans inhabit, and its existence is objective (Llewellyn, 
2007). The structural world is the realm that governs human action, which 
encompasses institutions, roles and rules reproduced by people. Although its 
existence depends upon human activity, overtime it becomes a reality experienced 
by humans which can also enable or constrain human activity (Llewellyn, 2007). For 
this reason, Llewellyn (2007) argues that the structural world is not objective but 
objectified. The agential world is the realm of human action. It encompasses both 
subjectivity and objectivity or, as defined by Llewellyn (2007), it is subjective-
objective. The cultural world is the realm of knowledge, concepts, values, beliefs, 
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ideologies, signification and symbolism (Llewellyn, 2007). The cultural world can be 
described as socially constructed or, as proposed by Llewellyn (2007), inter-
subjective. Finally, the mental world is the realm of perception, thought, feelings, 
desires, emotions and pre-dispositions (Llewellyn, 2007). It is internal to the human 
mind, and its existence is subjective. Social reality can be differentiated into 
structural, agential and cultural realities; therefore, these realities tend to be the 
primary focus in social sciences research (Llewellyn, 2007). 
 
This study crosses the boundaries between these differentiated worlds (or realities). 
In other words, this study investigates different aspects of differentiated realities. 
For example, this study explores the internal, external and inter-organisational 
factors (institutions) that impacted upon the SCA practices in the focal organisation 
and across its supply chain. These institutions cannot be simply characterised as 
either objective or subjective realities. Instead, these institutions encompass 
differentiated realities with different modes of existence. For example, while the 
external factors that shaped the SCA practices in the case study enter into the 
structural world, the internal factors enter into both the agential (e.g. accounting 
and cost systems), and cultural (e.g. role of accountants) worlds. Therefore, the 
findings of this study have both objective and subjective aspects. 
 
One of the external factors that impacted the practices in the case study supply 
chain was a government incentive for local content. The structural world exists 
independently of particular individuals’ intentions and motivations; however, the 
structural world is not self-subsistent; its existence depends upon human activity 
(Llewellyn, 2007). This incentive existed independently of the individuals within the 
focal organisation and its suppliers knowing it. However, it did not exist 
independently of human action. It was a project (action) undertaken by individuals 
working for government, and it continued to exist because individuals within 
organisations reproduced it though practices. Another external factor that shaped 
the practices in the case study supply chain was the “Brazil cost” (e.g. bureaucratic 
importing process). The importing process in Brazil was bureaucratic even if the 
individuals within the focal organisation and its suppliers did not know it or perceive 
it as bureaucratic. In other words, the individuals within the case study 
organisations would have faced difficulties in importing materials independently of 
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their perceiving it as a bureaucratic process. On the other hand, the existence of 
bureaucracy in the importing process depends on human action. It is a result of the 
actions of individuals working for government, and it continues to exist because it 
is reproduced through organisational practices. The bureaucratic importing process 
is an unintended consequence of importing materials. 
 
4.2.2 Epistemological Assumptions 
 
Epistemological assumptions deal with our knowledge about knowledge (Duberley, 
Johnson, & Cassell, 2012). That is, epistemology examines whether we are able to 
know what constitutes (scientific) knowledge (Duberley, Johnson, & Cassell, 2012). 
In other words, epistemological assumptions deal with the question of what is or 
should be regarded as acceptable knowledge (Bryman & Bell, 2003). A particular 
epistemological issue is whether social sciences can and should be studied 
according to the same principles as the natural sciences. Epistemology approaches 
can be differentiated between positivist and interpretivist (Bryman & Bell, 2003). 
 
This study assumes an interpretivist approach, which is based upon the view that 
there is a fundamental difference between the subject matter of the natural 
sciences and of the social sciences and that social sciences researchers should use 
different methods in order to understand the meaning of the social reality. While 
the positivist approach assumes that it is possible to objectively observe and 
describe social reality (Duberley, Johnson, & Cassell, 2012), the interpretivist 
approach assumes that the researcher should seek to understand the perspectives 
of those being researched, acknowledging that there can be multiple realities, and 
also that the researcher has their own subjective assumptions that need to be taken 
into account and reflected upon. 
 
4.3 Research strategy and methods 
 
This research uses a case study as research strategy, which is arguably the most 
appropriate method (or strategy) to my interpretivist approach as outlined above. 
Case studies offer the possibility of understanding management accounting 
practice in its organisational context, both in terms of what practices are used and 
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how they are used (Scapens, 1990). Thus, a case study is arguably the most 
appropriate method (or strategy) to achieve this study’s objectives, enabling in-
depth insights into organisations’ rules and routines, and the institutions that 
shaped those rules and routines. The next sub-sections explain the approach and 
methods used in conducting this case study. 
 
4.3.1 Case study approach 
 
Case studies are regarded as representing the interpretive approach to 
management accounting research (Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka, & Kuorikoski, 2008). 
Although the inherent aim of interpretive research is to produce descriptions and 
understandings of meanings that people assign to various phenomena, these 
descriptions and understandings of meanings can also be used for producing 
explanations (Lukka & Modell, 2010; Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka, & Kuorikoski, 2008).  
 
A means of developing explanations in case study research is the use of abductive 
reasoning (Lukka & Modell, 2010). An abductive reasoning approach combines both 
inductive and deductive reasoning (Lee & Saunders, 2017). Deductive reasoning 
involves identifying propositions (from previous literature) and then undertaking a 
case study to establish whether there is evidence to support those propositions 
(Lee & Saunders, 2017). In other words, deductive studies use empirical data to test 
hypotheses derived from existing theories (Lukka & Modell, 2010). Inductive 
reasoning involves undertaking a case study and then interpreting the findings and 
fitting the case study into an explanation or theory (Lee & Saunders, 2017). In other 
words, inductive studies produce new theoretical insights using empirical data 
(Lukka & Modell, 2010). By combining both inductive and deductive logic, abductive 
reasoning involves “moving back and forth between theory and data” in order to 
choose or develop the most suitable theory or explanation for a piece of evidence 
(Lee & Saunders, 2017, p. 107). In other words, abductive reasoning involves the 
development of “theoretically informed explanations to new empirical 
observations” (Lukka & Modell, 2010, p. 467). 
 
The type of logic used in this case study can be better expressed as the employment 
of abductive reasoning. This study inductively identifies the SCA practices used in a 
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particular case study and seeks to explain the reasons for these practices. 
Simultaneously, this study (deductively) uses institutional theory as a framework to 
investigate the factors that shaped the SCA practices used across the case study 
supply chain. In other words, this study abductively develops explanations for the 
SCA practices observed across the case study supply chain informed by institutional 
theory. 
 
4.3.2 Defining the type of contribution of the study 
 
The discussion around the potential of case study research for producing 
explanations above highlights the importance of considering the type of 
contribution to knowledge enabled by case study research. One of the ways in 
which case study research can contribute to knowledge is that of theorising through 
particularization. While generalization involves the development of a general 
statement or proposition by inference from observing a particular phenomenon, 
particularization involves obtaining a deep understanding of a particular case and 
developing explanations that capture the unique characteristics of the case (Lee & 
Saunders, 2017). In other words, particularization involves explaining why some of 
the characteristics of a case are the way they are in the specific context presented 
(Lee & Saunders, 2017).   
 
This thesis contributes to knowledge by theorizing about the case through 
particularization. Using a particular case study in the textiles industry in Brazil, this 
research obtained an in-depth understanding of the case and developed 
explanations of why some of the characteristics that comprised the case were how 
they were. For example, this study described the SCA practices used by the focal 
organisation and across its supply and explained the factors that shaped those 
practices in the context of the textiles industry in Brazil. This is an important 
contribution to knowledge given the limited research of management accounting 






4.3.3 Selection of the case study 
 
This study is based on an in-depth case study undertaken in a supply chain in the 
textiles industry in Brazil. It had already been decided by the broader ESRC project 
that the focus of my PhD research would be on the textiles industry in Brazil. The 
textiles industry is particularly relevant for studying employment practices and 
social issues. According to Hale and Wills (2007, p. 455), this sector provides “the 
largest amount of manufacturing employment for women globally and is one of the 
most widely dispersed industries throughout the world”. In Brazil, the textiles 
industry is an important segment, both in terms of production value and of 
employment generation (ABIT, 2015, 2016). Therefore, the Brazilian textiles 
industry provides a relevant context in which to explore the potential of supply 
chain accounting to promote both economic and social upgrading. 
 
The selection of the focal organisation for my PhD case study was based on a range 
of different criteria. Therefore, the case study selection can be associated with a 
criterion selection approach (Lee & Saunders, 2017). One of the criteria for the 
selection of my PhD case study was the location of the focal organisation within 
Brazil. Firstly, consideration was given to the distribution of the textiles industry in 
Brazil by region. I decided to search for a focal organisation that operated in one of 
the regions with the largest number of textiles firms. The rationale for this criterion 
was that this could maximise the chances of selecting a manufacturer whose 
suppliers operated within close proximity and, consequently, increase the 
feasibility of my collecting data with other players (buyers and suppliers) across the 
focal organisation’s supply chain. According to the Brazilian Textiles Industry 
Association (ABIT), the textiles industry supply chain is distributed across the 
country’s five main regions as follows: the Southeast concentrates around 50% of 
the supply chain, followed by the South with around 30%, the Northeast with 
around 14%, the Midwest with around 5% and the North with around 1% (ABIT, 
2017). I decided to focus in the South because, alongside its importance as the 
second largest region in terms of concentration of textiles firms, I am originally from 
this region and therefore I had an intrinsic motive to conduct a case study in and 
potentially contribute to the development of this region. Moreover, being a local in 
the fieldwork can be beneficial in many aspects, including the possibility of 
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obtaining contacts of potential participants through previous connections. The 
peculiarities of being a local in the fieldwork are explored in more details later in 
this chapter (section 4.5).  
 
Once I had decided to select a focal organisation within this region, I approached 
the regional industry federation with the purpose of collecting information about 
the organisations that operated in the region. Using the information provided by 
the industry federation, I developed a database with a sample of potential 
organisations to be approached for participating in my case study. The database 
contained detailed information about the organisations, including their role in the 
supply chain (e.g. whether they were manufacturers or suppliers), their main 
activity (e.g. manufacturers of apparel, household or industrial textiles), location, 
number of employees and contact details. Initially, I narrowed the sample of 
companies to be approached based on the following criteria: their size regarding 
the number of employees, their role in the supply chain and their main activity. In 
terms of size by number of employees, I decided to focus on the companies with 
twenty or more employees, in order to maximise the chances of selecting firms with 
established organisational structures and well-defined divisions and/or roles (e.g. 
human resources, management accounting, supply chain management). In terms 
of the firms’ role in the supply chain and their main activity, I decided to focus on 
manufacturers of household products because I believed that these firms were 
more likely to have structured supply chains. Finally, I browsed the websites of the 
companies that met the criteria explained above in order to obtain further 
information about the companies, their products and practices.  
 
The organisation ultimately selected for my PhD case study operated in the textiles 
industry in the household segment, and specialised in floor covering products 
(hereafter referred to as CarpetCo). The product line was divided into two segments: 
residential and commercial, and the customer base included homes, offices, hotels, 
airports, and commercial environments. The plant in Brazil manufactured their 
products in-house, and the base materials were purchased from both the internal 
and the external market and from both companies within the same group and 
external suppliers, therefore the company provided an interesting case to study 
inter-organisational relationships and to explore the use of supply chain accounting 
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practices at different levels of buyer-supplier relationships. Finally, based on the 
information obtained from CarpetCo’s website during the case selection process, 
CarpetCo held many quality certifications and local government recognition awards 
for its contributions to the development of the region in which the company 
operated. Thus, given that one of the aspirations of this research is to disseminate 
good practices in terms of SCA as a means to promote both social and economic 
upgrading, CarpetCo seemed to be a socially responsible organisation and a good 
case company for achieving this study’s objectives. 
 
4.3.4 Data collection 
 
This study used mainly qualitative data, including both primary and secondary 
sources of data. Primary data was collected mainly through face-to-face semi-
structured interviews. In-depth interviews were conducted with senior and middle 
managers within the focal organisation and within five of their main suppliers, and 
with other organisations that represented the wider Brazilian institutional context 
(two industry federations, the regional trade union, and the regional development 
bank), totalling 32 interviews across 11 organisations and three countries. Alvesson 
& Ashcraft (2012) argue that the selection of research participants should follow 
the principles of representativeness and quality. The selection of participants in this 
study reflect these principles, given that the interviewees were able to provide 
good representativeness of the case study and good quality in the interview 
responses. For example, within the focal organisation the interviewees included 
middle and senior managers of all divisions of the company, therefore the 
participants provided large representativeness of the organisation. Moreover, 
owing to the position of the interviewees both in the focal organisation and in its 
suppliers, the participants were able to provide rich and insightful responses. 
Therefore, the selection of participants enabled both breadth and depth to the 
interviews. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the interviews, which include the 
participants’ position in their organisations. As shown in table 4.1, the total of 32 
interviews in this study included five follow-up interviews. In other words, five of 
the interviewees from the first phase of data collection were interviewed again on 
a second opportunity.  
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Primary data also included observations during site visits within the case study focal 
organisation. These site visits allowed me to obtain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the production and supply chain flow, and helped to inform 
additional interview questions. Primary data was also collected from internal 
documentation provided by the case study focal organisation (e.g. production 
process and internal documentation flows, suppliers and contractors selection 
forms; quality inspection and corrective and preventive action form), and some of 
the suppliers (e.g. codes of conduct). Secondary data included external 
documentation (e.g. publications from the industry associations and national news).  
 
Data was collected in three phases. The first phase was conducted in August 2014 
and consisted of interviews with various actors within the case study focal 
organisation, as well as one site visit in the focal organisation’s factory. The first 
phase also included one interview with the CEO of one of the focal organisation’s 
suppliers based in Brazil, and one interview with the president of the regional trade 
union. The second phase of data collection was conducted in April 2015 and 
consisted of one face-to-face interview with one of the focal organisation’s 
suppliers based in Europe. The third and last phase of data collection was 
conducted in August 2015 and consisted of follow-up interviews within the focal 
organisation as well as a second site visit to the focal organisation’s factory; 
interviews within three suppliers to the focal organisation; and interviews with 
other organisations that represented the wider institutional context in which the 
organisation operated (two industry federations and the regional development 
bank). Interviews varied in length, ranging from half an hour to over two hours. 
Most interviews were conducted in Brazil, except for two of the focal organisation’s 
suppliers who were based in Europe. A summary of the interviews conducted is 
provided in Table 4.1.  
 
The use of semi-structured interviews was valuable for this research because it is 
provided me with the opportunity to probe answers and hence enabled an 
understanding of the reasons for the interviewees’ opinions. Furthermore, semi-
structured interviews allowed me to lead the conversation onto topics which I had 
not previously considered, following the answers given by interviewees. The 
interview questions included open questions, often followed by probing questions. 
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The open questions facilitated raising a subject and letting the interviewee provide 
an extensive answer. Probing questions have been used to further explore answers 
that were relevant to the research, as well as to ask for further explanations where 
necessary. During the site visits I was able to contact other employees with whom 
interviews had provisionally not been arranged. I was also given full details of the 
production process and of the supply chain flows, and the contact details of some 
of the focal organisation’s main suppliers, who were then contacted and 
interviewed during the third phase of data collection.  
 
In the first phase of data collection, the interview questions included those for the 
project as a whole and those that I developed specifically for my case study, which 
were particularly relevant for the Brazilian context and were key for achieving my 
aims and objectives. The interview questions for the project included questions 
about the company as a whole, such as the companies’ size in terms of number of 
employees, the companies’ nationality and time of operation. More specific 
questions for the accountants included those about accounting practices such as 
which cost methods were used, what kind of information they shared with suppliers 
and customers, and what kind of HR expenses and practices they monitored. 
Specific questions for HR managers included what kind of benefits they offered to 
the employees, some indicators such as the proportion of workers by gender, age 
group, education levels, etc., and about their relationship with the trade unions. 
Questions for supply chain managers included broad questions about the supply 
chain processes. I was involved in the development of the interview questions for 
the project as a whole as these were determined through an iterative process. The 
project’s Principal Investigator drafted a brief outline of questions for: HR managers, 
accountants, supply chain managers, trade union representatives within the 
company, regional trade unionists, CEOs, production managers and NGOs, and 
these were then sent to the project team (formed of seven members), the advisory 
board (formed of ten members) and to me and the other PhD student working on 
this project. I fed my suggestions into this process and many were taken on board. 
In addition, I attended the project team meeting at which further changes were 
made to the interview schedules, and again contributed toward changes made. The 
questions were then circulated again, and I further contributed. In particular, the 
changes that I suggested were with regard to the Brazilian context and culture, and 
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my knowledge of accounting in Brazil. For my case study, I developed further 
questions around the SCA practices and the factors that impacted upon these SCA 
practices. For example, I included questions about product criticality such as were 
which their more critical materials, what kind of materials they procured from each 
supplier, and who were the more critical suppliers (which were related to the 
literature on SCA). I also included more questioning around the role of management 
accounting and of the accountants within the organisation. Moreover, given that 
the data was collected through semi-structure interviews, I was able to probe 
further each of the questions in the interview scripts, which enabled me to obtain 
an in-depth understanding of my own specific case study. 
 
The second and third phases of data collection were carried out after the 
preliminary analysis of data collected in the first phase, which allowed me to probe 
the initial findings from the first phase of data collection and analysis. The second 
and third phases of data collection also allowed me to explore new themes that 
emerged during the analysis of data from the first phase. Moreover, the second and 
third phases of data collection enabled me to explore the changes in the supply 
chain and in the intra-organisational dynamics since the first phase, providing a rich 
set of data for this intensive case study. The changes were explored through in-
depth follow-up interviews within CarpetCo, as well as through a second site visit 
to the focal organisation’s factory. 
 
As shown in Table 4.1, the second phase and third phases of data collection also 
included interviews with four of the focal organisation’s main suppliers. Having had 
obtained access to four of the focal organisation’s suppliers not only provided 
information about the SCA practices of these firms with their own suppliers and 
buyers (including CarpetCo), but also provided access to the point of view of two 
parties in the dyadic relationship between these suppliers and CarpetCo. In 
common with the study from Seal et al. (1999), such access to the point of view of 
two parties in a dyadic relationship provided crucial insights for understanding the 
dynamics of these inter-firm relationships. The next sub-section explains this 







Location Organisation's role 
in the Supply Chain 




1 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Accounting manager 01:17 
1 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Accountant 
1 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Supply chain manager 01:44 
1 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  HR manager 01:55 
1 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Quality manager 01:29 
1 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Industrial director 00:25 
1 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Sales director 00:22 
1 CalciteCo Brazil  Supplier  CEO (Owner) 00:28 
1 TrUn Brazil  Trade Union  President 01:14 
2 YarnsCoEU Europe  Supplier  Sales manager 02:30 
3 FedBR Brazil  Industry association  CEO 00:34 
3 FedReg Brazil  Industry association  Social affairs manager 01:17 
3 FedReg Brazil  Industry association  Social affairs manager 
3 FedReg Brazil  Industry association  Development manager 01:03 
3 FedReg Brazil  Industry association  Social affairs consultant 01:03 
3 Edu Brazil  Training provider  Course coordinator 00:16 
3 Edu Brazil  Training provider  Course coordinator 00:20 
3 Edu Brazil  Training provider  Course tutor 00:12 
3 Bank Brazil  Development bank  Business manager 00:59 
3 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  HR manager 00:28 
3 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Accountant 01:13 
3 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Supply chain manager 01:09 
3 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  External trade coordinator 01:04 
3 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Sales coordinator 00:34 
3 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Quality manager 00:57 
3 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Finance director 01:26 
3 CarpetCo Brazil  Focal organisation  Accounting manager 00:43 
3 LatexCo Brazil  Supplier  Business director 01:22 
3 BackCoJC Brazil  Supplier  Sales manager 01:07 
3 BackCoJC Brazil  Supplier  HR manager 00:52 
3 FloorCo Europe  Supplier  Sales coordinator 01:10 
3 FloorCo Europe  Supplier  Sales supervisor 
Table 4.1: Summary of interviews 
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4.3.5 Data analysis 
 
The process of data analysis of this study can more accurately be described as a 
journey. In terms of systematic analysis, it had already been decided by the ESRC 
project that the qualitative data analysis software NVivo would be used for coding 
and categorising. Prior to the first phase of data collection I developed the node 
structure within NVivo (themes and sub-themes) which was mostly informed by my 
reading. During the first phase of data collection, all interviews were recorded. The 
recordings were then transcribed in Portuguese by myself and subsequently 
translated into English by myself as well. The process of translation of the interview 
transcripts will be explained in more details later in this chapter (see section 4.4). 
Subsequently, all the translated interview transcripts were uploaded into NVivo and 
individually coded. That is, I went through each interview and coded chunks of the 
interview into nodes (themes). After this process, I could extract reports from NVivo 
by nodes which would show, for example, what all interviewees had said about a 
particular theme. Initially, broad themes were set out and, as the analysis of data 
progressed, other subcategories and unexpected themes have emerged. 
Interestingly, although the actual coding was done onto the translated transcript, 
the process (journey) of analysing data started as early as during the process of 
transcribing the interviews. As I was transcribing the interviews, I was inevitably 
reflecting on the interviewees’ answers, on how my findings compared to the 
literature, and finding new themes that I had not previously anticipated. I then 
started including new themes into my nodes structure in NVivo and taking many 
notes of my insights during the process. Therefore, when it came to the actual 
coding in NVivo (in other words, when I uploaded the final translated transcripts 
into NVivo for coding), I already had a very different node structure compared to 
what I had before conducting the interviews. Moreover, I had most of my insights 
while I was transcribing the interviews. Therefore, my data analysis journey started 
with the transcribing process. On reflection, I find it difficult to draw a thick line 
between my data collection and my data analysis. I believe that my making sense 
of the data that I collected inevitably started with the data collection.  
 
The second phase of data collection consisted of one interview with one of the focal 
organisation’s supplier (which was conducted in English). In this case, the 
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participant did not consent with recording the interview, thus detailed notes were 
taken during the interview (taking note of answer by answer). These notes were 
then uploaded into NVivo and coded in the same way as with the first phase of 
interviews. The third phase of data collection consisted of various interviews 
conducted in Brazil, and all interviews were recorded and later transcribed by 
myself. For this phase, the transcripts uploaded into NVivo and coded were in the 
original language of the interview. The rationale for this strategy is explained in the 
next section of this chapter (section 4.4). 
 
In terms of the node structure, before the first phase of data collection two broad 
categories were set out: ‘Supply Chain Accounting (SCA)’ and ‘Employment 
practices and gender equality’. In relation to the latter, later on I changed it to 
‘Managing social issues’ in order to encompass firms’ approach to managing social 
issues that they may encounter across supply chains more broadly, as explained in 
more details in chapter 2. In relation to SCA, as the data analysis progressed, I 
decided to set out one sub-category for each of the most relevant SCA practices in 
my case study (as explained in chapter 2): inter-firm governance, open book 
accounting (OBA), make-or-buy decisions, and customer accounting. These four 
SCA sub-categories turned into my four analysis chapters later on. In other words, 
during the data collection a wide range of SCA practices (or mechanisms) were 
explored and, after preliminary analysis of data collected, greater focus was given 
to the SCA mechanisms that were more relevant to the case study and offered 
richer empirics to achieve this study’s purpose and objectives. Thus, in common 
with previous exploratory case study studies (e.g. Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the 
preliminary case analysis helped to identify the SCA practices to focus on in the 
course of the research. Moreover, further themes under the outlined subcategories 
were detected. For example, under SCA motives, the possible factors that might 
influence SCA practice anticipated prior to the data analysis were: uncertainty, 
asset specificity, trust, and cost reduction. After the analysis of the interviews, 
many factors that I had not previously anticipated were identified, such as personal 
relationships. These unexpected themes led me to create new nodes and, more 
importantly, to go back to the literature. As I read about those themes that I had 
not previously anticipated, I reflected further on my findings and went back to the 
interviews, creating more nodes and taking more notes. This iterative process 
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between my reading and my findings continued throughout the entire data analysis 
and writing-up processes. In fact, I would say that there is a blurred line between 
my data analysis and writing-up journeys.        
 
4.4 Language decisions and the process of translation 
 
There is an emerging literature of language in international business research 
calling for international and cross-language studies to report on the important 
decisions related to language and translation processes (e.g. Chidlow, 
Plakoyiannaki, & Welch, 2014). Language is the way people communicate, 
therefore language is embedded in the research process, and it is particularly 
important in qualitative research. Previous international business researchers seem 
to assume a positivist approach towards translation, whereby translations are 
assumed to be able to provide a literal translation of original data (see Xian, 2008). 
For example, some scholars suggest that the use of techniques such as back 
translation (e.g. Harkness, 2003), whereby the research instruments is translated 
from one language into another and subsequently translated back to the original 
language; and using more than one translator (e.g. Douglas & Craig, 2007) may help 
to overcome language barriers. As articulated by Xian (2008, p. 243), “translated 
data are constructions or results of interpretation”. Xian (2008, p. 242), 
recommends a more interpretative approach to international research, 
emphasising the “researcher/translator’s active constructing of “reality” - through 
perception, cognition and the handling of cultural difference - between languages”. 
This section describes this study’s specific language strategy used both during the 
fieldwork and the data analysis stages (e.g. the process of translation). 
 
4.4.1 Language biography 
 
In this study, I was both the researcher and the translator. Inspired by other 
researchers who are also the translators of their studies (e.g. Xian, 2008), I first 
present my language biography in order to explain my language decisions in 
designing and conducting my study. I was born in Brazil, where Portuguese is the 
official language, and my first language is Portuguese. I was educated in Portuguese 
since primary school throughout to my university degree. I only spoke Portuguese 
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in school, but at the age of 11 I started learning English as a second language. During 
my university studies, I spent one summer in the United States working in a 
temporary job in order to improve my English. Shortly after completing my 
university degree in accounting, I started working for an American company 
operating in Brazil in the accounting division. Although most of my colleagues were 
Brazilians and we only spoke Portuguese amongst ourselves, the corporate 
language within this company was (American) English. All company documents 
were in English, and we had to report to managers based in the headquarters in the 
United States. While I was working for this company I had to learn all the accounting 
terms in English, and I also had to learn different accounting conceptual 
frameworks and standards (e.g. USGAAP, IFRS, Colombia GAAP). After working for 
this company for 5 years, I decided to take a study leave to pursue my MBA in the 
UK. Although this was the first time I was formally educated in English, I already had 
experience working in English and I was already familiar with business and 
accounting terms. However, during my time in the UK I learned differences in these 
terms between American and British English (as well as other day-to-day 
differences). Moreover, during my MBA studies I engaged in reading academic 
papers published in international journals. By doing so, and combined with the 
discussions in the lectures, I learned not only new terms but also new concepts. I 
developed a more critical thinking approach and a new writing style. Upon 
completion of my MBA studies and after 17 months living in the UK I returned to 
Brazil and to work for my previous employer, where I worked for a further 18 
months before returning to the UK to pursue my PhD studies. During my PhD 
studies I engaged in extensive reading of academic papers published in 
international journals, and I have continuously been developing a more critical 
thinking approach. Within this context, I designed and conducted a research using 
a case study in Brazil. Switching between Portuguese and English became a natural 
process for me. For example, while based in the UK and speaking English in a daily 
basis, I was contacting participants in Brazil with whom I spoke Portuguese. While I 
was collecting data in Brazil and speaking Portuguese in a daily basis, I sometimes 
found links between my findings and the previous literature (which I had read in 
English), and I spontaneously made my notes in English. In hindsight, I was using 
raw data in Portuguese and instantly writing up my analysis in English. This process 
will be explained further later in this chapter (in section 4.4.3).  
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4.4.2 Fieldwork language design 
 
In terms of type of cross-language research, this study can be broadly defined as a 
study within a single non-English speaking country (see Chidlow, Plakoyiannaki, & 
Welch, 2014). This is because this study is based on a case study in Brazil, a non-
English speaking country and in which English in not widely spoken. Moreover, the 
vast majority of the interviews were conducted in Brazil (29 out of 32 interviews), 
and the vast majority of interviews were conducted with Brazilian nationals (28 out 
of the 32 interviews). In common with previous studies in single non-English 
speaking countries (Sinkovics & Penz, 2009; Krivogorsky & Eichenseher, 2005), this 
study’s strategy was to use the interviewees’ native language in the interviews 
(where possible). As with previous cross-language studies (Moore, 2003; Pla-Barber, 
2001), this was enabled by the researcher’s own language skills. As explained above, 
most interviewees were Brazilians and, in these cases, since both I and participants 
were Brazilians, the interviews were conducted in our native language (Portuguese). 
This strategy enabled a dynamic interaction between me and the interviewees (a 
mixture between formality and informality) and helped to avoid any possible 
misinterpretations of both the questions and of the answers. 
 
There were a few exceptions to this strategy, in three instances in which the 
interviewees were not Brazilians. In these cases, the strategy adopted was as 
follows. In the first instance, while the interviewee worked for the focal 
organisation in Brazil and the interview was conducted in Brazil, the interviewee 
was a national of a European country. In this case, since I did not speak his native 
language, I gave him the option of conducting the interview either in Portuguese or 
in English and he chose the latter. Despite being based in Brazil and speaking 
Portuguese, he said that he felt more confident speaking English. In the second 
instance where the interview was not conducted in Portuguese the interviewee was 
a supplier to the focal organisation based in Europe, and the interviewee was a 
national of the country where he was based. I travelled to his country to conduct 
the face-to-face interview but since I could not speak his native language and our 
only common language was English, the interview was conducted in English.  The 
third instance involved a joint interview with two interviewees whose native 
language was English thus the interview was conducted in English as well. 
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4.4.3 Translation and data analysis language strategy 
 
As explained above, data collection was conducted in three phases: the first phase 
involved interviews within the focal organisation and one of their suppliers based 
in Brazil; the second phase involved one interview with one of the focal 
organisation’s suppliers based in Europe which was conducted in English; and the 
third phase involved various interviews within Brazil and one in Europe. All 
interviews were recorded except for the one in the second phase where the 
consent of participant was not obtained. For the all interviews from phases one and 
three, the recordings were then transcribed by myself, as explained in section 4.3.4. 
Then, all interviews from phase one that had been conducted in Portuguese were 
translated into English by myself. My translation could be described as a sentence-
by-sentence translation. I listened to the recordings and wrote the sentences in 
English. This approach has been used by other researchers/translators (e.g. Xian, 
2008). In instances where there is not an exact similar word in English, I kept the 
original word in Portuguese under brackets to make sure nothing got “lost”. 
 
The process of translation adopted for phase one was then revised for phase three. 
For the data collected in the third phase of data collection, the analysis was 
conducted in Portuguese, and the writing up of findings was conducted in English. 
In other words, my making sense of data was based on the interview transcripts in 
Portuguese. During the writing-up phase, the quotes that were deemed important 
to be included in the thesis were translated individually. Other international 
business researchers have used a similar approach, whereby data is collected and 
analysed in one language and findings are written-up in a different language 
(Brannen, Piekkari, & Tietze, 2014; Welch & Piekkari, 2006). 
 
The language strategy used for the analysis of data from phase three was enabled 
by the researcher’s cognitive structure. As articulated by Brannen, Piekkari and 
Tietze (2014, p. 500), for most international business scholars research is not a 
monolingual process but rather a process “characterized by linguistic plurality that 




Since I can speak both Portuguese and English, I can think in both languages and I 
can easily transfer a train of thought from one language to the other. For example, 
I can read an interview script in Portuguese and arrive at conclusions, and I can 
easily write-up such conclusions in English. Moreover, as explained in section 4.3.4, 
the data analysis process (or my making sense of data) started when I started 
transcribing the interviews. Therefore, I decided that it was not necessary for me 
to translate the interviews from phase three.  
 
Some authors consider language as a barrier to accuracy in international research 
(Chidlow, Plakoyiannaki, & Welch, 2014). In this study, language was not a major 
barrier to accuracy given that I was both the researcher and the translator. 
However, as with any qualitative data study, the research findings may be 
influenced by my own subjective view of the world and, particularly, of the case 
study context. The next section explores this limitation in more details, and explains 
the tools applied in this study to overcome such limitations. 
 
4.5 Reflexivity and Positionality: being a local in the fieldwork 
 
In order to conduct ethical research, it is critical to consider issues of reflexivity, 
positionality and power dynamics in the fieldwork (Sultana, 2007). Being a local in 
the fieldwork may have particular implications in terms of reflexivity and 
positionality. As a Brazilian doing research in Brazil (where I am a ‘local’), in this 
section I offer a reflection around these issues.  
 
Doing research while being a local can be helpful in many aspects. For example, 
knowing the language of the interviewees enables a more dynamic interaction 
between the researcher and the participants. Moreover, being a local allows the 
researcher to relate to the interviewees and to understand their (external) 
institutional context. Being a local can also be very fruitful in terms of getting 
contacts. In this study, being a local indeed helped me to secure a few interviews 
through networking. Moreover, the selection of participants had a ‘snowballing 




On the other hand, being a local can also be problematic, as it may lead to bias in 
interpreting data influenced by my own views and taken-for-granted assumptions. 
In order to overcome this limitation, I sought to constantly monitor myself, 
throughout the entire study. During the data collection phases, I was very careful 
in order not to influence or lead the interviewees to an answer. As a Brazilian who 
has worked in Brazil, but who has also studied outside of the country, I was able to 
relate to the participants and to understand the reality of the case study 
organisation, whilst at the same time I was able to critically analyse the firm’s 
practices owing to the experience that I have obtained studying abroad. I worked 
for a Brazilian manufacturer company for nearly four years as a financial and 
management accountant. In this job I participated in the implementation of an ERP 
system, where I had to map the whole process of the company, from purchasing 
raw materials to selling and delivering products to final customers, which allowed 
me to obtain a broad picture of how a manufacturing company works, including its 
supply chain networks, HR and accounting practices. Later I worked as an 
accountant for a large multinational company for seven years, where I had the 
opportunity to work with more sophisticated accounting practices which are 
usually not used by small companies. Furthermore, in this job I had the opportunity 
to do business with various affiliates of the company across the globe, which helped 
me to obtain a view of different firm practices in different countries. Moreover, my 
understanding has also been informed by my reading and, as explained above, 
much of the literature has so far been based on more developed countries. 
Therefore, despite being a local I was able to critically evaluate and distance myself 
from the interviewees’ responses. 
 
I was also aware of the need to be reflexive in my research practices. In other words, 
I have continually questioned my understanding of what I was hearing and seeing, 
and of how I was interpreting this as an insider/ outsider. During the initial stage of 
interviews in August 2014, I found that sometimes my interpretation of what 
people were saying was influenced by my previous experience.  For example, my 
previous experience in an American owned company may have influenced my 
perception of the role of the trade unions in Brazil. The view in my previous 
company was generally not positive toward the role of the trade unions; thus, when 
I interviewed the HR manager I needed to be aware that the way in which I 
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questioned her might have been influenced by my own assumptions. In such 
circumstances, I sought to make an open question.  
 
4.6 Ethical considerations 
 
The ethical issues involved in this study included the fact that it involved research 
on human subjects (through interviews); and the collection, usage and storage of 
data. These issues were managed in accordance to the ethical guidelines of the 
University of Sheffield. Given that this study is also part of a wider project funded 
by the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK (ESRC), the ethical guidelines 
of the ESRC were followed as well. The ethics approval for this research was granted 
by the University of Sheffield, as part of the approval for the ESRC project. I have 
received training in research ethics both through formal training and through 
supervision, and have been made aware of the procedures to be considered while 
designing and conducting the research, including personal safety and the 
prevention of harm to participants. 
 
All participants were informed about the purpose of the study, the research 
methods and the nature of their participation. The participants were also made 
aware that data would be anonymised in order to preserve confidentiality, and that 
all research data would be submitted to the UK Data Archive, as required by the 
ESRC. These were communicated through written means during the process of 
negotiating access, and participants were asked to sign a consent form before each 
interview. 
 
Other ethical issues involved in this research included information about supply 
chains. Peculiarities of the inter-organisational relationships across the supply chain 
and of the production process might be commercially sensitive. This study also 
involved ethical issues regarding firms’ approach to managing social issues. For 
example, enquiries about employment practices may potentially lead into sensitive 
issues, where the information provided by the interviewees may indicate that the 
firm does not comply with labour standards or ethical practice. Therefore, I 
carefully maintained data confidentiality throughout the entire research process in 





This chapter explained the research methodology applied in this study. The chapter 
started with an account of my personal journey towards undertaking this study, 
which is part of a wider research project funded by the ESRC. The chapter then 
presented an account of the research philosophy underpinning this study, which is 
grounded on a social constructivist ontological approach, and an interpretivist 
epistemological approach. The chapter then explained the research methods used 
to achieve this study’s objectives. This study uses mainly qualitative data and is 
based on an in-depth case study undertaken in a supply chain in the textiles 
industry in Brazil. The fourth section explained the language decisions of this study, 
whereby data was mainly collected in Portuguese and analysed both in Portuguese 
and in English. The fifth section offered a reflection of the issues of reflexivity and 
positionality arising from a study whereby the researcher is also a local. Finally, 
ethical considerations were discussed. The next chapter describes the case study 




CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY CONTEXT: THE TEXTILES 
INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL 
 
As explained in the Methodology Chapter, this research uses a case study in the 
textiles industry in Brazil. The textiles industry is an important sector in Brazil both 
in terms of production value (economic context) and in terms of employment 
generation (social context). For instance, in 2014 the textiles sector represented 
5.6% of the GDP of the national manufacturing industry (ABIT, 2015). In terms of 
employment, in 2014 the textiles sector created 16.9% of the jobs in the entire 
manufacturing industry in Brazil (ABIT, 2015). This chapter explores the institutions 
that impact upon this important industry sector in Brazil. By doing so, this chapter 
helps to understand the external factors impacting the supply chain accounting 
practices as well as the rules and routines in terms of managing social issues within 
the case study focal organisation and across its supply chain. The chapter begins by 
exploring the institutions that are likely to influence the supply chain accounting 
practices – the technological development of the Brazilian industry, the taxation 
system in Brazil, and government initiatives such as incentives for local content. The 
chapter then moves on to explore the institutions that are likely to impact upon the 
approach of firms operating in the industry to managing social issues, such as the 
organisations’ employment practices and their monitoring of practices down their 
supply chain. This chapter explores the (employment) legislation in Brazil and the 
role of the trade unions; the role of the industrial federations and the educational 
institutions. 
 
5.1 External environment: institutions impacting the SCA practices in Brazil 
 
This section focuses on the institutions that influence the supply chain accounting 
practices in the textiles industry in Brazil. This section begins by exploring the 
technological development of the Brazilian industry with a particular focus on the 
textiles sector. Secondly, this section will explore the Taxation system in Brazil and 
what was referred to by interviewees as the ‘Brazil Cost’. Finally, the Government 
incentives for local content will be explored. These institutions are likely to shape, 
for instance, the make-or-buy decisions, supplier selection and governance 
structures in inter-firm relationships. 
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5.1.1 Technological development of the Brazilian industry 
 
One of the main challenges faced by the textiles industry in Brazil was the 
competition from abroad, as explained by the Business manager at the Regional 
Development Bank. The manager explained that the Brazilian textiles firms 
struggled to compete both in the external market (in other words, to export their 
products to other countries), and in the internal market (in other words, to compete 
within Brazil with the imported products entering the country). Other interviewees 
referred to challenges faced by the Brazilian textiles industry in trying to compete 
both in terms of price with products from low-cost countries and in terms of quality 
with high-end technology countries (BackCoJC_SM, Bank_BusM). In fact, the sales 
manager of YarnsCoEU, one of the suppliers to the case study focal organisation 
which was based abroad, compared the production process in Brazil to that of other 
countries, suggesting that the lack of modern equipment sometimes led to less 
sophisticated production processes in the textiles industry in Brazil: 
 
“There are things that I only see in Brazil. In the production process of 
carpets, after the carpets leave the yarns machine they go through a 
process that applies the backing material and then latex on top of the 
backing to fixate. Then they go to the oven to dry the latex. In Brazil, once 
I saw them applying the latex manually with a brush, rather than having 
a machine to apply it, and then they took the carpet to the sun to dry it. 
Only in Brazil” (YarnsCoEU_SM) 
 
The sales manager of BackCoJC, a Brazilian firm that supplied backing material to 
the case study focal organisation, suggested that the Brazilian industry could not 
compete with some imported products due to the lack of the machinery needed 
for the production of those items in Brazil. He explained that this was not the case 
only for his company, which manufactured backing materials, but also for all firms 
down the supply chain in the textiles industry. As an illustration, he narrated an 
occasion when he had attended a trade fair in Brazil where he spotted a Chinese 
product that, if made in Brazil, would be more than three times’ expensive as the 
imported one. He expressed his own disbelief when he heard the price of the 




“This carpet here, for example, my client makes it like this and delivers 
to a retailer, for example, at R$45 per square metre. The same carpet 
from China arrives here for less than half the price… Last year we 
exhibited our products in a trade fair with focus on home textiles - bed 
and bath, curtains, carpets, and so on. At the end of the corridor there 
were only Chinese. Our stands were empty, and theirs [were] crowded. 
Just out of curiosity we went there and visited. There was a carpet there 
which was beautiful, in 3D, this and that. I was talking to a client of mine 
who knows a lot about this business and [I asked]: ‘How can you do 
something like this?’ and he said that there were no machines here in 
Brazil to do this... I asked: ‘If it were made in Brazil, how much [would it 
cost]?’ He said that it would be around R$140, R$150 per square metre. 
Then I asked the Chinese how much it costed. He answered in English 
and in US$, and I said ‘I think I didn’t understand – how much?’ I made 
the calculations, it was R$40-45, compared to R$150. So, when you talk 
about competitiveness, we lose a lot with this.” (BackCoJC_SM) 
 
The sales manager at BackCoJC further explained the difficulties that his company 
faced in seeking to invest in modern equipment. The manager explained that the 
lack of manufacturers of machinery within the country forced the company to 
import, and also referred to the complexity of the importing process. 
 
“…first there is the issue of the taxes… there is the matter of protecting 
the national industry. For example, if I import a weaving machine, a 
second-hand weaving machine. To be able to import that, first you need 
to search the country to see if there isn’t a national manufacturer of that 
machine, similar to that one that you are trying to import. There isn’t. In 
Brazil no one makes projectile weaving machinery. In the past 4 years I 
imported 12 weaving machines, if I’m not mistaken, 4 lots of 3. First lot, 
yellow channel. Second, same specification, lot in yellow channel. Third 
and fourth, same thing. You see? You have a process that you make like 
the previous one and… it gets stuck. We brought an extruder here too. It 
was in the port for almost 40 days, in the yellow channel. Then you need 
to go there, explain… maybe you need to convince in a different way. It’s 
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too much bureaucracy... if there were national manufacturers it would 
be much easier. But today there is no incentive for the production of 
machinery here in Brazil. It’s a shame.” (BackCoJC_SM) 
 
In addition, the same manager suggested that the competition from abroad even 
threatened the business continuity of firms in the textiles industry in Brazil. 
 
“Today, an entrepreneur like Mr. (Owner) is tempted to shut everything 
down – every, everything, terminate almost 1,200 workers – and bring 
products from abroad. Just resell. They even come with a label with the 
company’s logo if he wants.” (BackCoJC_SM) 
 
In fact, BackCoJC had recently lost the bid to supply one of their products to the case 
study focal organisation (CarpetCo). The supply chain manager of CarpetCo 
explained that the company was forced to keep high levels of stocks given that the 
importing process in Brazil was too slow, and for that reason the company had 
sought to change to a national supplier. They purchased a sample of backing 
material from BackCoJC, but the material had a lower quality than the imported one, 
thus the company decided to continue to import from the external supplier. The 
quality manager at CarpetCo explained how, given the low quality of the Brazilian 
product, the attempt to buy this backing material from the local supplier caused a 
loss to the company. 
 
“We developed a backing with BackCoJC. They did it, but when it got 
here it broke. We had a loss of 350 square meters of carpet, because 
they did not have the necessary traction. They are trying to adapt.” 
(CarpetCo_QM_Fup) 
 
The low quality of the national product compared to imports had also influenced 
CarpetCo’s choice of suppliers of yarns. CarpetCo bought yarns from three suppliers, 
two from the external and one from the internal (Brazilian) market. However, the 
supplier based in Brazil did not manufacture the yarn in-house; instead they resold 
yarns purchased from abroad. CarpetCo had tried to buy yarns from a national 
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manufacturer in the past, but product quality was inadequate and the attempt was 
unsuccessful, as explained by the quality manager. 
 
“We have already tried to [buy from local suppliers]... but they cannot 
deliver technically, so we are forced to buy from abroad. They cannot 
deliver the colour; they have quality problems... so it becomes very 
expensive. We made two attempts with yarns…but they did not deliver 
[on quality]… With yarns is complicated because, for example, there are 
some colorants that cannot be used, but they only have these ones. Or 
they should use a specific polymer, and they don’t have it. Another 
example – there is a component which works like a sunscreen for the 
yarn, so that it doesn’t burn throughout the production process. But in 
the end this component needs to be removed, and the yarn got here 
with this component on it many times… They did not have the capability 
to remove it, then this caused problems of quality.” (CarpetCo_QM_Fup) 
 
5.1.2 Taxation and the “Brazil Cost” 
 
Taxation was one of the core elements that influenced the textiles industry in Brazil. 
Many interviewees referred to the tax burden and the high complexity of the tax 
system in Brazil as a major factor impacting the competitiveness of the Brazilian 
firms (FedBR_CEO, FedReg_DevM, Bank_BusM, LatexCo_BusDir). This sentiment 
was echoed by interviewees from the national and regional branches of the 
employers’ federation: 
 
“[The tax burden is] the worst possible. I’m not even saying that it is too 
high; it is too high and too complex. So just the cost that you have to be 
in compliance with the Brazilian legislation is already absurd…” 
(FedBR_CEO) 
 
“[The tax burden] impacts the competitiveness absurdly [in the textiles 
industry] as in any industry in Brazil. Statistics show that you work more 
than four months just to be able to organize the bureaucracy… This is a 
matter of excess of burden and of complexity, bureaucracy. I do not 
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know what is worse, sometimes I tend to think that the bureaucracy is 
more expensive and more complicated…” (FedReg_DevM) 
 
In fact, it was suggested that the term ‘Brazil Cost’ was widely used throughout the 
country to refer to all of the factors that increased the costs of operating in Brazil 
and that consequently decreased competitiveness, which included the high tax 
burden and bureaucracy, as explained by the CEO of the National Industrial 
federation. 
 
“We also have something that we cannot go without mentioning which 
are these internal costs, the infamous Brazil cost - cost of transport, cost 
of bureaucracy, legal costs, etc.” (FedBR_CEO) 
 
The business director of LatexCo, one of the case study focal organisation’s 
suppliers, explained that the failure of the government to turn tax collection into 
investments in infrastructure was negatively impacting on the entire productive 
chain in the industry.  
 
 “In my opinion [the tax burden in Brazil] is completely out of reality for 
our country, out of reality for the international standards, and it burdens 
too much the production chain, making the businesses non-competitive. 
Especially because there is little return for all the taxes you pay. If there 
were investments for everything that you pay in structure, in 
improvements, more ports, more roads, more infrastructure, water, 
sewage, energy, all this would facilitate the production chain. Better 
roads, train lines. But that does not exist. Then you end up burdening the 
chain, and we do not see the benefit in this process. So the tax burden is 
terrible. It is totally disproportionate to the reality of our economy, of 
our industry, of our reality. It needs to be reviewed. There are [value 
added] tax rates of 4%, 7%, 12%, and 18% in the same country. This is 
just one example. Each state does what they want, the way they want 
and at their convenience, practically. This should be standardized, 




As explained above, one of the reasons for the negative outcomes was the lack of 
consistency across the country and consequently the large amount of bureaucracy 
that was necessary in order to ensure that companies complied with tax regulations, 
with potential impacts on regional collaboration and inward investment. 
 
5.1.3 Government initiatives: incentives for local content 
 
Aiming at protecting the national industry, the Brazilian government had 
introduced many incentives for manufacturers to use national suppliers; therefore, 
this was an important factor that influenced the choice of suppliers in the textiles 
industry. One of the government incentives for local content that affected the 
textiles industry was related to sales to Mercosur (the South American economic 
bloc formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). This incentive 
determined that exports to Mercosur were free of taxes, as long a certain 
percentage of the sales price of the exported product was related to costs incurred 
within Brazil. These costs could be related to either material purchased from 
Brazilian manufacturers or to labour and/or service costs. The percentage of 
Brazilian costs depended on the type of product exported, and in the case of 
CarpetCo’s product the amount required was 60%, as explained by the External 
Trade manager. 
 
“…it depends on the product; it depends on the tax classification. In our 
case we must have around 60%. It must have an alteration, actually. For 
example, I import yarns, I cannot export the yarns and add 60%, say it is 
packed or something like that. I have to export something made out of 
that yarn. So I import the yarn and export the carpet. It had an alteration 
and had an increase of 60% of national... Alteration and 60% increment… 
I have to aggregate 60% of value, not material. If I sell for ten, six must 
be from here - labour, raw materials; and 40% can be imported.” 
(CarpetCo_Comex) 
 
This incentive impacted CarpetCo’s choice of supplier, given that CarpetCo sought 
to use national suppliers in order to be eligible for this benefit, as indicated by the 




“We try, despite the difficulty, to broaden our range of suppliers within 
Brazil, so that we can export with the certificate of origin. In order to be 
able to export with the certificate of origin, my product has to have 60% 
of nationalization, of its price. So, for that reason, I need to have more 
national materials.” (CarpetCo_Comex) 
 
For example, CarpetCo purchased one of their raw materials (a type of backing) 
from a Brazilian firm even though they could import the same material for a lower 
price, just in order to obtain 60% of nationalisation of their product and be able to 
export to Mercosur free of taxes, as explained by the supply chain manager.  
 
However, despite the tax incentive, sometimes the quality of the national material 
was inadequate and CarpetCo opted to import the materials. For example, as 
explained above, CarpetCo purchased yarns and another type of backing from 
abroad because the quality of these materials from the Brazilian suppliers was 
inadequate. The choice of supplier for each type of material will be explained in 
more detail in chapter 7. 
 
5.2 External environment: the social context in the Brazilian textiles industry 
 
This section explores the institutions that influenced the social context in which the 
focal organisation operated. This section covers employment legislation, the role of 
trade unions, and the role of industrial federations and educational institutions in 
the provision of training. 
 
5.2.1 Employment legislation  
 
Brazil had a comprehensive labour system aimed at protecting labour rights which 
was in accordance with the international standards, as explained by the CEO of the 
national federation and echoed by the industrial director within the case study focal 
organisation: 
 
“[We have] free trade unionism, collective agreements, wage 
negotiation, social clauses, and economic clauses. We are the 
International Labour Organisation’s darling” (FedBR_CEO) 
93 
 
“…we know that Brazilian law is very... It's massive. The workers are very 
well protected in this country. If you implement what is required, I would 
dare to say that in some points is much further here than other 
countries…in terms of Human Resources, or looking after your workers. 
Because if you see what happens in South Africa or in other countries, or 
in China, or wherever... The other BRICS in the world. Brazil must be one 
of the main players on that issue… Brazilian workers are very well 
protected in this country” (CarpetCo_IndDir) 
 
However, such comprehensive employment legislation did not guarantee 
regulation enforcement. For example, the CEO of the national federation 
acknowledged that there were some informal businesses in the industry: 
 
“[The textiles industry in Brazil] has informal businesses, alike any other 
country in the world... it is a formal sector, which complies with the 
legislation, but there are some [businesses] which are not [formal]… and 
obviously these ones need to be punished” (FedBR_CEO) 
 
The CEO of the national federation also admitted that some cases of forced labour 
involving immigrants from Bolivia had been recently identified in the textiles 
industry in Sao Paulo, although he said that this was not a common practice in Brazil. 
 
“Forced labour there were some cases identified in the city of Sao Paulo 
involving the immigrants… but this is not a practice, this is an exception. 
[This is] because there are controls, there are trade unions, there is the 
Ministry of Labour, everything” (FedBR_CEO) 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there was a general feeling among employers that there 
should be deregulation of employment rights. According to the CEO of the national 
federation, the labour system was too complex and too bureaucratic, which 
harmed small employers in the textiles industry.  
 
“[The labour system in Brazil] is highly standardized; it is highly complex; 
it assumes that one side is totally underprivileged, i.e. has no ability to 
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defend its rights – the labour side, and that the other side is totally over 
privileged - that is the employer side. In fact, they forget that we have 
thousands and thousands of small employers who suffer as much or 
more than the biggest [firms]. So, I think that Brazil has a complex labour 
law and here I'm not talking about labour rights, questioning labour 
rights, but it is a very comprehensive system and it's very bureaucratized 
and which originates an over judicialization of relations that is unique in 
the world” (FedBR_CEO) 
 
The CEO of the national federation suggested that the Brazilian industry would 
benefit from relaxing the employment legislation, and he believed that this would 
stimulate investment in the Brazilian industry. In the literature of employment 
issues there are divergent opinions regarding whether decent work and equality 
should be promoted by employment legislations or by a firm’s own diversity 
management initiatives (Risberg & Søderberg, 2008; Greene, 2005; Lorbiecki & Jack, 
2000). While some stakeholders argue that firms prefer to introduce their own 
codes of conduct rather than being forced to comply with legislation, others would 
argue that if firms are not obliged to implement diversity policies, nothing will be 
done  (Greene, 2005). 
 
“The Government doesn’t have to do more; the Government has to do 
less and well done. So, what it can do today fundamentally is to create a 
more predictable and less bureaucratized and stimulating investment 
business environment. If they do that: simplify the life of who produces, 
giving more transparency to their rules and regulations…” (FedBR_CEO) 
 
The social affairs manager of the regional federation had a similar opinion. She 
believed that the labour legislation in Brazil was outdated and that it should be more 
flexible. 
 
“I think one of the biggest complaints is the question of labour costs, all 
taxes placed on the payroll. And the lack of flexibility too, our legislation 
is... If you think of our labour law is there since the 50s, and so reviewing, 
maybe make it more flexible, ease things both for the employee and for 
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the company, a relationship more in the reality of the times we live, of 
transformations.” (FedReg_SaM) 
 
In terms of equality, within the Brazilian employment legislation some types of jobs 
(referred to as job categories) were regulated by a base pay, which were covered 
by the bargain agreements. Therefore, this regulation arguably promoted equality 
in terms of pay, because this regulation determined that employers had to pay the 
same salary for all workers in the same position, irrespective of gender, religion, 
race and ethnicity. It is important to note that the regulated base salary was not the 
same as the minimum wage – while the minimum wage was universal, the base 
salary was the defined salary for a particular job “category”, which should be equal 
or above the minimum wage. The sentiment that the regulated base salary 
promoted gender equality was echoed by the CEO of the national industrial 
federation and by the consultant of the regional federation: 
 
“...there is vulnerability [for women] in terms of salary irrespective of the 
industry. This difference happens. It is lower in some cases when, for 
example, the jobs are regulated by a base salary. Where there is fixity, 
the difference is not so big...” (FedReg_Cons) 
 
“There are base salaries - there are job categories - so they work, there 
isn’t a big difference because there are compatible salaries… a female 
spinner and a male spinner earn the same. There is no discrimination in 
this [job] profile” (FedBR_CEO)   
 
However, the legislation regulated the base salaries only for jobs within the factory 
floor. Therefore, it did not help to promote equality within other types of job (e.g. 
administrative jobs), as suggested by the CEO of the national industrial federation. 
 
“…But I am talking about the factory floor, if in an office there is one 
‘here’ and one ‘there’, I don’t know…” (FedBR_CEO) 
 
Additionally, pay in the textiles industry in Brazil was relatively lower than for many 
other sectors, as acknowledged by the CEO of the federation, and the textiles 
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industry was female dominated, with 75% of the jobs in textile being undertaken by 
women (FedBR_CEO). 
 
“…This is not the industry that pays the highest salaries, but it is, in 
volume, the fourth biggest payer of salaries in the manufacturing 
industry in the country. So, this is an industry with very tight margins, 
with a lot of competition. I won’t say that it pays more than the oil and 
gas industry because this is a lie…” (FedBR_CEO) 
 
Moreover, given the acknowledged low regulation enforcement and existence of 
many informal businesses in Brazil, this regulation’s potential to promote equality 
was arguably limited (irrespective of the type of job and of the industry). 
 
5.2.2 The role of the trade unions 
 
The main role of the trade unions in Brazil included negotiating annual collective 
bargaining agreements with employers. These collective agreements included 
clauses regarding work conditions for all employees, including pay and benefits, 
work hours, work shifts, collective annual leave, health and safety policies, and so 
on. The role of the trade unions in Brazil also included monitoring compliance with 
the clauses agreed in the collective bargaining agreement. However, the strong 
presence of the trade unions did not guarantee the enforcement of the agreements. 
For example, the president of the trade union of the textiles industry said that they 
only monitored the employment practices of companies when someone reported 
wrongdoing, because they did not have time and resource to monitor companies. 
 
“[We investigate employers] only if someone reports. Because it is 
complicated for us, there are few people here to do the work. It's too 
much for us to see, we can’t take care of everything. Because today all 
trade unions have a lot of difficulty with money” (TrUn_Pres) 
 
Therefore, it could be argued that the lack of resources reduced the benefits that 
the trade unions could offer to employees, given that this resulted in a low 
enforcement of the benefits negotiated in the trade agreement. On the other hand, 
the financial resources available for trade unions were paid for by the employees. 
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Some interviewees expressed the belief that there was no value for money for the 
contributions they were paying to the trade unions. For example, the HR manager 
at CarpetCo said that trade unions demanded too many contributions from 
employees (payments of fees to trade unions), but with no value for money to the 
employees because the collective bargaining agreement was the same every year, 
and that the trade union would simply sign the same agreement every year and 
charge fees for this. 
 
“Most of the times I think they [the relationship of companies with trade 
unions] are [bad]… because they want the company to pay, pay, and 
pay... not to the employees… they negotiate the collective bargaining 
agreement, [but] they usually don’t add any value to the agreement, it’s 
the same agreement every year, but they want contributions from the 
company. It’s contribution of I don’t know what, it’s assistance... And 
sometimes the company... there’s a law for everything, you know? If it’s 
due, the company will pay for it, otherwise the company will not pay. So, 
they have this [thing] with the companies. But this is overall.” 
(CarpetCo_HRM) 
 
The hostile relationship between trade unions and employers could arguably 
reduce the benefits that the trade unions could offer to employees.  
 
5.2.3 Industrial federations 
 
The industrial federations seemed to be important actors in the external 
environment to firms in the textiles industry in Brazil. These federations served all 
industrial sectors and were organized both at the national and regional levels. As 
explained by the social affairs manager at the regional industrial federation 
(FedReg), the role of the regional federations included representing the interests of 
firms (employers) to the government and trade unions, as well as providing support 
in a range of areas such as health and safety, training and education, social 
responsibility, gender equality, and projects aimed at increasing competitiveness. 
Also, as explained by the social affairs consultant at FedReg, the regional industrial 
federation sought to act as an “example” for other firms in terms of good practices. 
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“...we are an organisation that promotes new technologies and new 
postures... in terms of business model, [and] of behaviour for the 
industries. So, we seek to be an example in this sense. Especially with 
regards to a topic that is so difficult to be assimilated by companies 
[gender equality]. So, we have this parallel work. We do this work 
[promote gender equality] inside the organisation and we also provide 
consultancy outside” (FedReg_Cons) 
 
The national federations had a similar role to that of the regional federations as 
explained above. As explained by the CEO at FedBR, one of the roles of the national 
federation was to represent the interests of the firms in the industry to the 
government, but this was at a more national level compared to the regional 
federations. For instance, while the regional federations dealt with the regional 
(state) authorities, the national federations dealt with the national government. In 
parallel, the national federations also conducted projects to help the industry to 
achieve increased competitiveness. 
 
“…[we] have the fundamental mission of representing the legitimate and 
transparent interests of the textile industry of Brazil... we have in parallel 
all the aspect of representation in administrative institutions, 
relationships with Governments, etc.; but also, we conduct projects 
linked to free enterprises, such as competitiveness, and productivity 
projects, internationalization, innovation programs and management. 
So, we have two very strong pillars: the pillar of the institutional 
representation, which means bringing together fundamental demands 
of the sector, turning them into something that's designable for a 
discussion with the federal Government mostly-including the legislative, 
the executive, the judiciary; and in parallel conduct these agendas that 
we understand to be the most relevant for competitiveness.” 
(FedBR_CEO)  
 
The industrial federations also played a role in monitoring employment practices 




“[Monitoring employment practices down the supply chain] is 
something that has become relevant with this inter-connection of the 
productive chains and retailers have been paying a lot of attention on 
this subject and we are working in conjunction with retailers to have a 
monitoring process from source to final product in order to, in this whole 
production chain, have a proper compliance. Brazil manages that well” 
(FedBR_CEO) 
 
5.2.4 Professional educational institutions 
 
One of the arms of the regional industrial federations provided technical and 
professional courses according to the specific needs of the industries. As explained 
by the development manager of the regional industrial federation, companies in 
the textiles industry were not investing enough in training, thus the industrial 
federations had an important role in providing qualification for workers. According 
to the manager, companies did not invest in training because they believed that 
after being trained their employees would be recruited by other firms, a 
phenomenon that the manager called “labour cannibalism”. 
 
“We see companies not investing in training of skilled labour because 
other companies that pay a little more will take away the professional 
that they have qualified. Then we must accept the role of taking an 
industry with thousands and thousands of micro, small and medium 
enterprises and train skilled labour. Local training doesn’t happen a lot 
because there is so-called labour cannibalism. So, it seems clear that this 
is a sector with problems with its dynamics” (FedReg_DevM). 
 
The CEO at FedBR expressed the opinion that the industrial federations were 
indeed helping Brazil to move forward in creating a strong network of training and 
qualification institutions, which in turn benefited the industry. 
 
“I think we have a very interesting network and Brazil has evolved 
because… in this country is very clear- we're not operating on the 
frontier of technology, in the maximum level of knowledge; and we're 
not a cheap country. So, we're kind of "stuck in the middle", seeking our 
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route of development. And it cannot, in our view, go back, it can only 
move forward. And for that we need to have a country plan, a nation 
plan - a nation project, a project of State…So we are creating this 
network... this approach of universities with companies is increasing. It's 
not like the United States, where the research is much more directed. 
Here there is still a little rancidity, that the researcher has to be free and 
independent and not at the service of capital… There is some of that 
vision of the thinker, of pure research, and then whoever wants do the 
application, a model a little different from the American model. I think it 
is neither for one side nor for the other. What we should have is this mix. 
More independent research, purer; and more targeted research where 
companies can act more. For this, the business environment is very 
important because it promotes, trains, generates more perspective of 
this investment that is high risk... But there is a logic that this greater 
integration of universities, research centres, with businesses is 
important. Brazil is moving forward in this. Brazil has credit lines. 
Sometimes, however, they are very bureaucratic and hinder their access. 
But I would say this is a chapter in which Brazil has evolved… I have 
visited a lot of research and teaching institutions, [and I have told] them 
that this approach is relevant and is fundamental. So, I think Brazil is 




This chapter explored the institutions that impact upon the textiles industry in 
Brazil. The textiles industry in Brazil was struggling to compete in price with low 
cost countries (e.g. China) and in quality with high-end technology countries (e.g. 
European countries). It was argued that one of the reasons why Brazil struggled to 
compete in price was because of the “Brazil cost”, which encompassed high 
bureaucracy and high taxes (including value added tax, income tax and social 
security taxes). In terms of quality, one of the reasons why the textiles industry in 
Brazil was not competitive was because there was difficult access to high-end 
technological machinery in Brazil. There were no Brazilian manufacturers for some 
types of machinery, and the costs for importing were too high. Additionally, the 
clearing process of imports was also too bureaucratic and slow, making it even 
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more difficult for Brazilian firms to obtain modern machinery. The high taxes and 
bureaucracy related to the importing process also affected the acquisition of raw 
materials from abroad, which forced companies to keep high levels of stock of 
imported materials, further increasing costs. 
 
In terms of employment practices, Brazil had a comprehensive labour system which 
was in accordance with the international standards (e.g. ILO). However, such 
comprehensive employment legislation did not guarantee regulation enforcement 
and the protection of rights for all workers. For example, one of the roles of the 
trade unions was to monitor employment practices in the industry, but the trade 
unions only checked companies when someone reported wrongdoing, because 
they did not have enough resources to monitor all companies. Also, it seemed that 
the relationship between employers and trade unions were somewhat hostile 
rather than collaborative, reducing their prospect of working in the interests of the 
employees. In addition, it seemed that employers considered the Brazilian labour 
system too burdensome, making it difficult for employers to cope with it (especially 
small businesses) which, in turn, could lead to informality. As for formal businesses, 
the high costs of compliance with the employment regulations seemed to act as 
another element of the “Brazil cost”, decreasing the competitiveness of the 
Brazilian industry. 
 
In relation to equality, within the employment legislation there was a regulation 
that determined “base salaries” for each job “category”, which promoted equality 
in terms of pay, because employers had to pay the same salary for all workers in 
the same position irrespective of their gender, religion, race and ethnicity. However, 
this regulation seemed to be promoting equality in terms of pay only for certain 
types of jobs. Also, the unsatisfactory regulation enforcement as well as the 
acknowledged existence of informal businesses reduced the potential of this 
regulation to promote equality in the Brazilian industry.  
 
The institutions that impacted upon the textiles industry in Brazil identified in this 
chapter will form part of the institutional context in which the case study focal 
organisation operated. The next chapter will introduce the case study focal 
organisation and its supply chain.  
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CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY FOCAL ORGANISATION AND ITS 
SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
As explained in the Methodology chapter, this research uses a case study that 
focusses on a Brazilian textiles company and its supply chain. The previous chapter 
explored the institutions within the textiles industry in Brazil, which form part of 
the institutional context within which the case study focal organisation operates. 
This chapter will introduce the case study focal organisation and its supply chain. 
The first section will explain the focal company background and explore its intra-
firm dynamics. The following section will describe the company’s supply chain and 
explore the dynamics of the inter-firm relationships across the supply chain. The 
chapter ends with a summary. 
 
6.1 The focal organisation and its intra-firm dynamics 
 
The case study focal organisation operated in the textiles industry in the household 
segment, manufacturing floor covering products. The company started operating 
in Brazil in the early 2000s and was part of an international family business group 
with operations in several countries across the world. This section explains the focal 
company background, including its ownership structure, organisational structure, 
and some of the intra-organisational dynamics. 
 
6.1.1 Ownership structure 
 
The case study organisation (CarpetCo) was part of a group of companies with 
operations in several countries around the world (TexCorp). TexCorp was formed 
when an international family business (GranTex), was split up into several 
companies in the early 1990s. After the split, each child of the previous firm’s 
founder received a separate company. The entrepreneur who inherited one of 
these newly created firms soon formed his own group of companies (TexCorp), 
through both acquisitions and new ventures. All of the companies in TexCorp 
operated in the textiles industry, and they were vertically integrated, taking the 
product through the whole process, from raw materials to final products. CarpetCo 
operated in the household segment, specialising in floor covering products. It 
started operating in Brazil in the early 2000s. At the time of data collection 
103 
 
CarpetCo had one plant that employed approximately 100 workers, and they also 
had a small sales office with approximately 7 employees.  
 
After the split of GranTex, some of the heirs of the other firms later merged and 
formed their own business conglomerate (DutexCorp). Although CarpetCo did not 
have ownership connections with the companies that were part of DutexCorp 
group, it maintained close relationships with these companies. Some of these 








































6.1.2 CarpetCo’s organisational structure 
 
TexCorp’s Headquarters (HQ) was located abroad (the country has been omitted to 
maintain confidentiality), and the administrative functions of CarpetCo were based 
locally in their main plant. CarpetCo was divided into three main divisions: Sales 
and Marketing, Production Management, and Accounting and Finance. The 
Production Management division accounted for approximately 75% of the 
workforce, and it was a male dominated division where 3% of workers were women. 
The Sales and Marketing division accounted for approximately 8% of the workforce, 
where 43% were women. Accounting and Finance accounted for approximately 16% 
of the total workforce where 73% were women. In the company as whole, 80% of 







Accounting and Finance division 
 
As shown in Figure 6.2, the accounting and finance director was responsible for the 
departments of Accounting and Taxes, Financial Operations, as well as Human 
Resources Management, Information Technology (IT) and External Trade. The 
Accounting and Taxes department had two employees, including the accounting 
manager and one accountant. They were responsible for both Management and 
Financial Accounting activities. Their main responsibilities included the preparation 
and reporting of the company’s financial statements, cost calculation and price 
formation. Human Resources (HR) management was a small department with only 
one permanent employee (HR manager) and one contracted health and safety 
advisor. Although arguably unconventional in many countries, HR management 
was under the Accounting and Finance division seemingly because of the 
department’s small size.  
 
Supply chain management 
 
Supply chain management was divided into two departments, and each of them 
was under a different division. The first department was under the Production 
Management division and was responsible for buying materials from national 
suppliers as well as for planning material needs for the production. The second 
department was under the Accounting and Finance division and was responsible 
for the external trade – interacting with both customers and suppliers from the 
external market coordinating the import and export processes. However, the 
external trade department had no decision-making power in relation to the supply 
chain (e.g. choice of suppliers), and only handled the daily operations related to 
trade with the external market (e.g. processing purchase and sales orders, 
processing invoices, coordinating import and export processes with Brazilian 
authorities).  
 
The role of the Accounting and Finance division in the supply chain management 
 
Accounting information plays an important role in many areas within supply chain 
management, such as, for example, make-or-buy decisions (Seal et al., 1999). 
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However, in this study it is important to make a distinction between accounting and 
the accountants (Accounting and Finance division). Within CarpetCo, it seemed that 
the Accounting and Finance division had a rather ‘traditional’ role of producing 
‘post-factual’ accounting information such as calculating the cost of goods sold and 
preparing financial statements; while some of the strategic management 
accounting information were produced by other divisions. For example, customer 
accounting, which involved segment and customer profitability analysis, was 
controlled by the Sales and Marketing division. In fact, the relationship of the 
accounting and finance director with CarpetCo’s customers was mainly limited to 
financial operations (payment).  
 
“...if I need to visit my clients they get scared. At the beginning, 10 
years ago I used to visit them to get to know them, to know who I was 
selling to, where my product was going to. And the clients would 
come to the factory to see who they were buying from. But today we 
already know 100% of our clients. The company doesn’t have a large 
range of clients... So today, when I visit a client, it is when someone 
owes me [money]” (CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
Similarly, the relationship between the accounting and finance director with 
CarpetCo’s suppliers was limited to issues related to financial operations. Moreover, 
the Accounting and finance director explained that, although she was sometimes 
involved in the negotiations of price with suppliers, the ultimate decision was made 
by the industrial director. 
 
“[My relationship with the suppliers is] completely superficial. Many 
times, they call me due to a negotiation, but it’s to ask for a longer 
payment term, to discuss this kind of thing... if I check with the 
accounting manager and see that there will be an impact of 5% with 
cash payment, I will further negotiate that. But if the industrial 
director tells me that with or without 5% they want the yarn from 
that supplier, it’s decided – the yarn will be from that supplier. I don’t 





The accounting and finance director further explained that she had virtually no 
control over decisions related to the supply chain management, such as the 
selection of suppliers. For example, she explained that the selection of suppliers 
was controlled by the sales director together with the industrial director. 
 
“[My control over the selection of suppliers] is practically nil. Supplier 
is with the sales director and with the industrial director, because it 
requires technical knowledge, 100%. Grammage of the yarn that will 
be used, etc... These areas define this. So much so that I don’t even 
know [the supplier], I don’t visit. The ones who visit are the 
department of product development, the sales division, the industrial 
division… they go wherever they have to go to see who they are 
buying from, who they are negotiating with” (CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
Make-or-buy decisions seemed to be made at senior management level (directors, 
CEO and HQ), with little involvement of the accountants within CarpetCo. Each of 
these management accounting practices will be further explored in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
6.1.3 CarpetCo’s approach to managing social issues 
 
In order to help understand the internal factors that influenced the use of SCA 
practices in the case study organisation, the previous section explored some of the 
intra-organisational dynamics, including the organisational structure and the 
departmental roles, providing insights into the embedded power dynamics. This 
section continues to explore the intra-organisational dynamics by exploring some 
of CarpetCo’s employment practices and social impact which provided insights into 
organisational culture and, moreover, which enabled this study to understand the 
potential impact of the CarpetCo’s organisational practices across its supply chain 







6.1.3.1 Employment practices 
 
Overall, interviewees within CarpetCo seemed to believe that CarpetCo had better 
employment practices than other companies in the same industry and/or in the 
same region. For example, in terms of pay, both the finance director and the HR 
manager affirmed that CarpetCo paid much higher salaries to its employees in 
comparison to other firms in the textiles industry in the region. The finance director 
explained that while the practice of other textiles firms in the region was to pay the 
base salary determined by the regulation, CarpetCo paid wages above the base 
salary; and that, while the practice of other textiles firms in the region was to give 
annual increases limited to the inflation rate, CarpetCo had the practice of giving 
annual increases corresponding to the inflation rate plus a real salary increase. The 
finance director further explained that CarpetCo sought to benchmark its practices 
with companies from other industries within the region and with companies from 
other regions, because CarpetCo judged the firms in the textiles industry in the 
region to be too far away from CarpetCo’s practices. 
 
In terms of benefits, the HR manager suggested that CarpetCo’s practices were 
better than those of other companies in the region. She explained that CarpetCo 
offered a comprehensive package of benefits to all employees, such as private 
health and dental insurance, life insurance, food and transport, and she said that 
CarpetCo’s practices in terms of benefits were better because most benefits 
provided by CarpetCo to its employees were fully paid by the company (100% of 
the amount of the benefits with no salary sacrifice). According to the HR manager, 
not only was the salary of CarpetCo’s employees higher, but the amount of the 
“take home pay” of its employees was higher, given that the company offered a 
higher coverage of benefits. For example, CarpetCo provided private health 
insurance to its employees, and the company funded 100% of the costs of the 
insurance, therefore there was no salary sacrifice for CarpetCo’s employees. 
Meanwhile other companies funded only a percentage of the insurance, where the 
employer would pay the health insurance firm and later discount the percentage 
corresponding to the employee’s contribution to the plan from the employees’ pay 




Interviewees within CarpetCo also believed that they enjoyed high employment 
security. For example, the HR manager explained that the staff turnover within 
CarpetCo was low, and staff retention was high, as there were many employees 
who had been working for the company for many years. The accountant echoed 
the perception that CarpetCo provided high employment security to its workers. 
She said that CarpetCo avoided making use of redundancies and that the culture of 
the company was to try to resolve any occasional issues with employees (for 
example, frequent absenteeism or late arrivals) before considering dismissal. 
Moreover, the HR manager explained that CarpetCo also avoided employing 
temporary workers. She said that all CarpetCo’s employees had permanent 
contracts, and the only temporary workers within the company were the porters 
and cleaning workers who were contractors (hired through an agency). The 
industrial director also explained that whenever CarpetCo needed to increase the 
workload within the production for a period longer than a few weeks, the company 
would rather hire new employees than make use of temporary workers. One of the 
reasons for this was because within the Brazilian legislation permanent employees 
and temporary workers had the same rights. The industrial director also showed 
scepticism in relation to the firms that provided temporary workers. 
 
“We don't like to do that, because the Brazilian law provides 
that we have to pay exactly the same. It's better to employ 
them than to have temporary people. Also, the firms that 
provide this people are usually... not the best companies in 
the world” (CarpetCo_IndDir) 
 
These findings suggest that, as expected during the case study organisation 
selection process, CarpetCo provided a best practices case study, despite some 
limitations and areas for improvement which will be discussed throughout this 
thesis. 
 
6.1.3.2 Gender institutions 
 
Interestingly, the gender patterns within CarpetCo were not the same as the 
general pattern in the textiles industry in Brazil. As explained in chapter 5, the 
textiles industry in Brazil was a female dominated sector. CarpetCo, on the other 
110 
 
hand, employed more men than women in general. As explained in the previous 
section, CarpetCo was divided into three main divisions: Sales and Marketing, 
Production Management, and Accounting and Finance. The Production 
Management division accounted for approximately 75% of the workforce, and it 
was a male dominated division where approximately 97% of workers were men. 
Within the Sales and Marketing division, approximately 43% of workers were 
women. Within the Accounting and Finance division, approximately 73% were 
women. In other words, both the production and sales divisions were male 
dominated. It is important to note that while the production processes of most 
firms in the textiles industry involved sewing and other labour-intensive activities 
which tend to be female dominated, CarpetCo’s production process was largely 
capital intensive. 
 
“...in the factory there is no other way…. they have hired 
women in the past but it did not work, because it is heavy 
work. In the administrative division we don’t make this 
distinction…” (CarpetCo_HRM_Fup) 
 
Despite the notable gender segregation, CarpetCo seemed to maintain gender 
equality in terms of employment practices. For example, the HR manager explained 
that all the benefits were provided in equal terms for men and women. In terms of 
pay, both the HR manager and the finance director said that men and women 
working in similar positions within the company earned equal salaries. The 
interviewees made reference to the employment regulation that determined 
wages by job category (as explained in chapter 5) as evidence of CarpetCo's gender 
equality in terms of pay. However, it is important to note that the same 
interviewees had previously affirmed that CarpetCo paid higher wages compared 
to other firms in the textiles industry in the region where the company operated. 
Given this study's lack of access to accounting and cost information, it was not 
possible to verify whether the amount that CarpetCo paid to its employees in excess 
of the minimum pay required by the regulation was equal for men and women 





6.1.3.3 Labour skills and educational levels 
 
CarpetCo’s provision of education support and training to its workforce is important 
not only to understand the intra-firm dynamics that impacted upon the SCA 
practices used by the organisation, but also for understanding the potential impact 
of the CarpetCo’s organisational practices on the development of Brazil. The 
educational levels within CarpetCo varied depending on the division. In the 
administrative functions, the majority of employees had higher education, and the 
minimum educational level was secondary education. In the production functions, 
the majority of workers had secondary education, but some workers had studied 
only until the foundation level. According to the HR manager, this was the case with 
older employees within the production division. CarpetCo funded educational 
courses to employees, including English language courses and even graduate 
degree (university). The accountant told that there were two employees within 
CarpetCo undertaking graduate courses fully paid by the company at the time of 
the interview. However, the accountant said that there was not a clear criterion for 
determining whether the company would fund a course for an employee. She 
further explained that the funding was available for all employees regardless of 
hierarchical position and company division, but that these decisions were made on 
an ad-hoc basis with no clear criteria. 
 
In terms of provision of technical skills training, CarpetCo provided mainly 
functional training (directly related to the job), but professional development 
training (e.g. leadership) were generally not provided, as explained by the 
accountant. For example, the company paid for employees to attend external 
training on changes in the tax legislation for tax accounting purposes. These 
functional training also provided networking opportunities for staff. The finance 
director explained that these courses were important because this was a 
requirement for international quality certification held by CarpetCo (ISO 9001 and 
ISO 14001, both issued by the International Organization for Standardization – ISO). 
She further explained that these training were either fully or partially funded by 
company, depending on the relevance of the training to the role of the employee. 
The finance director further revealed that sometimes even if the training was not 
directly related to the employee’s role, but the employee was good, the company 




6.2 Case study supply chain and inter-firm relationships  
 
The previous section explained CarpetCo’s background and explored its intra-firm 
dynamics. This section will focus on CarpetCo’s supply chain and will explore the 
dynamics in the inter-firm relationships between CarpetCo and its customers and 
suppliers. As explained in the previous section, CarpetCo operated in the textiles 
industry in the household segment, manufacturing floor covering products. The 
product line was divided into two segments: residential and commercial, and the 
customer base included homes, offices, hotels, airports, and commercial 
environments. Some of the focal organisation’s customers and suppliers were 
located abroad, and some operated in different sectors, forming a complex supply 
chain that went beyond country and industry boundaries. CarpetCo’s supply chain 
is depicted in Figure 6.3. The firms that have been interviewed in this study have 
been highlighted in the figure. The inter-firm relationships across the supply chain 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































CarpetCo’s product mix was divided into two main ‘segments’ (product lines): 
residential and commercial. The commercial product line was further divided into 
two types: tufted carpets (sold in rolls) and modular carpets (sold in tiles). CarpetCo 
sold mainly to the internal (Brazilian) market, and exports represented only 1% of 
the business. Exports were exclusively within South America, with customers in 
Mercosur (the economic bloc formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) 
and Chile. Within Brazil, Sao Paulo was the largest market, representing 45% of 
sales. The distribution of the company’s turnover by region according to 
information given by the financial director is shown in the table below. 
 
Region % Sales 
Southeast (Sao Paulo) 45% 
Southeast and South  
(Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Parana and Rio 
Grande do Sul) 
40% 
Midwest (Mato Grosso, Goias and Brasília DF) 10% 
North and Northeast 4% 
Exports (Mercosur and Chile) 1% 
Table 6.1: Sales distribution by region (Source: author) 
 
CarpetCo direct customers were all retailers, and the company did not sell its 
products directly to end-consumers. In other words, CarpetCo operated with a 
business-to-business arrangement rather than a business-to-consumer 
arrangement. The end-consumer base included residential customers, commercial 
customers (e.g. smaller offices), and corporate customers (e.g. larger businesses 
such as airports, hotels, banks, etc.). Some of CarpetCo’s direct customers (retailers) 
were also wholesalers, as shown in Figure 6.3. In other words, besides serving 
residential, commercial and corporate customers, these retailers also sold 
CarpetCo’s products to other smaller retailers. 
 
The products sold to residential and commercial customers were generally 
standard products, whereby CarpetCo was responsible for developing the products, 
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defining characteristics such as design, colour, and type of yarn; and the retailers 
displayed the standardised products to the final customers. The corporate 
customers usually required some degree of product customisation, which 
demanded large projects involving CarpetCo, the retailer and the end-customer. 
For example, CarpetCo sometimes developed a specific carpet design or used a 
differentiated yarn colour for a specific customer (a national bank), and the product 
design phase involved staff from the bank, from the retailer who represented 
CarpetCo to the bank, and from product design team within CarpetCo.  
 
6.2.2 Tier 1 Suppliers 
 
CarpetCo bought its raw materials from both the internal (Brazilian) market and the 
external market, and the supplier base included third party firms, firms from within 
TexCorp, and firms with family links. In Figure 6.3, the suppliers of raw materials 
have been divided into six groups according to the type of material they supplied: 
yarns and fibres, backing for modular carpets, backing for tufted carpets, latex, 
calcite and materials for asphalt backing. These suppliers operated in different 
countries and industry sectors, forming a complex and broad supply chain: the 
suppliers of yarns and fibres operated in the textiles industry (YarnsCoEU_SM); the 
suppliers of backing material for tufted carpets also operated in the textiles industry 
(BackCoJC_SM); the suppliers of latex operated in the chemicals industry 
(LatexCo_BusDir); the suppliers of calcite operated in the mineral industry (as 
explained by the CEO at CalciteCo) and, finally, CarpetCo’s single supplier of backing 
for modular carpets operated in a range of different industries, wherein the division 
that supplied backing materials to CarpetCo focused on the flooring sector 
(MBackCo website). Apart from these suppliers of raw materials, there were other 
three groups of suppliers: suppliers of finished goods for resale (e.g. laminated floor, 
synthetic grass); suppliers of indirect materials (e.g. packaging and consumable 
goods); and suppliers of machinery and parts for machinery.  
 
Suppliers of Yarns and Fibre 
 
Yarns and fibres were the materials that formed the visible part of the finished 
goods. CarpetCo had three active suppliers of these materials. The main supplier in 
terms of volume was YarnsCoEU, which was based in Europe (country omitted in 
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order to preserve anonymity). As indicated in Figure 6.1, this supplier had family 
links with CarpetCo. In other words, this supplier was part of the business 
conglomerate DutexCorp, which was owned by members of the family of 
CarpetCo’s owners (as explained in section 6.1.1). The second supplier of these 
materials was TexCo, which was based in Africa (country omitted in order to 
preserve anonymity). It is important to note that this supplier was from within 
TexCorp, the same group of which CarpetCo was part (as explained in section 6.1.1). 
The third supplier of yarns and fibre was YarnsCoBR, which was the only supplier of 
these materials that was based in Brazil. In contrast to the other two suppliers of 
yarns and fibre, YarnsCoBR was a third-party company with no group or family links. 
 
Suppliers of Backings 
 
Backings were the materials that formed the back of the carpets. In terms of 
installation, CarpetCo divided their product lines into two types: tufted carpets 
(sold in rolls) and modular carpets (sold in tiles). For modular carpets, CarpetCo had 
only one supplier of backings which was based abroad (MBackCo). For tufted 
carpets, there were two different types of backing materials: primary and 
secondary backings. For primary backings for tufted carpets, there was only one 
supplier which was based abroad (BackCoEU). The SCM explained that CarpetCo 
had sought to change from BackCoEU to a national supplier (BackCoJC) in order to 
reduce the levels of stocks (since imported materials involved high levels of stock 
owing to the higher delivery cycle and the unpredictability of the importing process 
in Brazil). However, the SCM explained that this attempt failed because the quality 
of the primary backing material from BackCoJC was inadequate. For secondary 
backing for tufted carpets, there were three active suppliers: BackCoBR (based in 
Brazil), BackCoJC (based in Brazil), and BackCoEU (based in Europe). BackCoJC was 
CarpetCo’s main supplier of secondary backings for tufted carpets in terms of 
volume. Two managers within this supplier were interviewed as part of this study, 
and the findings from these interviews will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 




Latex and Calcite were materials used in the formulation of the bonding agent of 
the carpets. For latex, CarpetCo had only one active supplier for this material at the 
time of the interviews (LatexCo), which was based in Brazil. As for Calcite, CarpetCo 
also had only one active supplier (CalciteCo), which was based in Brazil close to 
CarpetCo’s plant. During the first phase of data collection CarpetCo had recently 
changed its supplier of calcite, which then remain the same up to the second phase 
of interviews. Managers within both CalciteCo and LatexCo were interviewed as 
part of this study, and the findings from these interviews will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Suppliers of Fibreglass and Bitumen 
 
Fibreglass and bitumen were materials used in the production of asphalt backing, a 
material that had recently been insourced by CarpetCo. In other words, CarpetCo 
had previously purchased a finished asphalt backing material from a supplier and 
had recently started to make this product in-house. Making this product in-house 
involved purchasing fibreglass and bitumen and transforming these materials into 
asphalt backing. This process of insourcing and the dynamics of the relationship 
between CarpetCo and these two new suppliers will be explored in chapter 8, which 
focuses on make-or-buy decisions.   
 
6.2.3 Tier 2 Suppliers 
 
This study mainly focuses on the relationships between CarpetCo and its tier 1 
suppliers and customers. Although CarpetCo did not have a direct relationship with 
its tier 2 suppliers, they were aware of who some of their tier 2 suppliers were. 
Some of the main tier 2 suppliers to CarpetCo have been identified based on the 
information provided by interviewees within CarpetCo, as well as by the 
interviewees within some of CarpetCo’s tier 1 suppliers that have been interviewed; 
and they are depicted in Figure 6.3. It is important to note that the list is not 
exhaustive as the mapping is limited to the tier 2 suppliers of which the 
interviewees were aware. 
 
As seen in Figure 6.3, an important tier 2 supplier within CarpetCo’s supply chain 
was PPBR (name anonymised). PPBR was a Brazilian giant petrochemical company 
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that supplied materials to two of CarpetCo’s main tier 1 suppliers – BackCoJC and 
LatexCo. BackCoJC bought its main raw material, polypropylene, from PPBR. In fact, 
PPBR was the only company that produced polypropylene in Brazil, and PPBR sold 
around 70% of all polypropylene consumed within Brazil (Braskem, 2014). It 
seemed that PPBR’s dominance of the market of polypropylene in Brazil impacted 
the power relations between buyers and suppliers. For example, the HR manager 
at BackCoJC suggested that PPBR’s advantaged position allowed them to impose 
selling prices at their will. 
 
“...we have only one big supplier. It’s the company that supplies to 
everyone, which is PPBR. I personally have no contact with them. All I 
know is that they have the monopoly here in Brazil, which I think is wrong, 
because they charge whatever price that they want” (BackCoJC_HRM) 
 
In relation to the quote above it is important to note that although the HR manager 
referred to PPBR having the monopoly of the propylene market in Brazil, this was 
not literal. Although PPBR was the only company that produced polypropylene in 
Brazil, in terms of distribution of polypropylene PPBR held around 70% of the 
market in Brazil, thus PPBR did not have the monopoly of the polypropylene market 
in Brazil given that there were other suppliers from abroad serving the national 
market. 
 
The sales manager at BackCoJC also referred to PPBR and the unbalanced power 
relationship between PPBR and its suppliers. He further explained that this 
situation impacted the competitiveness of the Brazilian products within the 
Brazilian market. For instance, both BackCoJC and BackCoBR were national 
manufacturers of backings, and both of them purchased raw materials from PPBR. 
According to the sales manager, the price of the imported backings (finished 
backing purchased from abroad) was lower than the price of the backings 
manufactured by BackCoJC and BackCoBR. 
 
“In our market we have one national supplier, which is PPBR. They 
dictate the rules, we cannot negotiate. Their selling price to us is the 
same as to BackCoBR. BackCoBR and we both have the same costs. There 
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is no other way, at the end of the process our price will be the same. But 
if, for example, our product has a final price of R$15, in a scenario with a 
low exchange rate the product arrives from Belgium, for example, at 
R$10. So it’s very complicated” (BackCoJC_SM) 
 
Another supplier of CarpetCo that bought materials from PPBR was LatexCo. The 
business director at LatexCo explained that, although there were no alternative 
suppliers of polypropylene within Brazil, they had the option to buy the material 
from abroad. However, LatexCo chose to buy the materials from PPBR because, 
according to the business director, the import timing and costs would not offset the 
higher price charged by PPBR.    
 
“...for the polypropylene we have alternative suppliers, but we don’t buy 
from them. We can bring from China, for example…There are many 
options, but imported. In Brazil there isn’t, only PPBR. And for importing 
there are costs… Import duties, nationalisation, cost of customs, cost of 
storage, timing. We need to analyse all that. If you add all that up, at the 
most it will be the same, so it’s unviable…. This reduces the 
competitiveness; it has a terrible impact, drastic” (LatexCo_BusDir). 
 
In summary, PPBR was an important tier 2 supplier to CarpetCo, who supplied raw 
materials to two of CarpetCo’s main tier 1 suppliers. PPBR had an advantaged 
position in its market and an unbalanced power relationship with its buyers, which 
directly affected the cost of the materials that CarpetCo purchased from its supplier. 
However, despite the importance of PPBR, CarpetCo had no directly relationship 
with this tier 2 supplier. Other tier 2 suppliers that could have had an important 




This chapter introduced the case study focal organisation (CarpetCo) and its supply 
chain. The focal organisation operated in the textiles industry in Brazil in the 
household segment, specialising in floor covering products (mainly carpets). 
CarpetCo was part of an international group (TexCorp) and the owner of the group 
had family links with another international group (DutexCorp). The plant in Brazil, 
120 
 
which had approximately 100 employees, manufactured products in-house and 
sold its products to the Brazilian market (99%) as well as to other countries in South 
America (1%).  
 
CarpetCo’s direct customers were all retailers, and the end-customer base included 
both residential and commercial customers. Products sold to residential customers 
were standard, and products sold to commercial customers (e.g. banks, hotels, 
offices) usually involved some degree of customisations in terms of design, colour 
and type of yarn.  
 
As for CarpetCo’s suppliers, the company bought its raw materials from both the 
internal (Brazilian) and the external market, and the supplier base included third 
party firms, firms from within the same group (TexCorp), and firms from the group 
with family links (DutexCorp). CarpetCo’s suppliers operated in different countries 
and industry sectors, forming a complex and broad supply chain.  
 
In order to enable this study to understand the internal factors that influenced the 
use of SCA practices in the case study organisation, this chapter also explored the 
intra-organisational dynamics. These included the organisational structure and the 
departmental roles, providing insights into the embedded power dynamics. This 
chapter also explored CarpetCo’s employment and social practices, providing 
insights into organisational culture and, moreover, enabling this study to explore 
the impact of CarpetCo’s organisational practices across its supply chain and on the 







CHAPTER 7: INTER-FIRM GOVERNANCE ACROSS THE 
SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
As explained in previous chapters, the main purpose of this study is to explore the 
potential of SCA to promote both economic and social upgrading. In pursuit of this 
aim, this study explores the SCA practices used by a focal organisation in the textiles 
industry in Brazil and across its supply chain and examines how these practices 
impacted upon the wider economic and social context in which the organisations 
in the supply chain operated. As explained in chapter 2, this thesis uses the term 
supply chain accounting (SCA) to refer to the domain of management accounting 
and controls in inter-organisational settings. In other words, in this thesis the term 
SCA encompasses all forms of controls in inter-organisational settings, including 
control archetypes, management control mechanisms and cost and accounting 
controls (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008). Initially, a wide range of SCA practices (or control 
archetypes and mechanisms) were explored and, after preliminary analysis of data 
collected, greater focus was given to the SCA mechanisms that were more relevant 
to the case study and that offered richer empirics to achieve this study’s purpose 
and objectives. Thus, in common with previous exploratory case study studies 
(Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the preliminary case analysis helped to identify the 
SCA practices to focus on in the course of the research. The SCA practices of focus 
of this study are: 1) inter-firm governance; 2) make-or-buy decisions; 3) customer 
accounting, and 4) open book accounting. This chapter explores the first of a series 
of four SCA practices explored in this study: inter-firm governance. 
 
Inter-firm governance has been argued to be a source of corporate and inter-
organisational competitive advantage (Estampe et al., 2013; Cullen & Meira, 2010; 
Dekker, 2004); therefore, inter-firm governance is arguably a key area of focus for 
promoting economic upgrading within emerging economies, particularly for the 
Brazilian textiles industry which was struggling to compete both in terms of price 
and quality. Inter-firm governance involves both the initiation and maintenance of 
inter-firm relationships. Thus, governance structure design and partner selection 
are key areas of debate in inter-firm governance literature (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; 
Dekker, 2004, 2008). While partner selection focuses on reducing control problems 
by finding a reliable and qualified supplier, the choice of governance structure (or 
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relationship arrangement) focuses on both reducing and managing control 
problems (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Dekker, 2008; Zhou et al., 2003). Although 
partner selection and the choice of governance structure (or relationship 
arrangement) are considered the key mechanisms used to mitigate control 
problems in inter-firm relationships, inter-firm governance may involve a wide 
range of control mechanisms, including contractual and non-contractual 
arrangements and controls. For example, control mechanisms may involve 
contractual contingency planning, performance target setting, incentives, 
monitoring and rewarding outcomes and behaviour, information sharing, process 
reviews and joint problem solving (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Dekker, Sakaguchi, & 
Kawai, 2013; Dekker, 2008). This chapter examines the rules and routines in terms 
of inter-firm governance within CarpetCo and down its supply chain, exploring the 
factors that shaped these rules and routines. This chapter also explores how the 
rules and routines in terms of inter-firm governance in the case study supply chain 
impacted upon the wider economic and social environment in Brazil.  
 
7.1 Inter-firm governance in the case study supply chain 
 
This section examines the rules and routines in terms of inter-firm governance 
within CarpetCo and down its supply chain and explores the factors that shaped 
these rules and routines. These factors include inter-organisational ones, such as 
the characteristics of the exchange transaction (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; 
Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; 
Speklé, 2001); the social embeddedness between buyers and suppliers (Ding, 
Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Dekker, 2008; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Buskens, 
Batenburg, & Weesie, 2003; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000); and 
external environment ones, such as government initiatives (Seal, Berry, & Cullen, 
2004) and unpredictability or lack of technological development (Dekker, Sakaguchi, 





7.1.1 Influence of transaction characteristics on inter-firm governance between 
CarpetCo and its suppliers 
 
Many studies that examine the antecedents of inter-firm governance suggest that 
the processes of selecting an appropriate partner and designing an appropriate 
governance structure (or relationship arrangement) are shaped by the 
characteristics of the transactions and/or of the tasks involved in the inter-firm 
relationship. For example, many studies propose that the key determinants of 
inter-firm governance choices are related to the transaction risks, which include: 
asset specificity (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; 
Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008; 
Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Speklé, 2001), uncertainty (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; 
Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008; Speklé, 2001), and 
transaction size (or transaction volume) (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Dekker 
& Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2008). Other factors that influence inter-firm 
governance include transaction frequency (Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Dekker, 2004; 
Vosselman, 2002), cumulativity (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), and supply chain maturity 
(Cullen & Meira, 2010).  
 
For example, Agndal & Nilsson (2010) argue that when asset specificity and levels 
of uncertainty are low, firms adopt a transactional purchasing strategy, which are 
characterised by typically arm’s length relationships. On the other hand, when asset 
specificity and levels of uncertainty are high, firms adopt a relational purchasing 
strategy (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010) and tend to form more collaborative and long-
term business relationships (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Cullen & Meira, 2010).  
 
Some of these findings were also reflected in this case study. For example, in 
common with previous literature, CarpetCo had different types of relationship 
arrangements with its tier 1 suppliers depending on transaction characteristics such 
as levels of uncertainty involved in the exchange transaction (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & 
Kawai, 2013; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker & Van 
den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008). However, the evidence in this study is not 
entirely consistent with these previous studies. For example, in contrast with 
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previous studies (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; 
Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008; 
Caglio & Ditillo, 2008; Speklé, 2001), in this case study asset specificity did not seem 
to influence the type of relationships between the buyer and its suppliers. The next 
sub-sections discuss these transaction characteristics that shaped inter-firm 
governance across the case study supply chain. 
 
7.1.1.1 Asset specificity 
 
Asset specificity relates to significant investments in assets dedicated to a specific 
transaction, and the extent to which these investments can be used in other 
transactions without loss of value or incurring high cost (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & 
Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008). These investments may be in 
physical assets, such as tools, computer systems and machinery acquired 
specifically to satisfy the demands of a particular buyer, and/or in human assets, 
such as specific skills, knowledge and experience of individuals in the firm (Dekker, 
Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). In contrast with previous 
studies (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Agndal & 
Nilsson, 2010; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008; Caglio & Ditillo, 
2008; Speklé, 2001), in this case study asset specificity did not seem to influence 
the type of relationships between the buyer and its suppliers. For example, yarns 
and fibres were critical materials for CarpetCo, but they were standard products for 
the suppliers and did not involve significant supplier-specific investments. In other 
words, for the suppliers of yarns and fibre CarpetCo was a customer that did not 
require customisations, thus the transaction did not involve asset specificity. 
 
“[Our material] is standard for them. The material, say the master batch 
with which they make the yarns for us, they buy, they produce for us 
with the material that they have in-house” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
The SCM further explained that the same was true for all other materials that 
CarpetCo purchased, not only yarns and fibre. In other words, there were no 
exchange transactions between CarpetCo and its tier 1 suppliers that involved asset 
specify. A possible explanation for this may be CarpetCo’s product characteristics. 
Many studies which discussed the influence of asset specify on inter-firm 
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governance were conducted in industries that involve high technology 
development, such the information technology industry (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 
2012; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2008), the telecommunications 
industry (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), the automotive industry (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), 
rail infrastructure (Dekker, 2004), and other complex manufacturing industries 
(Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013). In this study, the products did not involve 
customisations or high levels of technological development. Therefore, the findings 
in this study may suggest that asset specificity has little or no influence on inter-





Uncertainties in an exchange transaction may involve environmental and 
behavioural uncertainties (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 
2013; Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008). 
Environmental uncertainty refers to lack of predictability and control over the 
broader context in which the exchange transaction occurs (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & 
Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008). Examples of environmental 
uncertainties include changes in the market (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; 
Dekker, 2008), unpredictability and technological uncertainty (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & 
Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008). Environmental uncertainties 
may arguably be particularly relevant within the context of developing countries 
where, for example, inflation may be high (Hopper et al., 2009; Tsamenyi, Bennett, 
& Black, 2004) and the business environment may involve political uncertainty 
(Hopper et al., 2009). 
 
Behavioural uncertainty refers to difficulties in predicting and controlling how the 
partner will behave in the future (whether partners will behave opportunistically) 
(Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). Behavioural uncertainty may 
also be affected by environmental uncertainty. For example, Caglio (2017) argues 
that in times of recession behavioural uncertainty in inter-firm relationships 
increases. Behavioural uncertainty may be significant when the product is critical to 
the buyer (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), when there are 
few alternative suppliers (Dekker, 2008; Agndal and Nilsson, 2010; Kumra et al., 
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2012; Dekker and Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker et al., 2013), and when the 
exchange transaction involves high levels of high switching costs and (Agndal & 
Nilsson, 2010). The findings in the textiles industry in Brazil also suggest that 
behavioural uncertainties are significantly affected by product criticality, the 
number of alternative suppliers, and the level of switching costs van (der Meer-
Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; Hakansson and Lind, 2004; Dekker, 2008; Agndal and 
Nilsson, 2010; Kumra et al., 2012), as will be explained in the next sub-sections. 
 
7.1.1.2.1 Product criticality 
 
Previous literature suggest that levels of uncertainty are high when the exchange 
transaction involves product criticality (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & 
Nilsson, 2010). In other words, levels of uncertainty may be high when the materials 
supplied are critical to the buyer, whereby failures in quality and delivery would 
have major consequences for the buyer (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & 
Nilsson, 2010). These findings seem to be reflected in this case study. For example, 
yarns and fibres were the most critical materials for CarpetCo, given that these 
materials formed the visible part of their finished goods, as explained by the SCM 
below. 
 
“We have suppliers of raw material, which are the base of the products, 
the visible part of the products, which are the yarns. These are the main 
ones because for the yarn I can’t keep changing the suppliers. If I have 
an established product - for example, a colour [name of colour], which is 
a product that we have - I have to buy it from YarnsCoEU, which is the 
established yarn. It has the colour tone, everything just right” 
(CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
Given that yarns and fibre were critical materials for CarpetCo, quality was crucial 
for these materials. Therefore, CarpetCo employed mechanisms to mitigate 
uncertainties. These mechanisms were reflected particularly in the choice of 
suppliers for this material, which seemed to be mainly driven by quality. CarpetCo 
bought yarns from three suppliers, two from the external market (YarnsCoEU and 
TexCo) and one from the internal (Brazilian) market (YarnsCoBR). CarpetCo chose 
to import yarns and fibre because the quality of the national material was 
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inadequate, even though importing these materials involved higher costs and 
keeping higher levels of stock. The SCM explained that importing materials involved 
high levels of stock not only because the delivery period was higher, but also 
because the importing process in Brazil was unpredictable, which forced CarpetCo 
to keep stocks at higher levels than the normal cycle. The SCM further explained 
that CarpetCo had tried to buy yarns from a national manufacturer in the past, but 
the quality of the national material was too low thus the attempt was unsuccessful. 
In fact, the SCM further explained that CarpetCo’s supplier of yarns which was 
based in Brazil was a retailer. In other words, the supplier did not manufacture the 
yarn in-house; instead they resold yarns purchased from abroad. Therefore, all 
yarns and fibre used by CarpetCo were in fact imported. 
 
Other important raw materials used in the production of the final products were 
backings, which were the materials that formed the back of the carpets. These 
materials were less critical to CarpetCo in comparison to yarn and fibres, as they 
were not the visible part of the final product. As explained in chapter 6, CarpetCo 
divided their product lines into two: tufted carpets (sold in rolls) and modular 
carpets (sold in tiles). For modular carpets, CarpetCo had only one supplier of 
backings which was based abroad (MBackCo). For tufted carpets, there were two 
different types of backing materials: primary and secondary backings. The primary 
backings were a main contributing factor to the softness of the carpets. Therefore, 
although less critical than yarns and fibre, quality of primary backing materials was 
key. For primary backings for tufted carpets, CarpetCo had only one supplier which 
was based abroad (BackCoEU). The SCM explained that CarpetCo had sought to 
change from BackCoEU to a national supplier (BackCoJC) in the past, seeking to 
reduce the levels of stocks (given that imported materials involved high levels of 
stock owing to the higher deliver period and the unpredictability of the importing 
process in Brazil). However, the SCM explained that this attempt failed because the 
quality of the primary backing material from BackCoJC was inadequate. CarpetCo 
had purchased a sample of primary backing material from BackCoJC, but the 
material had a lower quality compared to the imported one, thus the company 
decided to continue to import from the external supplier. Interestingly, this very 
supplier (BackCoJC) was interviewed as part of this study, and the sales manager 
revealed that his company faced difficulties to invest in modern equipment to be 
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used in their production process. The manager explained that their difficulties were 
mainly due to the lack of manufacturers of that type of machinery in Brazil. Due to 
the lack of national manufacturers, his company sought to import the machinery, 
but they faced difficulties with the importing process, which was complex and 
costly. These findings suggest that one of the reasons for the lack of 
competitiveness of the textiles industry in Brazil in terms of quality seemed to be 
the difficult access to high-end technological machinery in Brazil. There were no 
Brazilian manufacturers for some types of machinery, and the costs for importing 
were too high. Additionally, as explained by the SM at BackCoJC, the clearing 
process of imports was also too bureaucratic and slow, making it even more difficult 
for Brazilian firms to obtain modern machinery. In addition, the findings here 
suggest that the uncertainties arising from product criticality were exacerbated by 
environmental uncertainties, namely the lack of development of the Brazilian 
industry and the unpredictability of the importing process in Brazil. 
 
For secondary backings for tufted carpets, CarpetCo had three active suppliers, one 
based abroad (BackCoEU) and two based in Brazil (BackCoJC and BackCoBR). The 
secondary backing was a determining factor on the dimensional stability of the 
carpets. Although secondary backings were important materials, they were less 
critical than primary backings and yarns and fibre. The SCM explained that the 
quality of the secondary backings manufactured in Brazil was slightly lower than 
the imported material, and yet the cost of the Brazilian material was slightly higher 
than the imported material. However, in this case the quality of the Brazilian 
material, although lower than the imported one, was satisfactory for the minimum 
quality standard required. Early literature on supplier selection (Verma & Pullman, 
1998) suggest that once the minimum level of quality is secured cost reduction 
becomes the main focus in the supplier selection process. In contrast, in the case 
of secondary backings at CarpetCo, although the imported backing had slightly 
lower costs CarpetCo chose to procure these materials from both suppliers. Buying 
from the national supplier enabled CarpetCo to keep lower levels of stock (given 
that, as explained above, imported materials involved a higher volume of stocks 
due to the slow importing process in Brazil). Moreover, as explained above, for 
these materials CarpetCo kept three suppliers active. In other words, CarpetCo had 
three options of suppliers for these materials and they could buy from whichever 
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supplier at any time. Therefore, CarpetCo took a more transactional purchasing 
strategy for these materials, which is associated with a market perspective whereby 
the buyer looks for alternative suppliers (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Cullen & Meira, 
2010). Therefore, in common with previous studies (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; 
Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), these findings suggest that product criticality not only 
impacted on the partner selection process, but also on the relationships 
arrangements between the buyer and its suppliers. While the relationship between 
CarpetCo and its suppliers of secondary backings could be characterised as more 
transactional relationships; the relationship between CarpetCo and its suppliers of 
yarns and fibre (critical materials), could be defined by a relational purchasing 
strategy, which involves repeat purchases with favoured suppliers, forming long-
term and close relationships (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010; Cullen & Meira, 2010). 
 
7.1.1.2.2 Levels of switching costs  
 
Uncertainty may arise when transactions involve high switching costs (Kumra, 
Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Håkansson & Lind, 
2004; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). As explained above, yarns and 
fibres were the most critical materials for CarpetCo, given that they formed the 
visible part of the finished goods. These materials also involved high switching costs. 
This is because CarpetCo designed their products in such a way that they had to use 
yarns from a specific supplier due to certain established specifications such as 
colour tone. For example, each model of carpet had an established colour tone 
specification which had been defined during product development with the 
supplier. Therefore, these materials involved high switching costs, because if 
CarpetCo were to change the supplier for these materials they would have to carry 
out a new product development with the new supplier, including colour tone tests 
and product specifications, as explained by the SCM below.  
 
“If I have an established product - for example, a colour [name of colour], 
which is a product that we have - I have to buy it from YarnsCoEU, which 
is the established yarn. It has the colour tone, everything just right. If I 
want to buy from another supplier I will have to do all the colour tone 
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tests again, all the specifications, a whole new development until I reach 
an identical one so that I can commercialize it” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
7.1.1.2.3 Number of alternative suppliers 
 
As explained above, uncertainty may be significant when there are few alternative 
suppliers (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008; 
Håkansson & Lind, 2004), or lack of competition (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; 
Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). These findings were also reflected in this case 
study. Yarns and fibre also involved uncertainty in relation to the number of 
alternative suppliers, given that there were few suppliers of these materials in Brazil. 
The quality manager (QM) at CarpetCo explained that there were very few suppliers 
of yarns and fibre in Brazil, and that the quality of the material of the Brazilian 
manufacturers was inadequate. 
 
“We have already tried to [buy from local suppliers]... but they cannot 
deliver technically, so we are forced to buy from abroad. They cannot 
deliver the colour; they have quality problems...” (CarpetCo_QM_Fup) 
 
As explained above, one of CarpetCo’s suppliers of yarns and fibres was based in 
Brazil (YarnsCoBR). However, this supplier only resold yarns purchased from abroad 
(in this case, U.S.A and Canada), rather than manufacturing the yarn in-house. 
Therefore, all yarns and fibre used by CarpetCo were in fact imported material.  
 
“I buy it from them here in Brazil but the yarn comes from the United 
States and Canada” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
“[our supplier] is only a retailer... the material is actually American or 
Canadian… [our yarns] are all imported” (CarpetCo_Comex) 
 
Although YarnsCoBR was based in Brazil, the price of the yarns purchased from this 
supplier was the highest; higher than the price of yarns purchased from the other 
two direct suppliers of yarns based abroad (YarnsCoEU and TexCo) even after 




“…the yarn from YarnsCoBR is the most expensive one that we use in our 
process today… It’s more expensive even for this convenience… the cost 
of the yarn that I buy from abroad includes import duties, freight and 
everything… YarnsCoBR has this cost of importing too… and their margin, 
so there’s no magic [laughter]” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
However, as further explained by the SCM, it was more advantageous to buy the 
material from YarnsCoBR rather than buying directly from the manufacturers in 
North America because, if CarpetCo were to import the material directly from 
abroad, the company would have to keep a higher volume of stocks due to the slow 
importing process in Brazil which, in turn, would involve costs for keeping stocks.  
 
“YarnsCoBR has other customers [in Brazil] and this is an advantage, 
because they keep a stock too… today my stock [of materials] from 
YarnsCoBR is 17 to 19 tonnes, which is a small quantity, it’s a stock for a 
month. If I had to keep a stock here of my own, I would have 
transportation time, time for the order… I would need to have a stock 
for at least around 4 months, so there would be a cost… and, also, there 
are yarns that I have an average consumption of 30 kilos per month. 
There are 37 colour tones that I use in my production, from one that I 
use 3 tonnes per month to other that I use 30 kilos. This one of 30 kilos, 
I would need only 300 kilos to run all year long, but if we receive an order 
of a large quantity, I would have to... say we received an order for a 
carpet that is not sold a lot, but in that month a customer says that he 
wants 10 thousand meters. I’ll have to produce and I’ll need 500 kilos. 
Until this yarn is imported and arrives here for me, it would take 
months… and YarnsCoBR has it here at prompt delivery, so I order today 
and the day after tomorrow it’s here. So it’s much more convenient…” 
(CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
In the case of Yarns and fibre, CarpetCo chose to keep more than one supplier active 
even though it would have been more advantageous to buy only from YarnsCoBR, 
seemingly to avoid opportunism from YarnsCoBR. The accounting manager echoed 
this sentiment. He said that if there were more suitable suppliers within Brazil 
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CarpetCo would rather buy yarns from Brazilian firms in order to minimise the cycle 
of stocks of materials. 
 
“…in Brazil it’s difficult, there aren’t many options of yarns. But, of course, 
where there are suppliers in Brazil, the logistics are shorter and it 
reduces the cycle, of course we opt for Brazil” (CarpetCo_AccM_Fup) 
 
For backing for modular carpets, as explained above CarpetCo had only one 
supplier which was based abroad (MBackCo). Therefore, this material involved 
behavioural uncertainty in relation to the number of alternative suppliers or lack of 
competition (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; 
Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Håkansson 
& Lind, 2004). For instance, if MBackCo suddenly stopped supplying this material, 
CarpetCo would not have an immediate alternative supplier of backing for modular 
carpets. For this reason, combined with the unpredictability of the importing 
process in Brazil, CarpetCo also kept high levels of stock for these materials. 
Therefore, the findings here suggest that, in common with previous literature 
(Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & 
Nilsson, 2010; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Håkansson & Lind, 
2004), the low number of alternative suppliers impacted upon inter-firm 
governance within CarpetCo, reflected both in the supplier selection and on the 
relationship arrangements  
 
Latex and Calcite were not critical materials for CarpetCo. These materials were 
used in the formulation of the bonding agent of the carpets, and they were also 
standard products for the suppliers; therefore, these materials did not involve asset 
specificity either (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). The 
choice of supplier for these materials was mainly determined by cost. For latex, 
although CarpetCo had only one active supplier for this material at the time of the 
interviews (LatexCo), there were many alternatives of suppliers for this material 
both in Brazil and abroad. In fact, CarpetCo had previously purchased latex from a 
supplier based abroad which was part of the group of companies with family links 
(DutexCorp), but CarpetCo had changed to the national supplier (LatexCo) in order 




“…the latex I can either import or buy from the internal market, and the 
only determinant is the cost. The difference is that the imported one I 
need to buy today to receive in two months, whereas the national I buy 
today and receive the day after tomorrow. So I can’t decide to buy from 
the external market today to receive soon, so I need to make a planning” 
(CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
In fact, CarpetCo had a rather transactional (or arms-length) relationship with its 
supplier of latex, whereby the focus was on reducing costs and the buyer and 
supplier took adversarial roles  (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Cullen & Meira, 2010). For 
example, as part of an international group, CarpetCo had access to comprehensive 
information about the price of certain international commodities which were the 
base materials of latex, giving CarpetCo an advantage when negotiating prices with 
its supplier of latex. 
 
“...given that [the price of] polymers are global, our management has a 
control over them, and they tell us when they are expensive. They know 
everything that is happening, and they manufacture, so they buy 
polymers too. So they inform us if it’s expensive. [They say]: ‘you can 
push it because from that you can get 3%...’ This kind of information we 
discuss with the entire group and we pass it on to our suppliers. So many 
times, because of that, the supplier justifies: ‘but [there is] my transport, 
my freight, my labour hours, the inflation, the Brazil cost’… They open 
this information to us, but only up to that” (CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
For calcite, the choice of supplier was determined by price as well. For instance, at 
the first phase of data collection CarpetCo had recently changed its supplier of 
calcite, and the change happened after CarpetCo had been sought by CalciteCo 
offering a better price compared to their previous supplier (as explained by the 
SCM). However, similarly to Latex, CarpetCo could buy calcite from either supplier 
at any moment. 
 
“[CalciteCo] is a new supplier, we received their first load last week and 
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we already used it yesterday, but we had already made a test in 
production, we have visited their factory, the mining. And the quality of 
their product is much higher than the one from (name of old supplier)… 
But we have the possibility of buying from both of them” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
7.1.2 The influence of social embeddedness on supplier selection and governance 
structure 
 
Previous studies found that another important factor that shapes inter-firm 
governance is the previous partner experience or social embeddedness involved in 
the inter-firm relationship (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; 
Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie, 
2003). Partner experience refers to the experience between the buyer and the 
supplier developed during previous transactions (Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). 
The term social embeddedness can be used more broadly to refer to information 
held by the buyer acquired from the buyer’s own previous experience with the 
supplier and/or from the supplier’s previous experience with other partners 
(Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie, 2003). In common with these studies, social 
embeddedness (or partner experience) seemed to be an important factor that 
shaped inter-firm governance between CarpetCo and its suppliers. For example, 
CarpetCo had closer (and more personal) relationships with their suppliers of yarns 
and fibres (YarnsCoEU and TexCo), and these were long-term suppliers with whom 
CarpetCo had been trading for many years, as explained by the external trade 
manager. Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie (2003) argue that social embeddedness is 
particularly relevant when the product supplied is critical to the buyer. Agndal & 
Nilsson (2010) argue that cumulativity (or repeat purchases) tends to be higher 
when the products are critical to the buyer, whereby the buyer tends to use the 
same favoured suppliers. Yarns and fibre were the most critical materials for 
CarpetCo, and CarpetCo seemed to favour their closer suppliers for these materials 
(YarnsCoEU and TexCo). The external trade manager also suggested that CarpetCo’s 
close relationship with these suppliers was attributed to the fact that they were 
from within TexCorp or from within the group with family links (DuTexCorp).  
 
“[Our relationship] with our closest suppliers is as if they were our 
customers. [We have] the same kind of close relationship that we have 
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with them. The most frequent ones, which are YarnsCoEU; TexCo... [Our 
relationship] is closer with those companies that are part of the group – 
either of our group [TexCorp] or of DutexCorp International. With the ones 
who are from the family it is better, with these ones the relationship is 
much closer… It is because they belong to the group, I believe… and TexCo 
for being with us for so many years, talking to the same people” 
(CarpetCo_Comex) 
 
These findings may suggest that social embeddedness may also be linked to firms’ 
ownership structure. As explained in chapter 6, CarpetCo was part of an 
international family business group (TexCorp group) which had family links with 
another international business conglomerate (DutexCorp group). CarpetCo had 
some suppliers that were part of TexCorp, some that were part of DutexCorp, and 
some completely independent third-party suppliers, and CarpetCo had closer and 
more personal relationships with suppliers from within the same corporate group 
(TexCorp) or from the group with family links (DutexCorp). In other words, the 
ownership structure seems to influence social embeddedness, whereby 
uncertainties are reduced by the fact that the buyer and supplier have ties in 
common. 
 
While interviewees within CarpetCo acknowledged that the ownership structure 
influenced their relationship arrangement with their suppliers, whereby suppliers 
from within the same group and/or with family links had closer and more personal 
relationships, interviewees said that the partner selection process was not 
influenced by the suppliers’ ownership.  For example, the finance director said that 
CarpetCo was independent from the other companies from within TexCorp group, 
and that CarpetCo was free to procure materials from other suppliers. She said that 
CarpetCo chose to buy materials from the companies from within the group or with 
family links because they were the best option. 
 
“We are independent, we can buy from whoever we want; we don’t 
need to buy from within the group. But of course we buy [from within 




Despite the finance director’s belief that ownership did not influence the partner 
selection process, it seemed that the social embeddedness between CarpetCo and 
the suppliers from within the group did influence CarpetCo’s supplier selection. 
Social embeddedness reduces uncertainty in relation to how the supplier will 
behave in the future and increases the probability of taking on new transactions 
with known partners (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Dekker, 2008). The close 
relationships between CarpetCo and these suppliers reduced levels of uncertainty 
in relation quality, as referred to in the quote above. The finance director seemed 
to have taken this for granted. In other words, the reduced uncertainty in relation 
to these partners arising from their previous experience seemed to be 
institutionalised within CarpetCo.  
 
Previous studies suggest that firms tend to give more importance to common 
culture during the partner selection process when they have previous experience 
with the partner (Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013). This argument may help to explain 
CarpetCo’s close relationships with the main suppliers for yarns and fibre.  For 
example, in the perception of the external trade manager, another reason for the 
closer relationship of CarpetCo with these two suppliers was the fact that the 
middle managers at CarpetCo knew these suppliers personally. She said that, 
although CarpetCo had a good relationship with its other suppliers as well, the fact 
that they did not know them personally made a big difference in building personal 
relationships. Moreover, she said that their relationship with the suppliers from 
Asia was more formal, suggesting that culture played a role in the relationship 
arrangement with their partners. 
 
“…with the other [suppliers] we have a certain easiness negotiating as well, 
they are visited by our president from abroad... He is always there, 
negotiating… but we don’t actually know them, so this makes a big 
difference… and [with] the suppliers in Asia I feel a big difference. In terms 
of warmth even. They are very formal. The one from South Korea is 
actually quite easy to deal with; because everything is done by one person; 
complaints, orders, document, it is all with the same person. So with him 
it is easy. But, for example, with the suppliers from China the relationship 





7.1.3 The impact of government initiatives on partner selection within CarpetCo 
 
The findings in this case study also suggest that there are other external 
institutional factors that influence the selection of suppliers such as government 
incentives for local content. For example, for secondary backings, another 
important raw material within CarpetCo’s production process, CarpetCo had the 
option to procure either from local suppliers or from a supplier based abroad. Both 
the local and the external suppliers satisfied the minimum product quality required, 
but the price of the national material was higher. Verma and Pullman (1998) argue 
that once the minimum level of quality is secured, cost reduction becomes the main 
focus in the supplier selection process. In this case, it seemed that cost was not the 
main focus after the minimum level of quality was achieved. Here, if focus had been 
placed on cost, CarpetCo would have chosen to buy this material from the external 
supplier which had the lower price because, given that both suppliers satisfied the 
minimum product quality required, the price would have been the determinant 
element in the supplier selection. However, CarpetCo chose to buy a mix of national 
and imported secondary backings. CarpetCo’s decision to buy a mix of national and 
imported secondary backings was driven by a government incentive for local 
content, which determined that exports to the countries within the Mercosur bloc 
would be free of taxes as long as 60% of the sales price was related to Brazilian 
products and/or to cost incurred within Brazil. This incentive influenced CarpetCo’s 
choice of suppliers of secondary backings. CarpetCo purchased this material both 
from abroad and from the national supplier, and kept a mixed stock of imported 
and national materials. When CarpetCo had a production order for export, the 
company used the national backing; otherwise the company used the imported 
backing, as explained by the SCM.  
 
“There is a strategy for exports. To be able to export... you need to have 
within the product a certain quantity of national product... I can use either 
one at any time. If there is an export, I use the national backing… there 
won’t be any difference, because it’s the same backing, it has the same 
characteristics, and it’s a backing that doesn’t show; it’s tufted, so there’s 




Admittedly, it could be argued that the influence of the government incentive was, 
in essence, a search for cost reduction, given that as a result of the use of national 
materials, exports would be free of taxes, and therefore it could be argued that 
these findings support the assumptions by Verma and Pullman (1998). However, 
exports were not profitable for CarpetCo, as will explained in more details in 
chapter 9 (Customer Accounting practices), therefore the findings in this case study 
do not support this argument. One possible reason for CarpetCo’s decision to buy 
national materials despite their costs in order to be eligible to the government 
incentive might be that the company was taking a long-term perspective in relation 
to exports. As will be explained later in chapter 9, CarpetCo chose to export even 
though this was not profitable because the company wanted to maintain its 
presence in the external (South American) market. Thus, it seemed that CarpetCo 
believed that this market could be profitable in the future, characterising a form of 
use of the customer valuation analysis technique. Therefore, it could be argued that 
such long-term perspective and the use of such customer accounting technique was 
impacting upon supplier selection in this case study. Another possibility is that 
CarpetCo wanted to gain legitimisation within this market. If the final products 
achieved 60% of nationalisation, the company would be able to use the 
denomination “made in Mercosur”. However, the findings in this study also suggest 
that when product criticality was high, government initiatives did not have an 
impact on inter-firm governance. This could be observed in the case with yarns and 
fibre, which were the most critical materials for CarpetCo. CarpetCo chose to 
import yarns and fibre because the quality of the national material was inadequate, 
even though importing these materials involved higher costs and keeping higher 
levels of stock, and despite the government incentive for local content. 
 
7.1.4 Power dynamics across the supply chain and its influence on inter-firm 
governance structure 
 
Interestingly, the SCM further explained that the price of the secondary backings 
manufactured in Brazil was higher than the price of the imported backings due to 
the higher cost of raw materials used by CarpetCo’s national suppliers. In other 
words, the Brazilian backings were more expensive because the cost of the Brazilian 
raw material (in this case polypropylene) was higher. What is more interesting is 
that the supplier of the raw materials in this case was PPBR, who dominated the 
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market of polypropylene in Brazil (as explained in chapter 6).  
 
“This backing that I import, they have it here ready to sell, but at a higher 
price because PPBR, which supplies the polypropylene here in Brazil, 
they regulate the price, it’s a fixed price, and if I import, it ends up 
cheaper... so it’s a matter of... PPBR supplies and... they can’t buy from 
another one, only from PPBR” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
The findings here may support the argument that the unbalanced power 
relationship between PPBR and its suppliers impacted upon the competitiveness of 
the Brazilian products within the Brazilian market. For example, CarpetCo would 
have chosen to purchase all secondary backing from the national suppliers if their 
costs were the same as the imported secondary backings. Instead, CarpetCo chose 
to keep a mix of both national and imported backing in order to take advantage of 
the lower costs of the imported material. 
 
7.1.5 The influence of suppliers’ approach to managing social issues on inter-firm 
governance down the supply chain 
 
It has been argued that social responsibility can be an influencing factor in inter-
firm relationships decisions both for moral reasons and for financial performance 
reasons (Klassen & Vereecke, 2012; Dibben et al., 2002). For example, a firm’s 
reputation (as being socially responsible) could influence its sales, and hence its 
profits (Dibben et al., 2002). The evidence in this study is not entirely consistent 
with these assumptions. This was evident in the supplier selection process within 
CarpetCo. Suppliers’ approach to managing social issues (including the suppliers’ 
own employment practices) was not taken into account during the supplier 
selection process. For example, for secondary backings CarpetCo had the option to 
buy from two local suppliers (BackCoBR and BackCoJC). Both suppliers achieved the 
minimum level of quality required, and in this case CarpetCo favoured the supplier 
with the lower cost. The SCM explained that CarpetCo had previously purchased 
secondary backings only from BackCoBR, but BackCoJC offered the same product 
for a lower price, thus CarpetCo was gradually reducing the amount of purchases 
from BackCoBR and switching to BackCoJC. Interestingly, the HR manager within 
BackCoJC was interviewed as part of this study, and he admitted that his company 
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paid lower salaries in comparison to BackCoBR, who was their main competitor. 
The HR manager also revealed that his company had a high employee turnover. 
These findings imply that the lack of awareness suppliers’ accounting information 
may have led to changing to a supplier with worse employment practices, which 
may not be sustainable in the long term.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the SCM admitted that it would have been “interesting” 
to ask the suppliers to comply with certain HR requirements. However, he said that 
even if he did become aware of suppliers’ bad employment practices, this would 
not influence his decision regarding the selection of a supplier of raw materials.  
 
“The selection of a supplier is mainly related to the product, we never 
have [asked suppliers to comply with HR requirements]... But thinking 
about it… I believe it is interesting too, now that you have mentioned... 
we’ve never asked… it would [be interesting to ask]... Not that it will 
influence in the selection of the supplier or not, because if I need a 
product and they have it and it’s very good… Of course it would make 
you balance this, but maybe even so…” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
The external trade manager expressed a similar view, stating that she believed 
that it was important to know about a supplier’s employment practices, but yet 
she (or her division) did not monitor these practices. 
 
“I think it is important [to know about the suppliers’ employment 
practices], because everything is involved in one chain… but this is not 
something that we control” (CarpetCo_Comex) 
 
In contradiction with the comments of the SCM and the external trade manager, 
the QM said that CarpetCo required the suppliers under selection to present official 
documents issued by different governmental agencies (including social security) 
showing that they did not have any irregularities. Additionally, the QM provided a 
copy of the form used by CarpetCo to collect information from suppliers under the 
selection process (see appendix, company document 3). In this form, there is a note 
requesting the suppliers to present a letter signed by their senior executive 
declaring that they were following all the employment, anti-discriminatory and 
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safety norms. One possible explanation for the contradiction between the 
information provided by the QM, the SCM and the external trade manager may be 
a lack of communication between divisions. In other words, while the QM requested 
these documents from the suppliers, the SCM and the external trade manager were 
not aware of such control. Another possible explanation may be that the SCM and 
the external trade manager referred to suppliers’ employment practices beyond the 
minimum requirements by employment legislation, such as non-compulsory 
employment benefits and wages above the minimum wage. For example, the SCM 
said that if he became aware of suppliers’ “bad employment practices” this would 
not influence his decision. However, by “bad employment practices” he did not 
necessarily mean irregularities. This reasoning can be supported by the case of the 
change of the supplier of secondary backings. As explained above, CarpetCo had the 
option to buy secondary backing from BackCoBR and BackCoJC, and both suppliers 
achieved the minimum level of quality required thus CarpetCo favoured the supplier 
with the lower cost. The interviews within BackCoJC revealed that they paid lower 
salaries compared to BackCoBR, but this did not mean that BackCoJC paid salaries 





In pursuit of this study’s aim of exploring the potential of SCA as a means to 
promote both economic and social upgrading, this chapter examined the first of a 
series of four SCA practices (or control archetypes) used by a focal organisation in 
the textiles industry in Brazil and across its supply chain. This chapter examined the 
rules and routines in terms of inter-firm governance in the case study supply chain, 
which involved the processes of selecting an exchange partner within the focal 
organisation (CarpetCo) and of designing governance structures (or relationship 
arrangements) between CarpetCo and its suppliers. This chapter explored the 
factors that shaped the rules and routines in terms of inter-firm governance and 
investigated how these rules and routines impacted upon the wider economic and 
social environment in Brazil. 
 
In common with previous studies, the findings in this study indicate that inter-firm 
governance was impacted by uncertainties arising from the characteristics of the 
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transaction involved in the inter-firm relationships, such as the criticality of the 
product for the buyer (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), 
the levels of switching costs (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010; Dekker, 2008; Håkansson & Lind, 2004; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 
2000) and the number of alternative suppliers (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; 
Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Håkansson & Lind, 2004), or lack of suppliers’ 
competition (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). 
For example, yarns and fibre were the most critical materials for CarpetCo given 
that they were the visible part of the final product, and quality was crucial for these 
materials. Consequently, the exchange transaction for these materials involved 
high levels of uncertainty. These materials also involved high switching costs 
because the carpets were designed in a way that they had to use specific yarns from 
specific suppliers. Yarns and fibre also involved uncertainty in relation to the low 
number of suppliers of yarns and fibre in Brazil. Also in common with previous 
literature (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008), 
the exchange transactions between CarpetCo and its suppliers involved 
environmental uncertainty, such as unpredictability and/or lack of technological 
development. For example, one of CarpetCo’s local suppliers of secondary backing 
material who was interviewed as part of this study (BackCoJC) revealed that his 
company was facing difficulties in getting access to modern machinery, which 
generated uncertainty to the buyer as to whether the supplier would be able to 
deliver on quality. These findings suggest that environmental uncertainty in the 
textiles industry in Brazil may arise from the lack of technological development and 
access to modern machinery. These findings may help to explain the lack of 
competitiveness of the Brazilian industry and, in turn, influence policy. For example, 
government initiatives could be built around simplifying the importing process 
and/or facilitating access to credit for textiles firms to achieve modern machinery. 
 
On the other hand, in contrast with other studies (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; 
Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 
2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008), asset specificity did not seem to impact the relationship 
between CarpetCo and its suppliers. One possible explanation for this may be 
CarpetCo’s industry and/or product characteristics. Many studies which discussed 
the influence of asset specify on inter-firm governance were conducted in 
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industries that involve high technology development, such the information 
technology industry (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 
2010; Dekker, 2008), the telecommunications industry (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), 
the automotive industry (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), rail infrastructure (Dekker, 2004), 
and other complex manufacturing industries (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013). In 
this study, conducted in the industrial textiles industry, the materials did not involve 
significant customisations or high levels of technological development. Therefore, 
the findings in this study may suggest that asset specificity has little or no influence 
on inter-firm governance within industries that do not involve high levels of 
technological development.   
 
In common with previous studies (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 
2013; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Buskens, Batenburg, & 
Weesie, 2003), another important factor that impacted upon inter-firm governance 
in this study was the social embeddedness between buyers and suppliers (or 
partner experience). The findings here support previous assumptions (Xie, Liang, & 
Zhou, 2016; Dekker, 2008) that social embeddedness may reduce uncertainties 
related to the exchange transactions and, in turn, may influence the relationship 
arrangements between buyers and suppliers and the process of partner selection. 
For example, CarpetCo had closer (and more personal) relationships with their 
suppliers of yarns and fibre, and these were long-term supplies with whom 
CarpetCo had been trading for many years. In other words, the social 
embeddedness between CarpetCo and the suppliers of yarns and fibre seemed to 
influence CarpetCo’s choice of supplier. The findings in this study further suggest 
that social embeddedness may be linked to firms’ ownership structure. For example, 
CarpetCo was part of an international business group, and CarpetCo had closer and 
more personal relationships with the suppliers from within the same group. In 
other words, the ownership of the suppliers seemed to enhance the social 
embeddedness between CarpetCo and these suppliers. 
 
The findings in this study also suggest that another external factor that influence 
inter-firm governance includes government initiatives, such as incentives for local 
content. For example, for secondary backings CarpetCo had the option to either 
buy from local suppliers or import the materials. Both the external and the local 
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suppliers attended the minimum quality requirements, but the cost of the imported 
material was slightly lower. Nonetheless, rather than buying the materials with the 
lower cost, CarpetCo decided to buy a mix of national and imported secondary 
backings. This was because there was a government incentive for local content 
which determined that exports to the countries within the Mercosur bloc would be 
free of taxes as long as 60% of the sales price was related to Brazilian products 
and/or to cost incurred within Brazil. By buying a mix of national and imported 
products, CarpetCo took advantage of both the lower cost and of the government 
incentive. Therefore, the findings here suggest that government initiatives such as 
incentive for local content may impact organisations’ SCA practices such as supplier 
selection. On the other hand, the findings in this study also suggest that when 
product criticality was high, government initiatives did not have an impact on inter-
firm governance. This could be observed in the case with yarns and fibre, which 
were the most critical materials for CarpetCo. CarpetCo chose to import yarns and 
fibre because the quality of the national material was inadequate, even though 
importing these materials involved higher costs and keeping higher levels of stock, 
and despite the government incentive for local content. 
 
In terms of the impact of inter-firm governance on the economic and social 
environment, the findings discussed in this chapter suggests that an organisation’s 
SCA practices impacts upon the wider external environment in which the 
organisation operates, both in the economic and in the social context. For example, 
CarpetCo chose to import primary backing materials rather than to purchase from 
a local supplier because the quality of the national material was inadequate. As 
discussed above, the local supplier in question (BackCoJC) was interviewed and he 
revealed that his company was facing difficulties to purchase modern machinery to 
be used in their production process, due to both the lack of manufacturers of that 
kind of machinery in Brazil, and the difficulty of BackCoJC to get access to financing 
to import the machinery. Thus, it seemed that a possible reason for the low quality 
of the national materials (which impacted upon the partner selection process 
within CarpetCo) was the (institutionalised) lack of technological development in 
the textiles industry in Brazil. By choosing to import the material (rather than, for 
example, engage in collaborative actions with the local supplier to help them to get 
access to the technology and to improve quality), CarpetCo played a role in the 
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reinforcement of the lack of technological development in the textiles industry in 
Brazil and, arguably consequently, to the reinforcement of the low quality of the 
national material. From an institutional perspective, the previous institutions (lack 
of technological development) impacted upon the SCA practices (partner selection) 
which resulted on the reinforcement of the previous institutions (lack of 
technological development) (Burns & Scapens, 2000).  
 
In terms of the impact of the SCA practices discussed above on the social context, 
by choosing to import the material, CarpetCo arguably impacted upon the social 
context in the textiles industry in Brazil in terms of employment security. For 
example, the BackCoJC’s sales manager revealed that BackCoJC’s owner had 
recently considered shutting down their operations in Brazil. Therefore, CarpetCo’s 
SCA practices (in this case, partner selection) had social implications for the 
Brazilian industry in terms of employment security. Another example of how 
CarpetCo’s SCA practices in terms of inter-firm governance impacted upon the 
social context of the external environment in which the organisation operated was 
CarpetCo’s choice of supplier of secondary backings. CarpetCo had recently 
changed the supplier for one of its raw materials because the new supplier offered 
a lower price (both suppliers achieved the minimum quality requirement). The HR 
manager within the new supplier for this material (BackCoJC), who was also 
interviewed as part of this study, revealed that his company had a high employee 
turnover and that he was aware that his company paid lower salaries than 
CarpetCo’s previous supplier. These findings imply that the lack of awareness of 
suppliers’ accounting information may have led to changing to a supplier with 
worse employment practices. Therefore, the findings discussed in this chapter 
suggests that an organisation’s SCA practices may impact upon the wider external 






CHAPTER 8: MAKE-OR-BUY DECISIONS IN THE FOCAL 
ORGANISATION 
 
In pursuit of this study’s aim of exploring the potential of SCA to promote both 
economic and social upgrading, this study explores the SCA practices used by a focal 
organisation in the textiles industry in Brazil and across its supply chain and 
examines how these practices impacted upon the wider economic and social 
context in which the organisations in the supply chain operated. This chapter 
explores the second of a series of four management accounting and control 
mechanisms explored in this study: make-or-buy decisions. 
 
Make-or-buy decisions refer to the decision-making process for determining 
whether to purchase a material from external suppliers (outsourcing) or to produce 
the material internally (insourcing). (Meira et al., 2010; Du, Lu, & Tao, 2009). 
Accordingly, outsourcing is generally referred to as the process in which a firm 
contracts outside companies to perform activities that have traditionally been 
undertaken internally (Espino-Rodríguez, Chun-Lai, & Gil-Padilla, 2017; Meira et al., 
2010; Du, Lu, & Tao, 2009; Lamminmaki, 2008). This chapter explores the rules and 
routines in terms of make-or-buy decision within CarpetCo. In particular, CarpetCo 
was undergoing a process of insourcing the production of one of its materials during 
the data collection, and this process is explored in this chapter.  
 
Literature on make-or-buy decisions tend to revolve around outsourcing. In more 
recent years, researchers have been studying the process of insourcing (Hartman, 
Ogden, & Hazen, 2017; Sundquist, Hulthén, & Gadde, 2015; Drauz, 2014). However, 
this area of research tends to focus on the process of re-insourcing. In other words, 
insourcing activities that had been previously outsourced (Hartman, Ogden, & 
Hazen, 2017; Sundquist, Hulthén, & Gadde, 2015; Drauz, 2014). Studies on first time 
insourcing seem to have been neglected so far. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the 
rules and routines in terms of make-or-decisions within CarpetCo in general. The 
second section explores the above-mentioned case of insourcing, from the 
decision-making phase (explored retrospectively) through to the outcomes of the 
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change, including an exploration of how this case of insourcing may have impacted 
upon the wider economic and social environment in Brazil. Finally, the third section 
offers a summary of this chapter. 
 
8.1 Make-or-buy decisions within CarpetCo 
 
Existing literature suggests that make-or-buy are strategic decisions which allow 
firms to identify their core and non-core competencies in order to determine which 
functions to outsource and which to keep in-house (Meira et al., 2010). The findings 
in this study suggest that decisions regarding the source of the materials needed 
for the production of CarpetCo’s final products were mainly determined by the 
costs and technical characteristics of the material. Moreover, make-or-buy 
decisions within CarpetCo were generally made by the departments of sales and of 
new product development (both within the sales and marketing division), with little 
involvement of the accounting division.  
 
“...this is done by the product development department together with 
sales. The carpets business is dynamic, the design and models are being 
renewed on a daily basis, and based on that they have to decide which 
yarn to use, for what destination, if it is residential or commercial… 
Based on that they decide which is the yarn needed, for example. Of 
course that the first question is the cost… But the decision of all this is 
up to the departments of product development and sales. I know that 
this is how it works, but I'm not the one who decides. Sometimes it 
comes to me when it's time to calculate the costs and the eventual 
selling price, in order to research the market for that carpet, to see if it 
will sell or not with that price. That sort of thing” (CarpetCo_AccM_Fup) 
 
Previous studies found that management accounting plays a very limited role in 
outsourcing decisions, often limited to assessing basic accounting figures (Brandau 
& Hoffjan, 2010). What is more, previous studies show that accounting data tends 
to be neglected in decision making processes within organisations operating in 
developing countries (Tsamenyi, Bennett, & Black, 2004). These arguments may 
help to explain what appeared to be the case in CarpetCo. The decision for changing 
this process was made at senior management level, by HQ together with the 
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directors of the three divisions of CarpetCo. The accounting department was only 
involved at a later stage, to calculate the payback period of the investment. Indeed, 
as argued before, it seemed that the accounting manager played a more “traditional” 
role within CarpetCo rather than a strategic one. 
 
“...the decision was made at managerial level, by the owner. It was joint, 
the directors here with the Headquarters. I started participating from the 
moment that the payback was prepared, the calculation of the payback. 
That’s when I came, to calculate how much time it would take to have a 
return on this investment… But the decision for changing the process 
was all at that level, of the owner” (CarpetCo_AccM_Fup). 
 
Surprisingly, the supply chain manager was not involved in the decision-making 
process either, and his only role in the change process was to communicate the 
change to the former supplier. 
 
“[Who was involved in the decision making] was the industrial director; 
with the endorsement of the finance director and of the sales director, 
who definitely participated in relation to the investment in the 
machinery; and with the approval of the bosses, the CEO and the owner. 
As for me, I only informed AsphaltCo that we wouldn’t buy anymore... 
(CarpetCo_SCM_Fup) 
 
8.2 Insourcing within CarpetCo: the case of the asphalt back material 
 
During the first phase of the data collection CarpetCo was going through a process 
of insourcing one of its raw materials. CarpetCo had previously purchased one of its 
raw materials (asphalt backing) from a local supplier and had recently decided to 
make this material in-house. This particular change within CarpetCo’s production 
process will be explored in the next sub-sections in order to understand the make-
or-buy decisions process at CarpetCo in general and the impact of these decisions 
across its supply chain. More specifically, during the first phase of interviews at 
CarpetCo (first phase of data collection), the nature of the process change, the 
decision-making process and the reasons for change were explored. The second visit 
to CarpetCo (second phase of data collection) enabled an assessment of what had 
149 
 
happened over time. The outcomes of the change were explored through in-depth 
follow-up interviews within CarpetCo, including the impact of this change on the 
employment practices and gender equality within CarpetCo and across its supply 
chain. The next sub-sections will explain this in details. The first section will explain 
the process change and the decision-making process; the second sub-section will 
explore the reasons for the change; and the last sub-section will explore the 
scenario after the change including the impact of the changes across the supply 
chain. 
 
8.2.1 The new process and resulting changes in the inter-firm relationships 
 
As explained above, the process change that CarpetCo went through consisted of 
the insourcing of one of its backing materials. At the time of the first round of 
interviews, it was explained that CarpetCo had previously purchased a finished 
backing material (asphalt backing) from a local supplier and decided to make this 
material in-house. The production process before the change consisted of bonding 
the asphalt backing (purchased in rolls) onto the back of the carpet. By making the 
asphalt backing in-house, CarpetCo would buy the components needed to 
manufacture the asphalt backing and ‘throw” it onto the back of the carpet in a 
liquid form, as explained by the accounting manager: 
 
“...this asphalt backing comes ready from AsphaltCo. It just passes 
through the machine and is bonded [onto the carpet]. Now a process will 
be developed in which this backing will be produced in a machine here, 
but in the form of a liquid… we will buy the components of this backing 
and will “throw” it onto the carpet…” (CarpetCo_Acc) 
 
The SCM explained the changes to CarpetCo’s supply chain following the 
implementation of the new process. Before the introduction of the new process, 
CarpetCo had one supplier for the finished backing material (asphalt backing in rolls), 
which was based in Brazil. With the new process, CarpetCo used three suppliers for 
the components needed to produce the asphalt backing in-house. Figure 8.1 shows 






As seen in Figure 8.1, before the change CarpetCo purchased a solid asphalt backing 
and, after the change, the supplier for this material (AsphaltCo) was discontinued. 
After the change, one of the components needed for the new process (fibreglass) 
was purchased from a new supplier which was located abroad (FibreglassCo); the 
second new component (bitumen) was also purchased from a new supplier, which 
was a national and state-owned company (NGO). The third component needed for 
the new process (calcite) was supplied by a local supplier (CalciteCo). The material 
supplied by CalciteCo was also used in another process within CarpetCo’s 
production process, and it was already regularly supplied by CalciteCo. Therefore, 
CalciteCo was not a new supplier, yet the volume of material that they supplied to 
CarpetCo had doubled as a result of the new process (CarpetCo_SCM). One of the 
new suppliers (NGO) was a Brazilian firm that operated globally in the oil, natural 
gas and energy industry, and was one of the largest companies in Brazil. Despite 
NGO’s leadership position in the Brazilian industry, CarpetCo’s interviewees did not 
refer to any issues related to unbalanced power relations when negotiating with 
them. During the second visit to CarpetCo the quality manager stated that the 
transaction with NGO went ‘smooth’. Moreover, the SCM, also in the second visit 
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to CarpetCo, expressed that CarpetCo felt that they were relaxed working with NGO 
because they trusted NGO’s good social practices. 
 
Another area of research in the literature of make-or-buy decisions relates to bi-
sourcing, whereby firms opt to acquire the same material by both purchasing from 
external suppliers (outsourcing) and by producing in-house (insourcing) (Du, Lu, & 
Tao, 2009). The findings here seem to suggest that CarpetCo had adopted a bi-
sourcing strategy for the asphalt backing. This was evident in the interviews with 
the SCM. The SCM explained that CarpetCo was interested in maintaining a good 
relationship with AsphaltCo because CarpetCo could need to buy the material from 
AsphaltCo again in the future. In other words, although CarpetCo had implemented 
a new process to produce the asphalt backing in-house, CarpetCo kept the 
production process of the finished product (carpets) set up to work with both the 
material produced internally and the material purchased from AsphaltCo. 
 
 “…our industrial director called them here to inform them of this 
change... because [the backing material] is not going to be 100% ours, 
the machine will be set up to work with both types of backing, the 
backing in rolls and also the backing made here. So they have been 
informed that [our trade] will be reduced, but there is a possibility of still 
buying [from them]” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
Existing literature suggest that an organisation may engage in bi-sourcing in order 
to learn best practices from an external supplier to be adopted in the internal 
production (Du, Lu, & Tao, 2009). This argument appears to have been reflected by 
this study’s findings. The SCM further explained that although CarpetCo 
communicated to the supplier that CarpetCo would stop purchasing the material 
from them, the supplier was willing to share knowledge with CarpetCo and/or 
provide training if CarpetCo wanted this to happen.  
 
“In this meeting AsphaltCo said that their doors were open for us, 
whether someone from here wanted to go there to absorb this 
knowledge, or we needed someone to come here, to provide training, 
they’ve put themselves at our disposal...” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
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8.2.2 Reasons for the insourcing 
 
8.2.2.1 Cost reduction 
 
One of the main reasons for changing the process was to achieve cost reductions, 
as suggested by the accounting manager in the first phase of interviews at CarpetCo: 
 
“...this asphalt backing comes ready from AsphaltCo… now a process will 
be developed in which this backing will be produced in a machine here… 
because this backing is expensive… this is to reduce [the costs]” 
(CarpetCo_Acc) 
 
The SCM attributed the cost reduction to the elimination of the supplier’s profit 
margin from the cost of acquisition of the asphalt backing. This was because the 
price of the finished material purchased from the supplier included the supplier’s 
profit margin and purchasing the raw materials directly from the (tier 2) suppliers 
would lead to cost reductions (although it was not clear if the SCM was aware of the 
full costs or if this was an assumption). In other words, this seems to have been a 
‘taken for granted assumption’ (ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014; Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 
2005; Burns & Scapens, 2000). 
 
“…their manufacturing cost has their profit margin, so if we manufacture 
it here we will buy the material, the fibreglass, everything that they use, 
we will buy straight from the supplier. So they purchase from the 
supplier to sell us” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
Despite the aforementioned reductions in the cost of acquisition of the backing 
material, the SCM acknowledged in his first interview that, in order to make this 
material internally, CarpetCo would have to buy a new machine (which was 
imported from an external supplier), incurring a cash disbursement at the initial 
stage of the project. 
 
“…of course that there is an investment in machinery which will 




In the second round of interviews the SCM referred again to the drivers for the cost 
reduction with the change in this process. This time he referred to the reduction of 
costs with transport as one of the main drivers for the cost reduction. He explained 
that with the new process the main base material (bitumen) was purchased locally 
within a short distance from the plant, and that even after adding other additional 
expenses incurred with the new process (for example, expenses with energy in 
order to maintain the stock of the liquid material warm), the change in the process 
resulted in an overall cost reduction. 
 
“[The main objective was] the cost reduction, because we had a process 
for this backing outside which, certainly, added value [with] transport 
and all that. Now I buy the base material here in our city, 10km from 
here, so I order today and receive the next day. The other material, 
which is the calcite, is the same one that we already use in another 
process… the fibreglass is imported, but I buy in container and the 
amount is small, it is not impactful by square meter. As for the rest – 
there are expenses with energy to maintain it warm, but even so it is 
much more attractive than buying it. The [expense with] gas has doubled 
because the material needs to be kept warm 24 hours a day, but given 
the quantity that we produce it still is [more attractive]” 
(CarpetCo_SCM_Fup) 
 
8.2.2.2 Product quality and technological development 
 
According to the SCM, another main advantage of making this material in-house 
was to achieve better quality in the final product. In the first phase of interviews at 
CarpetCo, the SCM explained that the new process would result in a better-quality 
product due to an improvement in its adherence and density, given that with the 
new process the material would be directly “thrown” onto the back of the carpet in 
a liquid form rather than being bonded onto the back, the adherence of the backing 
onto the carpet would be improved. As for the density, the SCM explained that with 
the new process the density of the carpet would be more precise because the 
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manufactured material could vary from 1.8 mm to 2.3 mm, and with the new 
process the material would always have precisely 2 mm.  
 
“…it will have [better] adherence and density, because the asphalt 
backing from AsphaltCo is a backing of 2 millimetres [and] it can vary 
from 1.8 to 2.3, if I’m not mistaken… And our application will be direct… 
so it will always be 2 millimetres… we will save material too. So we will 
migrate to a better quality material, with the same characteristics, but 
with a lower cost” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
In the second phase of interviews the SCM said that with this change the 
machinery had become “top”, suggesting that the new process resulted in 
technological development for CarpetCo. 
 
“[The machine] that used to be in the back [of the plant] at the very 
beginning was later brought here [to the finishing stage] and ran for 2 
years with [the backing from] AsphaltCo… After 2 years running with [the 
backing from] AsphaltCo, the other part has been included, it was 
attached. This is the second alteration that we make in this machine. The 
very first one was medieval. Now it is top. Now we are buying a press, 
then with this press it will be one of the most modern in the world.” 
(CarpetCo_SCM_Fup) 
 
The finance director echoed the sentiment that the investment made in the new 
machinery for the new process positioned CarpetCo’s as a modern plant, suggesting 
achievement of technological development. 
 
“In a single year we invested 10 million reais – 5 million and now 5 million 
more. At the end of the year our press will arrive, to make [carpet in] 
plaques that are ideal for the Brazilian market, which could compete in 
price. In quality it competes, but in price it doesn’t... So we invest, think 
about the future. I believe that we really will be, within one year, the 





The findings here suggest that CarpetCo may also have engaged in this process in 
order to achieve legitimacy (Ball & Craig, 2010; Scapens & Varoutsa, 2010). 
 
8.2.2.3 Inter-organisational factors 
 
Existing literature suggests that make-or-buy decisions should include 
considerations of the coordination and control costs associated to the inter-firm 
relationship (Espino-Rodríguez, Chun-Lai, & Gil-Padilla, 2017; Meira et al., 2010; van 
der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), and transaction characteristics such as asset 
specificity  (Espino-Rodríguez et al., 2017; Lamminmaki, 2008). The findings here 
suggest that the insourcing was also driven by inter-organisational factors such 
behavioural uncertainty (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 
2013; Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008). 
For example, the accounting manager stated in his first interview that by making 
the material in-house CarpetCo would achieve independence from the supplier of 
asphalt backing, thus reducing behavioural uncertainty arising from supplier-buyer 
dependency. 
 
“…we’re on the hands of the supplier… this is not good…” (CarpetCo_Acc) 
 
The SCM suggested that the change in the process (using the asphalt backing in a 
liquid form rather than in rolls) could not have been achieved through collaborative 
efforts with the supplier. He explained that since the new process consisted of 
throwing the material in a liquid form onto the back of the carpet, it could only work 
in-site during the production of the final product (carpet). Therefore, if the change 
in the process were to have been carried out by the supplier, the supplier would 
have had to install a unit at CarpetCo’s plant. 
 
“…they would have to install the machinery here. Because it only works 
running here, at the time of the production of the carpet… even if they 
modernized or changed anything there, it would keep the same 
characteristics; it would have to come in rolls. Unless they, say, made an 
investment in machinery for us and then supplied us, if they came here 
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with their workforce to manufacture everything...” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
The SCM believed that AsphaltCo would not be interested in making this investment 
because CarpetCo was not a significant buyer for them in terms of revenue, and the 
material that AsphaltCo supplied to CarpetCo was not part of AsphaltCo’s core 
business. However, he admitted that he never asked the supplier whether they 
wanted to make this investment. SCA was not institutionalised within CarpetCo, 
therefore they did not seek for collaborative actions with the supplier. Instead, they 
assumed that the supplier would not be interested (a taken-for-granted 
assumption). From an institutional perspective, the previous institutions (SCA not 
institutionalised) shaped the new routines (process insourcing) (ter Bogt & Scapens, 
2014; Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Burns & Scapens, 2000). 
 
“…AsphaltCo is big. Once we asked what was the size of CarpetCo within 
AsphaltCo… Of course that the revenue was big, because their material 
is expensive, but we represented around 2%… they said that every client 
is important, but their segment is very big… surely they have other 
segments in which, if they invested the same amount... [Their product is 
used in] construction, for water sealing for pavement, for soil... they 
have automotive segment… They have many segments, so... they would 
surely have a much higher return if they invested somewhere else” 
(CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
8.2.2.4 Influence of other firms from within the group  
 
The change in the asphalt backing process may also be explained by different 
isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powel, 1993). For example, mimetic 
isomorphism occurs when an organisation imitates the systems in use by other 
organisations perceived to be more legitimate or successful (Brandau et al., 2013; 
Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 2006; Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). The findings in this study suggest that CarpetCo seemed to be imitating the 
process used by another firm within the same company group (TapisCo), which was 
also a carpet manufacturer but operating in a different country (Eurocountry2). 
TapisCo seemed to be perceived by CarpetCo as more successful. This was evident 
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in the interviews with the supply chain manager (SCM) within CarpetCo. The SCM 
explained that TapisCo already made this material (asphalt backing) in-house as part 
of its production process. The SCM mentioned the production system used by 
TapisCo in his first interview (during the first round of interviews), then again in his 
second interview (during the second round of interviews nearly one year later).  
 
“…the production supervisor and the employee who is taking care of the 
implementation of this new machine went to (EuroCountry2) last month 
to visit the plant of TapisCo, which uses this same system for this 
production. They are from the same group too. So they went there to 
learn how the set-up is made, how the application works, to bring this 
knowledge here...” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
“Within TapisCo, which is one of the companies of the group, they 
already use this production system. So our employee with the supervisor 
went to TapisCo, to visit the plant, to see the process… 
(CarpetCo_SCM_Fup) 
 
Simultaneously, the process change within CarpetCo may also be explained by an 
account of normative isomorphism. Normative isomorphism relates to the adoption 
of internal structure and procedures encouraged by influential actors, such as 
consultants and professional bodies (Brandau et al., 2013; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & 
González, 2006; Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The findings 
here may suggest that the firm from within the same company group that already 
used this process (TapisCo) may have played a role as an influential actor. Moreover, 
Brandau et al. (2013) suggest that normative isomorphism may also be a reaction 
to normative pressures from the networks in which an organisation is embedded. 
The findings here suggest that a firm that is part of a larger company group may face 
normative pressures to adopt similar structure and/or practices. 
 
8.2.3 Impact of the insourcing on the economic context 
 
In the second round of interviews, the SCM said that CarpetCo had achieved all its 




“[The new process] is doing very well. It accomplished everything that 
we expected… We adapted very fast to the new machine, it was very 
tranquil. I believe that in relation to costs too, they have reduced 
significantly” (CarpetCo_SCM_Fup) 
 
The accounting manager corroborated that CarpetCo achieved its purpose of cost 
reduction with the change in the process of the asphalt backing. He explained that 
the insourcing resulted in a cost reduction of 60% in the process of applying the 
asphalt backing to the carpet, and that this resulted in a cost reduction of 17% in 
the final product (Therefore it can be calculated that the asphalt backing material 
accounted for 25% (17% divided by 70%) of the costs of the final product). 
 
“The cost reduction was significant. It was around 17% on the cost of the 
final product, and in this process alone – the process of changing from 
solid backing to liquid backing - it was 60%. But it represented 17% at the 
end of the production” (CarpetCo_AccM_Fup) 
 
Moreover, the SCM explained that the reduction in the cost of the final product 
achieved with the new process enabled CarpetCo to avoid increases in the sales 
price of the final products to the customers. 
 
“The last general rises in everything were not passed on [to the 
customers]. Everything went up… There were some products of the 
modular [carpets line] of which we managed to hold the sales price due 
to this new process, otherwise it would have increased a lot, because 
AsphaltCo had already signalised a big rise, because their process 
became expensive too” (CarpetCo_SCM_Fup) 
 
The quality manager also referred to the cost reduction achieved with the change 
in asphalt backing process in the second phase of interviews. He explained that the 
new process resulted in cost reductions in the entire production process, including 




“...the market of the backing in plaques is practically dominated by the 
USA, and our price was too expensive. Not anymore. Today we make it 
ourselves. So we also reduced costs with transport and within the entire 
production process. Now we get the bitumen locally, so it has become 
much easier. And we have become more competitive as well” 
(CarpetCo_QM_Fup) 
 
Additionally, the quality manager explained that the process of insourcing also 
resulted in reduction of waste and residues, indicating that the new process also 
had a positive impact to the environment.  
 
“... the residue in this process of the asphalt backing went to virtually 
zero, because the backing used to come finished, so we would always 
lose a piece of it. Additionally, there was the packing and everything. 
Today it comes in bulks and liquid, and we only apply the correct amount. 
So this process itself has zero residues. Unless there is a problem…” 
(CarpetCo_QM_Fup) 
 
Given that this study mainly focuses on the impact of the SCA practices on the 
economic and social context in which the organisations operated, the impact of the 
insourcing on the environment, despite its importance and influence on both the 
economic social context, is not drawn upon heavily here. 
 
8.2.4 Impact of the insourcing on the social context 
 
It has been argued that economic upgrading does not necessarily lead to social 
upgrading  (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011; Hale & Wills, 2007; Barrientos & 
Kritzinger, 2004). Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi (2011) argue that there are different 
types of economic upgrading, and that these may have different implications for 
workers. For example, economic upgrading may involve the introduction of more 
advanced products (product upgrading), and therefore it may require more skilled 
labour (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011). Economic upgrading may involve 
production process improvements (process upgrading) which may be achieved by 
automation (e.g. substituting capital for labour), and therefore it may reduce work 
for skilled and/or unskilled labour (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011). The findings 
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in this study are not entirely consistent with the contentions made by Barrientos, 
Gereffi, & Rossi (2011). According to the accounting manager in his first interview, 
there were about 5 employees working in the production process that changed 
(bonding the asphalt backing in rolls onto the carpet). In the first phase of 
interviews at CarpetCo the HRM explained that CarpetCo would need to hire two 
new employees to work on the new machine, but in the second phase of interviews 
the HRM explained that CarpetCo had hired only one new employee. Therefore, 
the findings in this study do not support the contentions made by Barrientos, 
Gereffi, & Rossi (2011) in relation to process improvements (process upgrading). 
The findings here show that the new production process did not reduce work but, 
on the contrary, increased work given that CarpetCo had hired one new employee 
to work on this process. 
 
The new process also involved physical changes in the plant. These changes 
involved attaching the new machine (which would throw the liquid asphalt backing 
onto the carpet) into another existing machine within the finishing stage of 
production process. This physical change in the plant was executed by a contractor 
company who allocated its workers within CarpetCo during the transition period, 
as explained by the accountant and the QM in the first phase of interviews at 
CarpetCo: 
 
“We are hiring a firm and this firms’ employees will be here installing the 
new machine… it is a service provider” (CarpetCo_Acc) 
 
“There are outsourced workers here now, who are working on the 
construction where we are expanding the production process. They are 
outsourced… they are contractor, like if they were a construction 
company… we hired a company and this company will allocate its 
employees here” (CarpetCo_QM) 
 
Also, a team from the manufacturer of the new machine was working within 
CarpetCo during the transition period in order to provide technical support with the 




“The workforce from (Company name), which is the manufacturer of the 
machine that will be installed, will come here and will stay during the 
whole implementation of this system, they will provide training...” 
(CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
After the implementation of the process was completed, the SCM explained that 
the transition period lasted approximately 3 months, and that the machine to which 
the new equipment was attached was stalled during this period.  
 
"[The machine of the asphalt backing process] stopped for almost three 
months... it was a total of about 3 months of transition period... There 
were a few days that [the machine] worked. We had a material - the 
asphalt backing in roll – that we were keeping specifically for this. 
Materials that the customers needed we produced, but in alternate days, 
we produced one day and then only after 4 or 5 days - only for 
emergencies. But the production of machine itself was cancelled... We 
had a small stock of backing in roll from AsphaltCo, waiting for our 
machine. We could not have a lot of material here to avoid accumulating” 
(CarpetCo_SCM_Fup) 
 
Although the machine was mostly stalled during the transition period, the SCM 
explained that none of the employees who worked in the machine were dismissed; 
instead these employees were allocated to work in different tasks during the 
transition period, sometimes helping with the alterations in the asphalt backing 
process machine, sometimes helping in other stages of the production process, and 
occasionally running the asphalt backing process machine using the old setting in 
some cases where urgent needs of materials arose. 
 
“...the [workers of the] finishing department were able to help in other 
departments during this period… they were reallocated during this 
period, helping other departments. They did not take annual leave 
because there were these emergency productions that they had to do. 
So it was taken advantage to do other [things]... while the personnel 
[from the manufacturer of the machine] were making the alterations in 
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the machine, they [employees] were cleaning, painting... so they helped 
to renovate the machine... No one was dismissed because of this” 
(CarpetCo_SCM_Fup) 
 
An important impact of this change on the workers was the training and 
qualification provided. Therefore, the findings here support Barrientos, Gereffi, & 
Rossi’s (2011) assumption that when economic upgrading involves the introduction 
of more advanced products (product upgrading), it may require more skilled labour. 
As explained by the SCM in his first interview, the workers involved in the process 
change received training from the other firm from within the company group which 
already used this process before CarpetCo, as well as from the manufacturer of the 
new machine, combining technological advancement with employee training and 
development.  
 
“…the production supervisor and the employee who is taking care of the 
implementation of this new machine went to EuroCountry2 last month 
to visit the plant of TapisCo, which uses the same system for this 
production. They are from the same group too. So they went there to 
learn - how the set-up is made, how the application works, to bring this 
knowledge here. The workforce from (Company name), which is the 
machine that will be installed, will come here and will stay during the 





This chapter explored the rules and routines in terms make-or-buy decision within 
CarpetCo. In particular, this chapter explored a process of insourcing one of 
CarpetCo’s raw materials which had recently been undertaken aimed at reducing 
costs and improving quality of the final product. This chapter explored such process 
of insourcing, including the decision-making phase (explored retrospectively), 
through to the outcomes of the change. The findings here suggest that to a certain 
extent management accounting data played a role in the make-or-buy decision; 
however, the decision was made at senior management level (directors, CEO and 
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HQ), with little involvement of the accountants within CarpetCo in Brazil. The 
findings also suggest that the achieved cost reduction with the insourcing positively 
affected CarpetCo’s customers, given that the company was able to avoid price 
increases due to the reduction of production costs. As for the suppliers, this 
insourcing led CarpetCo to stop trading with the former supplier of the raw material, 
which was a national (Brazilian) firm. On the other hand, the insourcing resulted in 
new businesses with two other national suppliers and one external supplier. This 
new process also involved a significant investment in modern (imported) machinery, 
contributing to the technological development of the industry. As for the 
employees, the implementation of this new process did not significantly create new 
jobs within CarpetCo, but it did involve the employment of temporary work within 
the plant in order to implement the new machine. 
 
Moreover, this chapter explored how this case of insourcing may have impacted 
upon the wider economic and social environment in Brazil. The findings here 
suggest that the process of insourcing undertaken by CarpetCo impacted upon the 
wider context of the textiles industry to some extent, given that this process 
generated technological development within the company and thus in the industry. 
Accordingly, this process also promoted employee skills development through 
training for performing the new process in-house, thus combining technological 
advancement with skill development. 
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CHAPTER 9: CUSTOMER ACCOUNTING IN THE FOCAL 
ORGANISATION 
 
In pursuit of this study’s aim of exploring the potential of SCA as a means to 
promote both economic and social upgrading, this study explores the management 
accounting and control mechanisms (or SCA practices) used by a focal organisation 
in the textiles industry in Brazil and across its supply chain, focusing on examining 
how these practices impacted upon the wider economic and social context in which 
the organisations in the supply chain operated. This chapter explores the third of a 
series of four management accounting and control mechanisms explored in this 
study: customer accounting. 
 
Customer accounting (CA) can be broadly defined as a firm’s internal practices used 
to measure and manage their customer relationships (Caker & Strömsten, 2010). 
CA involves, for example, the use of accounting techniques to measure customers’ 
performance in terms of profit contribution (Lind & Strömsten, 2006; Guilding & 
McManus, 2002) which, in turn, informs decisions that impact upon the inter-firm 
relationships across the supply chain. This chapter explores the relationship 
arrangement between CarpetCo and its customers and the accounting techniques 
used by CarpetCo to measure their customers which shaped such relationship 
arrangements. Focus is given to both financial and non-financial measurement of 
customers.  
 
9.1 Customer relationships 
 
As explained in Chapter 6, CarpetCo’s product line was divided into two main 
‘segments’ (product groups): residential and commercial, and the end-customer 
base included homes, offices, hotels, airports, and commercial environments. 
CarpetCo sold mainly to the internal (Brazilian) market, and exports represented 
only 1% of the business (CarpetCo_FinDir). Exports were exclusively within South 
America, with customers in Mercosur (the economic bloc formed by Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and Chile. Within Brazil, Sao Paulo was the largest 
market, representing 45% of sales (the distribution of the company’s turnover by 
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region according to information given by the financial director is shown in Table 6.1 
in chapter 6). 
 
9.1.1 Customer choice: business-to-business arrangement 
 
CarpetCo did not sell directly to end-customers, and all the direct customers were 
retailers (CarpetCo_FinDir). In other words, CarpetCo operated with a business-to-
business arrangement rather than a business-to-consumer arrangement. Both the 
finance director and the industrial director emphasised that CarpetCo did not want 
to sell its products directly to the end-customers. The finance director further 
explained that CarpetCo chose this sales strategy in order to be able to focus on 
their main activity, which was manufacturing. CarpetCo was concerned with 
manufacturing the carpets and selling them to the retailers, and the trade with the 
end-customers, including sales, logistics, installation and after-sales service, was 
left to the retailers.  
 
“I sell to the retailer and the retailer sells to you. Each in their own 
chain, just right. I manufacture the carpet and put it in stock. You 
come here as a retailer and buy, sell, install. The final customer uses 
it, steps on it. Done, everything just right. I cannot bypass everyone 
and go there. If there is a problem, [if] the installation was not good, 
they would have to come back to me and I don’t have this workforce 
to attend them and I don’t want to have it at this moment” 
(CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
“How can we sell directly to a person in Rio Grande do Sul, which is 
2.500 km away from here? Who is going to install? Who is going to 
do all the logistics? Who is going to do this and that? We can't do this. 
We don't want to do this. That's why we have our customer” 
(CarpetCo_IndDir) 
 
Another reason for CarpetCo to choose this sales strategy was because this 
arrangement also allowed the company to trade large-scale volumes. While selling 
only to retailers, CarpetCo could sell large quantities to its direct customers 
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(retailers), and the retailers sold small volumes to the end-customers. The finance 
director said that sometimes the end-customers approached the company seeking 
to buy CarpetCo’s products directly from CarpetCo rather than buying from a 
retailer, but CarpetCo refused to sell directly to these end-customers and told these 
end-customers that they would be better off buying from the retailers, because the 
retailers were able to sell at lower volumes and also at better prices, given that the 
retailers were often given discounts based on the volume of their order. 
 
“...[we tell the final customer] you are not a bad customer, but keep 
buying from the retailer. I won’t be able to attend you, I will have to 
charge you at a base price list and it will not be interesting. Keep 
[buying] there and you will also be able to buy only 2 meters, and you 
will be well served” (CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
Moreover, with this sales strategy CarpetCo could centralise its distribution with a 
smaller customer base. As explained by the finance director below, having a small 
customer base facilitated finance operations and reduced the risk of bad debts. 
 
“... so [the retailer] has a lot of small customers and I would rather 
give support to him and have him serve the small ones than having 
all these small ones coming to me. The same way that the 
government does, they take money from us instead of charging 
everyone; [the government] charges only the one who they know 
that will pay. So I do the same thing with Customer1. I sell everything 
to him, charge only from him and he goes after [the small ones]” 
(CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
In the quote above the finance director refers to the government’s strategy of tax 
collection, whereby the government collects some taxes from the larger players in 
the industry on behalf of the smallest ones. For example, if CarpetCo contracted a 
maintenance service from a small firm, CarpetCo was responsible for collecting the 
income tax incurred on that transaction on behalf of the service provider, and 
CarpetCo would then deduct this amount from the payment to the provider. The 
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finance director indicated that CarpetCo’s sales strategy allowed a revenue 
collection that resembled the Brazilian Government’s revenue collection strategy.  
 
9.1.2 Product customisation 
 
As explained above, all of CarpetCo’s direct customers were retailers, and the end-
consumer base included both residential and commercial customers. The products 
sold to residential customers were standard products, whereby CarpetCo was 
responsible for developing the products, defining characteristics such as design, 
colour, and type of yarn; and the retailers displayed the standardised products to 
the final customers.  
 
Some of CarpetCo’s direct customers (retailers) were also wholesalers. These 
retailers distributed CarpetCo’s products to other smaller retailers and also served 
residential and commercial end-customers (banks, hotels, airports, offices). The 
commercial (corporate) end-customers usually required some degree of product 
customisation, which demanded large projects involving CarpetCo, the retailer and 
the end-customer. For example, CarpetCo sometimes developed a specific carpet 
design or used a differentiated yarn colour for a specific customer, as explained by 
the sales director. 
 
“…today we have 2 products specific for Bank1, but it has taken 3 
years of work, making samples, designing, until it was approved… we 
supply these 2 products to Bank1 all over Brazil. But these are 
products developed together with the department of engineering in 
the bank, these are slow processes… in this case we don’t [sell to 
other clients]. We create a design, which they said: “look, can you 
make it, is it possible to make it…” then it passes through the 
departments of architecture, engineering, then they close the deal 
and approve, then they start consuming” (CarpetCo_SD) 
 
These product customisations did not involve investments in specific machinery, 
for example. CarpetCo had to make some investments to meet specific 
requirements from some customers, but these were limited to purchasing different 
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types and colour of yarns, as well as investing time in order to develop specific 
designs, as explained by the sales director. 
 
“…What we have are yarn colours, types of yarn, [but] in the same 
machinery… investment is to create the samples, going there, coming 
back – it’s 3 years’ worth of investment – visiting, traveling… it’s a big 
investment… Human, money, traveling…” (CarpetCo_SD) 
 
9.1.3 Mutual dependency 
 
According to the finance director, CarpetCo’s sales strategy led to a certain degree 
of company dependency on their customers. She believed that, given that CarpetCo 
did not sell its products to the end customers, CarpetCo depended on its direct 
customers (retailers) in order to have access to the market (in other words, to reach 
the final consumers). At the same time, she believed that CarpetCo’s customers 
(retailers) also depended on CarpetCo because, once the retailers sold the products 
to the final consumers, they needed CarpetCo to manufacture those products. The 
finance director described their relationship with their customers as one of mutual 
dependency. Interdependency is related to levels of uncertainty (Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010). 
 
“...we depend on them because if they don’t believe in this kind of 
floor covering we don’t exist. Once they believe in CarpetCo, they 
respect CarpetCo because if the company doesn’t exist, they will have 
to sell something else. So it’s completely mutual" (CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
9.1.4 Personal relationships and trust 
 
CarpetCo maintained different relationships with their main customers, referred to 
as the top 10, from those with other customers. The top 10 customers bought the 
products at different prices to those paid by other customers, with the prices 
usually being around 10% below the standard price list. Moreover, the company 
sought to maintain personal relationships with the top 10 customers, including 
informal social occasions as described by the finance director below. These close 
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relationships promoted trust and facilitated information exchange both at a formal 
and informal level, as will be explored in the next chapter.  
 
“With some [customers] we really have [a close relationship]… we 
have a relationship in which we like to bring them to the plant, and 
the top ones we usually invite to our home for dinner, or we go out 
together… The sales director is a very humble person, and he knows 
a wonderful group of musicians, and we take the top ones to listen to 
the music. My husband joins us; we always gather the families... For 
example, we are bringing the retailers from Rio de Janeiro. They 
arrive on Saturday, Saturday night we will go for pizza, on Sunday we 
will have a barbecue all day long, and on Monday morning they will 
come here to learn about what they are selling. They will have lesson 
on Carpets, have lunch and leave. So this is the relationship of 
CarpetCo with their customers. With the top ones is always like that. 
The top ones are top... it is not about differentiating, but we end up 
bonding. It’s not just about self-interest... They are good people, 
honest people, who come and tell you if they won’t be able to pay, 
who you can trust… So they deserve that we abandon our family if 
need be, to have dinner with them and talk, if that’s the case. Our 
relationship is great” (CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
9.1.5 Cultural context 
 
The sales director also referred to the personal relationships maintained with 
customers, and he suggested that CarpetCo’s management regarded cultural 
sensitivity as an important factor to consider when building relationships across the 
supply chain. As explained above, 99% of CarpetCo’s customers were based in Brazil 
and 1% of the customers were based in other countries in South America, therefore 
all customers were Latin Americans. CarpetCo’s owner was originally from Europe, 
but he acknowledged that for Latins it was important to meet their stakeholders 
face-to-face and to maintain personal relationships with them. For this reason, 
CarpetCo’s owner, who was based abroad, sought to meet all his customers 




“[We went to] a client in São José dos Campos - it was the first time 
that our CEO went there, they are a rather new client… they are 70 
Km from (Company name) who is a big competitor of ours in vinyl 
flooring, one of the biggest in the world. It’s not even 70 it is 15Km, 
or 20Km. They don’t know the managing director there. He said: “I 
can’t believe this, (Owner name) came all the way from (country 
name), came here to visit, and the guy is 20Km [away] and he never 
came here to have a coffee with me”. Today (Owner name) knows 90% 
of our clients. He knows them personally, [to the point] of having 
coffee. Small, medium, big, all of them – 90%. In our segment, in our 
business, where most of the companies are family businesses, and 
they are Latin, this is very important. Maybe it doesn’t make a big 
difference in Germany or in... He visits, stays for an hour, sometimes 
doesn’t even talk about business. So this is a very strong 
characteristic of CarpetCo” (CarpetCo_SD) 
 
Another factor regarded important to consider when building relationships with 
customers was whether or not the customers were family businesses. As explained 
by the sales director above, most of CarpetCo’s customers were family business and 
CarpetCo’s owner believed that for family businesses it was important to maintain 
personal relationships. 
 
Lind & Strömsten’s (2006) model of choice of customer accounting technique is 
based on a firm’s technical and organisational interface with its customers. 
CarpetCo’s relationship with its direct customers (retailers) involved high 
organisational interface, whereby CarpetCo sought to build long-term relationships 
with its main customers. In relation to its products, CarpetCo had a low technical 
interface with its customers. Most products sold to retailers were standardised and, 
in some cases where end-customers required customisations, these products did 
not considerably differ from the standard ones. 
 




Existing literature suggests that customer accounting helps firms make decisions in 
relation to which customers to prioritise (see, for example, Lind & Strömsten, 2006). 
These findings were also reflected in this case study. CarpetCo used customer 
accounting techniques, including customer profitability analysis (contribution to 
profit left by each customer) and sales revenue analysis by region and customer, in 
order to define who were its main customers (referred to as top 10).  
 
As explained above, CarpetCo’s direct customers were all retailers, and the 
customer segmentation was mainly geographical. CarpetCo divided its customer 
base into five groups of customers according to their geographical location: Sao 
Paulo; South and Southeast of Brazil (excluding Sao Paulo); Midwest; North and 
Northeast; and Exports (countries within the Mercosur and Chile). CarpetCo 
measured sales revenue (turnover) by region, and within each region CarpetCo also 
measured sales revenue by customer. For example, Sao Paulo was CarpetCo’s 
largest market, representing 45% of the company’s sales revenue. CarpetCo also 
maintained records of the ‘top 10’ customers within each region, which were the 
ten customers with the highest sales revenue within each region. Within Sao Paulo, 
the ‘top 10’ customers represented 70% of sales in the region (thus it can be 
calculated that the top 10 customers in Sao Paulo represented 32% of the 
company’s total sales revenue). 
 
This information was used to make decisions in relation to which customers to 
prioritise. For example, the main customers bought the products at different prices 
to those paid by other customers, with the prices usually being around 10% below 
the standard price list. This information was also used to make decisions in relation 
to which customer segment (regions) to prioritise. For example, Sao Paulo 
represented the biggest market in terms of sales revenue, and CarpetCo chose to 
prioritise this region in relation to product delivery. Only within this region 
CarpetCo sold products with next day delivery. In fact, prompt delivery was one of 
CarpetCo’s main competitive advantages given that most of CarpetCo’s 
competitors in Brazil did not have stocks of finished products to sell with prompt 




“Today [the product] leaves at 5:30pm, our last departure time, and 
tomorrow you receive it at 9:00am. Where else do you have that? 
Nowhere. Not even online [shopping], nowhere. If you go now to 
(local retailer name) and buy a TV, they will deliver to you next week. 
CarpetCo [delivers] overnight. This is another point where we are 
always evaluated at the top. But this is [possible] because we have 
Carrier1, which provides this service – a great carrier. I mean in Sao 
Paulo though. The other states demand more time…” 
(CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
Seal et al. (1999) note that “Strategic choice is affected by the competitive drivers 
in the industry” (Seal et al, 1999, p308). It seemed that CarpetCo’s competitive 
driver was the prompt delivery, given that within Brazil all their competitors were 
imported. In fact, the finance director suggested that prompt delivery was an 
important differential of the company; and yet this strategy was used only within 
Sao Paulo. The sales director and the sales coordinator also referred to the prompt 
delivery as being one of CarpetCo’s main competitive advantages. For example, the 
sales director explained that most of CarpetCo’s competitors in Brazil were 
importers, and their only competitor that was a manufacturer of carpets within the 
country did not have products for sale in stock (their customers had to put an order 
and wait for the production). 
 
Furthermore, it seemed that the information of sales revenue by region had the 
potential to promote better employment practices across the supply chain. For 
example, the finance director explained that CarpetCo used the services of a 
contracted carrier to be able to provide next day delivery to Sao Paulo and, given 
the importance of the service provided by this carrier to CarpetCo’s sales revenue, 
CarpetCo seemed to (informally) monitor the employment practices of this carrier. 
For example, when CarpetCo noticed that this carrier did not provide safety 
equipment to its employees, CarpetCo gave the equipment to them and advised 
the carrier that they had to have that equipment as a minimum. 
 
“Carriers don’t have a forklift. Carrier1 does not have a forklift. A 
Carrier! We made some trolleys for them to move the boxes… for 
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ergonomics… We gave it to them. We told them that they had to have 
at least that… But they provide a perfect delivery service” 
(CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
The information of sales revenue by customer seemed to be used to make decisions 
on which customers to prioritise. For example, the finance director explained that 
Retailer1, their top customer within Sao Paulo, was the customer who paid the 
lowest price for CarpetCo’s products. 
 
“Retailer1, who is the customers that buys every day, has the worst 
price – which is the best for him...” (CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
9.2.1 Customer profitability analysis 
 
In terms of contribution (sales revenue less costs), the customer profitability 
analysis undertaken by CarpetCo involved the calculation of the contribution left 
by each customer (rather than by groups of customers or segments). CarpetCo 
maintained records of the contribution to profit left by each customer in a given 
period (usually monthly and annually), as explained by the accounting manager. 
 
“We make a projection. We pull the information out of the system, 
by product and by invoice… Then we summarise at the end of the 
month by product and by customer. Monthly and Accumulated - for 
the year and “year to date”...  We have the contribution by customer, 
we go all the way down to the level of the contribution, of the margin” 
(CarpetCo_AccM_Fup) 
 
Customer accounting including customer profitability analysis was controlled by the 
Sales and Marketing division, as explained by the finance director: 
 
“...the department that has the best controls is the sales department. 
Anything you need from a sales department. if you mention sales, we 
know who bought, what they bought, how much they bought, what 
colour they bought, how much they paid, what margin and 
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contribution they left. That is monthly, daily, however you want it. I 
mean, it depends on AccMgr closing the cost” (CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
Although the main responsibility for customer accounting was attributed to the 
Sales and Marketing division, the Accounting department played an important role 
in calculating the costs of the products sold. As explained by the finance director 
above, the sales division depended on the accounting manager in order to be able 
to identify the contribution left by each customer. In other words, the Sales and 
Marketing division kept detailed records of sales to each customer, including sales 
price and sales volume, but they could only calculate the contribution left by each 
customer (sales price less cost) once the accounting manager calculated the unit 
costs and provide them to the Sales and Marketing division. 
 
In a study examining the implementation of customer accounting in a case study 
organisation, Fish et al. (2017) found that despite the implementation of customer 
accounting techniques, managers tended to rely on their intituition in relation to 
customer profitability analysis rather than on data. These findings seem to be 
reflected in this study. For example, although CarpetCo performed customer 
segment profitability, at the same time it seemed that CarpetCo chose which 
customers to prioritise based on other factors such as personal relationships built 
over time. For instance, CarpetCo had a differentiated relationship with its “number 
one” customer. CarpetCo maintained a personal relationship with this customer, 
including informal social occasions, and this customer was often prioritised in 
relation to service. However, surprisingly, this customer paid lower prices to those 
paid by other customers. It seemed that this customer was prioritised irrespective 
of his current contribution to the company’s profit.  Therefore, it seems that 
customer accounting may have been adopted in a ceremonial way in order to gain 
legitimacy (Dambrin, Lambert, & Sponem, 2007). In other words, CarpetCo 
frequently produced customer performance measurement reports in order to look 
professional and gain legitimacy, but in practice the customers who were prioritised 
were those with whom CarpetCo had built a personal relationship over time.   
 
One of the reasons why CarpetCo sought to maintain personal relationships with 
its main customers might be explained by the need for multinational corporations 
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to gain legitimacy in a foreign country (Kostova & Roth, 2002). More specifically, 
they “experience the pressure to adopt local practices and become isomorphic with 
the local institutional context” (Kostova & Roth, 2002, p. 215). CarpetCo was part 
of an international group of companies operating in Brazil. The company’s owner 
was originally from Europe, but he believed that for Latin Americans it was 
important to meet their stakeholders face-to-face and to maintain personal 
relationships with them. Therefore, he sought to meet all his customers personally 
and to visit his main customers every time he went to Brazil (adopting local 
practices).  
 
Some authors argue that one of the purposes of socialisation is to build mutual trust 
between “boundary spanners” (the individuals involved in the management of 
inter-firm relationships), which could “compensate for incomplete controls and 
increase the functioning of existing controls” (Dekker, 2016, p. 97). To some extent, 
this study’s findings support the contentions above. For example, another reason 
for CarpetCo to seek to build personal relationships with its main customers was 
because most of the company’s customers were family businesses. CarpetCo’s 
owner believed that for family businesses it was important to maintain personal 
relationships with their stakeholders. Therefore, it could be argued that by building 
personal relationships with these customers CarpetCo was seeking to build trust 
with these customers. 
 
9.2.2 Pricing decisions 
 
For pricing decisions, CarpetCo used the cost-plus pricing technique, whereby sales 
price was calculated by adding a profit margin (mark-up) to the cost of the product; 
and CarpetCo used the absorption method to calculate unit costs. The sales price 
was revised every six months (CarpetCo_FinDir). 
 
“When we ask [ourselves] ‘how do we make the price?’ [We] get the 
AccMgr’s spreadsheet… It is a massive spreadsheet with all the 
information for price formation, which is totally restricted to finance, 
sales and to the CEO of the company. It comes from the start, 
including how much we pay on wages… we have all that information. 
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Maybe it does not include the entire chain, but we have all our costs 
in there. After that, we close it. My finished costs is here: R$20. Now 
there are taxes, commissions, freight, it is now 'x'. Now my mark-up. 
Well, I need to have a contribution of 20% for this product. Sales price: 
'y'. I always work with worst price, always. So in the worst condition I 
have 20. Then I will work backwards. In the best condition I have 30. 
So I will try and sell as much as I can at the best condition. If I can’t, 
my limit is for Retailer1, who is the customer that buys every day...” 
(CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
These findings also suggest that cost plus was a generally accepted pricing method. 
In other words, the buyer (in this case CarpetCo) would accept the price increase 
as long as the supplier could justify the increase in their costs. Interestingly, Kumra, 
Agndal, & Nilsson (2012) conducted a study of OBA practices in India, also an 
emerging economy, and found similar results. The authors conducted an empirical 
study in a very different industry, a manufacturer of equipment, and they found 
that there too the cost-based pricing method was generally accepted for 
determining prices.  
 
For exports, CarpetCo used a different pricing technique. As explained in Chapter 7, 
exports represented only around 1% of CarpetCo’s sales. Exports were exclusively 
within South America, with customers in Chile and in Mercosur (the economic bloc 
formed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). As explained by the external 
trade manager, CarpetCo was not competitive enough to be able to sell to the 
external market outside of Mercosur.  
 
“CarpetCo was established to serve Mercosur. Our prices are not 
competitive to serve other countries rather than those within 
Mercosur” (CarpetCo_Comex) 
 
The finance director explained that the sales price for exports was calculated based 
on marginal costing (rather than absorption costing used for the Brazilian market); 
therefore, sales to the external market only covered direct variable costs. The 
finance director explained that CarpetCo chose to export to these countries even 
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though exports were not profitable in order to maintain its presence in this market. 
Therefore, it seemed that CarpetCo believed that this market could be profitable in 
the future, characterising a form of use of the customer valuation analysis 
technique (Lind and Stromsten, 2006). 
 
“...[exports] represented, in golden days, 40% [of sales]. Thank God it 
doesn’t anymore, otherwise we would be nuts, because today we 
work with marginal cost for exports. Marginal cost covers only 
material and consumable costs. Everything else – employees, 
administrative, energy, water – all that is at the expense of the other 
products… In other words, I don’t include labour and other 
administrative expenses in this. I include only how much was spent 
on yarns, latex, etc. It was spent R$10, so I will keep R$1 for me and 
sell for R$11. Including everything else it was spent R$15, but I ignore 
those R$ and consider R$10. This is the marginal cost. I look at my 
marginal cost and build the price on that. This gives me nothing. Only 
for exports, that is to keep our name alive. There isn’t anyone 
attending these markets, apart from Chile that is an open economy 
and receives from everyone with no import duties. Within Mercosur 
we have the exemption, but even so, with 30% difference, we can’t 
sell… Argentina is a catastrophe… so we do that to maintain. If we 
were to live off exports you wouldn’t be sitting there” 
(CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
In fact, CarpetCo had recently undertaken insourcing which involved a significant 
investment in new machinery, seeking to reduce production costs (and arguably 
become more competitive and more profitable both in the Brazilian and the 




This chapter explored the relationship arrangements between CarpetCo and its 
customers, as well as the accounting techniques used by CarpetCo to measure its 
customers and to make decisions in relation to which customers to prioritise. The 
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findings in this chapter show that the use of customer accounting techniques 
impacted the inter-firm relationships across the entire supply chain, and ultimately 
resulted in promoting better employment practices. For example, CarpetCo used 
customer accounting techniques, including customer profitability analysis 
(contribution to profit) and sales revenue analysis, in order to make strategic 
decisions in relation of which customers to be prioritised which, in turn, informed 
other strategic decisions such as distribution strategy. The main customer segment 
(region) was prioritised in relation to product delivery (next day delivery). In order 
to be able to provide next day delivery, CarpetCo built a strong long-term 
relationship with a freight services provider (carrier). Such close relationship with 
the carrier facilitated information exchange at an informal level, which allowed 
CarpetCo to become aware of their work conditions. CarpetCo became aware that 
the carrier did not have forklifts and, as a reaction, the company provided trolleys 
to the carrier in order to improve their work conditions. Therefore, the use of 






CHAPTER 10: OPEN BOOK ACCOUNTING PRACTICES 
ACCROSS THE CASE STUDY SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
This chapter continues this study’s journey of exploring the potential of SCA as a 
means to promote both economic and social upgrading. In pursuit of this aim, this 
study explores the management accounting and control mechanisms (or SCA 
practices) used by a focal organisation in the textiles industry in Brazil and across 
its supply chain, focusing on examining how these practices impacted upon the 
wider economic and social context in which the organisations in the supply chain 
operated. This chapter examines the fourth and last SCA practice explored in this 
study: Open Book Accounting (OBA).  
 
OBA is generally defined as the disclosure of management accounting information 
beyond organisational boundaries (Caglio, 2017; Caglio & Ditillo, 2012; Windolph & 
Moeller, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). While some 
authors define OBA as the disclosure of costs information between buyers and 
suppliers (Lamming, et al., 2005; Lamming, 1996), others define OBA more widely 
as the exchange of both financial and non-financial information in inter-
organisational settings (Caglio, 2017; Caglio & Ditillo, 2012; Windolph & Moeller, 
2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). This study takes the 
perspective of the latter. In other words, this study uses the term OBA to refer to 
the exchange of both financial and non-financial information across the supply 
chain. OBA plays a key role in SCA (Lamming, 1993; Cooper and Slagmulder, 1999; 
Mouritsen et al., 2001; Kulmala, 2002; Kajuter and Kulmala, 2005). Information 
exchange is inevitably part of every transaction (Windolph & Moeller, 2012). 
Therefore, OBA is embedded within all SCA techniques, and it is essential to 
promoting collaborative efforts between buyers and suppliers searching for joint 
cost reduction, process improvements and trust building. Therefore, this chapter is 
key for this study and, in a way, it brings the whole thesis together. 
 
Previous empirical studies on OBA practices suggest that information exchange 
between buyers and suppliers is rarely a systematic and unvarying process 
(Windolph & Moeller, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005, 2010). 
The same is observed in this study. In this study the variants in OBA practices 
180 
 
included the type of information disclosed (e.g. financial and/or non-financial 
information), the extent of disclosure (e.g. data fully or partially disclosed), the 
frequency of information exchange (e.g. continuous or occasional), the form in 
which the information disclosure took place (e.g. formal and/or informal disclosure), 
and direction of information disclosure (e.g. one-sided or two-sided).  
 
Given this study’s aim of exploring the potential of SCA to promote both economic 
and social upgrading, the rules and routines in terms of OBA practices in this study 
were analysed by the type of information disclosed. The analysis of the OBA 
practices was divided into three types of information: accounting and costs 
information, technical and procedural information, and information about 
approach to managing social issues. In contrast with previous literature (Möller, 
Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Cullen & Meira, 2010), the findings in this study suggest 
that the extent to which firms both disclosed and required information from their 
buyers and suppliers varied according to the type of information exchanged rather 
than on the type of the inter-firm relationship. 
 
This chapter starts by exploring the characteristics of the OBA practices between 
buyers and suppliers across the case study supply chain. Greater focus is given to 
CarpetCo’s approach to OBA, the focal organisation in which an extensive case 
study has been conducted. In addition, four of CarpetCo’s tier 1 suppliers of raw 
materials were interviewed as part of this study, and the approach of each of these 
suppliers to OBA practices with their own customers and suppliers is explored in 
the second section of this chapter in the context of four mini case studies. It is 
important to note that although five firms that form part of the same supply chain 
were interviewed, this study focuses on the dyadic relationships between each of 
the firms interviewed and their tier 1 buyers and suppliers. In other words, this 
study focuses on the immediate supply network of each of these firms rather than 
focusing on the total supply network (Seal et al., 1999). Having had obtained access 
to four of CarpetCo’s suppliers not only provided information about the SCA 
practices of these firms with their own suppliers and buyers (including CarpetCo), 
but also provided access to the point of view of two parties in the dyadic 
relationship between these suppliers and CarpetCo. Such access to the point of 
181 
 
view of two parties in a dyadic relationship provided crucial insights for 
understanding the dynamics of these inter-firm relationships.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section explores the characteristics 
of the OBA practices between CarpetCo and its customers and suppliers. The 
second section explores the OBA practices of four of CarpetCo’s suppliers with their 
own customers and suppliers in the context of four mini case studies. The third 
section explores the factors that influenced the OBA practices across the case study 
supply chain. Subsequently, the chapter analyses the impact of these OBA practices 
on the economic and social environment in which the firms operate. Finally, the 
chapter end with a summary. 
 
10.1 OBA practices within CarpetCo 
 
This section explores CarpetCo’s approach to OBA practices with its buyers and 
suppliers. In other words, it examines the extent to which CarpetCo engaged in OBA 
practices and the characteristics of these practices, including the type of data 
disclosed, frequency and form of information exchange. Some studies suggest that 
the sharing of information is mostly one-sided, where a strong customer requires 
their suppliers to disclose information, allowing the customer to get involved in 
improving the supplier’s costs (Windolph & Moeller, 2012; Meira et al., 2010). 
Although CarpetCo was the focal organisation in this case study (the manufacturer 
of carpets), CarpetCo was not always the most powerful player in its dyadic 
relationships with its suppliers. While for some suppliers CarpetCo was a significant 
and influential buyer, for others CarpetCo was not a buyer of a great magnitude. 
On the other hand, CarpetCo was generally the most powerful player in its 
relationship with its customers (retailers). The power asymmetries between buyers 
and suppliers in each of the dyadic relationships explored in this section will be 
highlighted where relevant. This section is divided into two subsections: the first 
explores CarpetCo’s overall approach to OBA practices with its tier 1 suppliers, and 





10.1.1 CarpetCo’s approach to OBA practice with its suppliers 
 
Various authors have argued that the extent of OBA practices depends on the type 
of relationship between buyers and suppliers (Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; 
Cullen & Meira, 2010). For example, Cullen & Meira (2010) argue that when the 
relationship between the buyer and the supplier is at a mature stage firms tend to 
adopt sophisticated SCA techniques such as OBA. In contrast with previous 
literature (Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Cullen & Meira, 2010), the findings 
in this study suggest that the extent to which firms both disclosed and required 
information from their buyers and suppliers varied according to the type of 
information exchanged rather than on the type of the inter-firm relationship. For 
example, CarpetCo did not fully engage in OBA practices with its suppliers, 
irrespective of the type and/or stage of the inter-firm relationship. Möller, 
Windolph, & Isbruch (2011) suggested that OBA studies should differentiate 
between disclosure of cost data and the exchange of less sensitive information. 
Given this study’s focus on exploring the influence of OBA practices on both the 
economic and social upgrading of Brazil, this study explored (e.g. through 
interviews structure) and analysed the OBA practices by type of data. Information 
exchange was divided into three types of information: accounting and costs, 
technical and procedural, and approach to managing social issues. The next 
subsections explore CarpetCo’s approach to information exchange with its tier 1 
suppliers by each of these three types of information. 
 
10.1.1.1 Accounting and cost information 
 
Previous studies on OBA show that one of the most common barriers for OBA 
practices across supply chains is the scepticism about sharing accounting 
information (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). For example, reporting from a case study in 
a Finnish manufacturing network, Kajuter & Kulmala (2005, p. 196) compiled a list 
of the major reasons for failure in OBA implementation and the authors found that 
one of the main reasons for failure was the suppliers’ belief that accounting and 
costs information should be “kept in-house”. These findings were also reflected in 
this case study. Within CarpetCo, financial information was generally seen as 
sensitive information, and openness to sharing information seemed to be lower 
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when information exchange involved financial data. Interviewees within CarpetCo 
said that they did not either disclose or required accounting and costs information 
from their suppliers. Moreover, interviewees seemed to feel generally awkward 
about the idea of sharing accounting and costs information with their suppliers. For 
example, the SCM said that he did not require his suppliers to disclose financial 
information because he would not feel “comfortable” asking the supplier to share 
this kind of information. The accountant also showed scepticism about exchange 
accounting information. In the very first interview the accountant said that 
CarpetCo did not and was not willing to disclose accounting and cost information 
to their suppliers because they did not want their suppliers to know the company’s 
profit. On the other hand, the industrial director said that CarpetCo did occasionally 
require its suppliers to disclose cost information, but this was required only in order 
to justify occasional price increases.  
 
“…we want [our suppliers] to justify increases… you can't just say 
[that] from tomorrow [there] will be 5% increase… We don't accept 
this. You must come here, you must sit and you must discuss this with 
us. We want to know why” (CarpetCo_IndDir) 
 
The literature usually portrays that the sharing of accounting information is mostly 
one-sided where, for example, a strong buyer requires their suppliers to disclose 
information (Windolph & Moeller, 2012; Meira et al., 2010). The findings from the 
interview with the industrial director suggest a type of one-sided OBA between 
CarpetCo and its suppliers. For example, while CarpetCo did not disclose cost 
information to its suppliers, CarpetCo required its suppliers to provide cost 
information in order to justify occasional price increases. Although information was 
disclosed only partially and in order to justify occasional price increase (rather than 
as a means of revealing opportunities for cost reduction and process 
improvements), such exchange of information seemed to play an important role on 






10.1.1.2 Technical and procedural information 
 
The exchange of technical and procedural information is arguably a form of 
knowledge exchange. Such exchange may lead to processes improvement and, in 
turn, increased competitiveness for both buyers and suppliers. Therefore, exchange 
of technical and procedural information may promote economic upgrading in the 
industry. The findings in this study show that in relation to technical and procedural 
information, such as production processes and technical characteristics of the 
materials, CarpetCo was generally keen to share information with its suppliers. For 
example, both the SCM and the quality manager (QM) explained that it was a 
common practice to invite suppliers to site visits within CarpetCo’s plant, in which 
they showed the entire production process.  
 
In relation to requiring technical and procedural information from suppliers, 
CarpetCo collected a reasonable amount of information during the supplier 
selection phase. This was done using a form designed by CarpetCo to be filled out 
by suppliers, called questionnaire for supplier approval (see appendix for company 
documents). The information required in this form included whether the supplier 
held any quality certifications (e.g. ISO); whether the supplier had a system in place 
for production control and product traceability, and whether the supplier provided 
technical assistance. The form also included some questions regarding relational 
information, such as production capacity and delivery time; and whether the 
materials were transported with traceable vehicles (which arguably refers to the 
supplier’s approach to managing social issues in relation to, for example, the drivers’ 
safety).  
 
10.1.1.3 Information about approach to managing social issues 
 
The exchange of information about firms’ approach to managing social issues across 
supply chains may arguably promote social upgrading in the environment in which 
the organisations in the supply chain operate. For example, such exchange may lead 
to better practices in terms of managing social issues due to pressures from a 
powerful buyer or supplier (coercive isomorphism) (Brandau et al., 2013; Tsamenyi, 
Cullen, & González, 2006; Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
185 
 
Also, exchange of information about firms’ approach to managing social issues may 
lead to better social practices across the supply chain due to dissemination of best 
practices (mimetic isomorphism) (Brandau et al., 2013; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & 
González, 2006; Moll, Burns, & Major, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this study, 
there were some instances in which CarpetCo required information related to social 
and environmental issues (coercive isomorphism). For example, as explained above, 
CarpetCo collected a reasonable amount of information about suppliers during the 
selection phase. One of the information requested was whether the supplier’s 
materials were transported using traceable vehicles which, although seemingly 
intended for the purpose of tracing the material delivery, this could arguably have 
implications to supplier’s approach to managing social issues in relation to, for 
example, the compliance with safety regulations and work conditions for the drivers. 
Furthermore, together with the above-mentioned questionnaire for supplier 
approval, CarpetCo required the suppliers under selection process to present official 
documents issued by different governmental agencies showing that they did not 
have any outstanding obligations. For example, CarpetCo required the potential 
suppliers to present their environmental licence for operation, and the official 
recognition of payment of security and environmental taxes. Additionally, CarpetCo 
required the potential supplier to present a letter signed by their senior executive 
declaring that they were in compliance with all the employment, anti-discriminatory 
and safety norms.   
 
Another example of coercive isomorphism in relation to information about firms’ 
approach to managing social issues can be observed in instances in which CarpetCo 
monitored the employment practices of its suppliers. For example, within the 
employment legislation in Brazil there was a regulation (Sumula do TST no. 331 Res. 
174/2011) which determined that when a company hired a service provider firm to 
render services involving labour working within the premises of the hiring company 
(for example, cleaning and security services), the hiring company was co-
responsible for the labour working within its premises. Given that CarpetCo did hire 
service provider firms to provide services of cleaning, security and local refectory, 
in these cases CarpetCo monitored the employment practices of the service 
providers, as explained by the HR manager below. The HR manager explained that 
in fact the legislation did not require the hiring firm to monitor the employment 
186 
 
practices of the service providers; but the regulation decreed that the hiring firm 
was co-responsible for the workers within the service provider, thus in this cases 
CarpetCo formally monitored the practices (by requesting information) as a 
precaution given that CarpetCo was co-responsible for the workers of the service 
provider. 
 
“…every supplier that comes here that has involvement with people, 
providing service, I request all the information… this [information 
required] is not in the law, but… we are co-responsible should 
anything happen to their employees here… It happens in some cases 
with the porters. It happened once, there was a guy who didn’t even 
work here; he didn’t come to work. But he worked for a service 
provider firm which didn’t pay his termination package, so he started 
a judicial claim saying that he worked for that company during a 
certain period and that, say, for one year he provided service for 
CarpetCo. But we had all the documentation that proved that he 
wasn’t in their payroll. Therefore, he didn’t... he didn’t have anything 
registered here showing that he worked here. But if he had worked 
here, CarpetCo would have to pay, because the company went 
bankrupt, the company for which he worked went bankrupt, so when 
the first defendant goes bankrupt, or is not present, the responsibility 
is transferred for who they provided the service. So that’s the reason 
for the requirement. I don’t know, but when the client is big they 
usually request this kind of information... this people of the asphalt 
backing [machine] too, I ask for. If they will provide service in here, I 
ask… [suppliers of raw material] no, only for who is providing services 
inside [the company] … I check if everything is OK. If everything is OK 
with the documentation, I archive it. This is a precaution that we take. 
Also, I am always careful if they don’t have life insurance from the 
company, then I inform the manager and the person who hired the 
service so that they give their consent. “Look, this worker is here 
inside [the company] but he doesn’t have a life insurance, they didn’t 





In other words, in these cases CarpetCo was a powerful supplier who, by monitoring 
the suppliers’ practices, ensured that these suppliers complied with the legislation. 
This is arguably particularly relevant in developing countries with low enforcement, 
as was Brazil.  
 
In other cases, there seemed to be some exchange of information about firms’ 
social impact and approach to managing social issues across the supply chain at an 
informal level. For example, the SCM explained that his suppliers informally shared 
information about the benefits that the supplier offered to its employees.  
 
“[We share HR information] only informally... when they mention 
maybe in a visit, something like that....” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
Information about the benefits that a firm offers to its employees is arguably an 
important indicator of a firm’s social impact. Employment benefits arguably 
promote improvements to the employees and their families, therefore contributing 
to the social upgrading of the environment in which the company operates. For 
example, through benefits such as health insurance, which are generally extended 
to family members, employees and their families gain access to health care and 
arguably better quality of life. Other examples of employment benefits that may 
contribute to the social upgrading of the environmental context in which a firm 
operates include training and financial support for formal education, contributing 
to the improved educational level of the region and availability of skilled labour.  
 
The supply chain manager further explained that he shared information with his 
suppliers about the benefits that CarpetCo offered to its employees because 
sometimes his suppliers asked if it was good to work for CarpetCo.  
 
“Sometimes we mention informally to those suppliers that we have 
more contact with. For example, sometimes there are suppliers who 





The accounting manager talked about the work conditions in the factory of one of 
CarpetCo suppliers, of which he became aware during a visit to the supplier’s 
premises. 
 
“What I hear is some informal talks, when they come [here]... in TexCo, 
for example, I’ve been there, in the factory, what I’ve seen that is 
different from here is that, for example, here we have the refectory, 
there the workers put their packed food next to the machinery and 
eat it there. This kind of thing…” (CarpetCo_Acc) 
 
Although seemingly unintendedly, such informal exchange of information had the 
potential to improve work conditions across the supply chain. For example, this 
exchange of information allowed CarpetCo to be aware of the work conditions 
and/or employment practices within its customers and suppliers, promoting the 
monitoring of these practices to some extent. For instance, through the informal 
exchange of information CarpetCo became aware that its main freight service 
provider (carrier) did not have forklifts for moving products, putting workers’ safety 
at risk. As a result of this, CarpetCo provided safety equipment for the freight 
service firm’s employees. 
 
“[Some] carriers don’t have a forklift… a carrier! We made some 
trolleys for them to move the boxes… for ergonomics… we gave it to 
them. We told them that they had to have at least that…” 
(CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
Although CarpetCo did not directly monitor the employment practices of its 
partners, some interviewees suggested that they were at rest because they trusted 
that CarpetCo’s suppliers and customers had good practices.  
 
“Most of the companies that we work with… they have a very good 
structure… with whomever we do business, it's normally well-
established companies, companies that have all the structures in 
place, so I don't think there is really an issue. Unless you buy from 
rural companies where there's lots of problems, [but] we don't do 




However, it seemed that this concern about their partners’ employment practices 
was limited to their tier 1 suppliers. For example, the SCM revealed that sometimes 
there were freight providers (carriers) who were hired directly by CarpetCo’s 
customers. In other words, in some cases the customer would contract a carrier to 
collect the products at CarpetCo’s plant instead of having the product delivered by 
CarpetCo (or by a carrier contracted by CarpetCo). In these cases, according to the 
SCM, CarpetCo did not take any actions even if they became aware of bad practices. 
 
“...the companies that we work with are very serious… maybe a 
freight provider comes to pick up a carpet to take it to someone… and 
their son is helping, or they bring a helper who is a minor. But this is 
something that we cannot control… it’s not something permanent. 
But our own suppliers, both of materials and of transport…I know for 
sure that they don’t have any kind of child labour, nothing” 
(CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
In summary, there was some exchange of information about managing social issues 
between CarpetCo and its tier 1 suppliers, but in general this practice was limited to 
partial and occasional disclosure of information. In relation the other firms across 
the supply chain (e.g. tier 2 suppliers, providers of service to CarpetCo’s customers), 
CarpetCo did not exchange and at times overlooked this kind of information. 
 
10.1.2 CarpetCo’s approach to OBA practice with its customers 
 
This subsection explores CarpetCo’s approach to OBA practices with its tier 1 
customers. Previous studies suggest that information exchange tend to occur when 
there is a strong player in the supply chain who requires its buyers and/or suppliers 
to disclose information (Windolph & Moeller, 2012; Meira et al., 2010). In this study, 
although CarpetCo was the most powerful player in its relationship with its 
customers (retailers), CarpetCo did not require full disclosure of information from 
its customers. The extent to which CarpetCo both required and disclosed 
information with its customers varied according to the type of information. The 
next subsections explore CarpetCo’s approach to information exchange with its 
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customers by each of the following three types of information: accounting and 
costs, technical and procedural, and approach to managing social issues. It is 
important to note that, given that CarpetCo’s customers were not interviewed as 
part of this study, the OBA practices between CarpetCo and its customers is taken 
from CarpetCo’s perspective. 
 
10.1.2.1 Accounting and cost information 
 
In general, interviewees within CarpetCo seemed reluctant about sharing 
accounting and costs information with their customers. For example, as explained 
in the previous section, the accountant said that CarpetCo did not share and was 
not willing to share accounting and cost information with its suppliers. In the same 
interview she said that they were willing “even less” to share accounting 
information with their customers.  
 
On the other hand, the industrial director said that CarpetCo had the practice of 
occasionally disclosing cost information to its customers in order to justify 
occasional price increases, in the same way that CarpetCo required its suppliers to 
do. 
 
“…we want [our suppliers] to justify increases… Because we do the 
same [with our customers]” (CarpetCo_IndDir) 
 
10.1.2.2 Technical and procedural information 
 
In relation to technical and procedural information, CarpetCo shared detailed 
information with its customers because, as suggested by the finance director, 
CarpetCo wanted its customers (retailers) to understand all the technical aspects 
of the products that they sold. 
 
“...we are bringing the retailers from Rio de Janeiro. They will arrive 
on Saturday, Saturday night we will go for pizza, on Sunday we will 
have a barbecue all day long, and on Monday morning they will come 
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here to learn about what they are selling. They will have a lecture on 
Carpets, have lunch and leave” (CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
Such exchange of information can be explained by the notion of knowledge transfer 
from Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to local firms in developing economies, as 
defined by Zaheer Khan et al. (2015). The authors argue that knowledge transfer 
may occur through formal and/or informal mechanisms. The findings in this case 
study suggest that knowledge transfer from CarpetCo (an MNE operating in a 
developing country) to its (local) customers used both formal mechanisms (e.g. 
schedule visits to the plant; technical training - “lecture on carpets”) and informal 
socialisation mechanisms (e.g. dinner; day activities; gathering families). 
Socialisation mechanisms in this context refer to “mechanisms which build inter-
personal familiarity, personal affinity, and convergence in cognitive maps among 
personnel from different subsidiaries” (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000, p.479). 
Therefore, contributing to the economic and social upgrading of Brazil (the 
knowledge exchange arguably contributed to increasing skilled labour). 
 
10.1.2.3 Information about approach to managing social issues 
 
In relation to partners’ approach to managing social issues, there was exchange of 
information at informal level. For example, as explained in the previous section, 
CarpetCo exchanged information both with suppliers and with its customers about 
the benefits that the company provided to its employees.  
 
“[We share information] only informally... when they mention maybe 
in a visit, something like that.... it’s the same with our customers, 
when they come here and they mention like, we have private health 
insurance, dental care, we have a refectory, a restaurant…” 
(CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
As argued in the previous section, the informal exchange of information had the 
potential to promote better practices across the supply chain. For example, the 
disclosure of information advanced CarpetCo’s awareness of the employment 
practices within its customers and suppliers, facilitating the monitoring of practices 
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across the supply chain. On the other hand, it seemed that sometimes CarpetCo 
was aware of bad practices and did nothing about it. For example, the finance 
director explained that one of their clients (retailer) did not have forklifts to move 
the products around the store. Although she was well aware of the dangers to 
which their customer’s employees were exposed, she revealed that CarpetCo did 
nothing about it. 
 
“Have you seen how a carpet roll is? I have clients today that don’t 
have a forklift to move things. I have clients in Rio de Janeiro, for 
example, in a hangar they put a line with a type of sheave, then the 
guy climbs on the rolls, it’s like this full of carpet rolls, he gets that 
thing, comes, brings it till here, puts it in one side of the tube, the 
other one he puts on the other side of the tube, and pretty soon they 
drag it until…I was watching and said: “my goodness, if that breaks 
and falls on this guy’s foot he will never walk again”. Also, that hook, 
the effort the guy is putting. Two people for one carpet roll. And then 
it arrives at the client’s house, in the office, he has to bring that down. 
It doesn’t go by lift; it has to go through the stairs. So you can 
imagine…so it’s stuff like that…they don’t have a space to open this, 
cut the cloths the size they have to be, fold it nicely and take it.” 
(CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
In summary, there was some exchange of information between CarpetCo and its 
customers, but this was occasional and varied according to the type of information 
disclosed. Table 10.1 summarises the OBA practices between CarpetCo and its 

















Costs items to be disclosed 
were specified case by case 
Quality certifications 
held by the buyer (e.g. 
ISO) 
 Work conditions, 
employment 
practices 





Existing relationships during 
renegotiation of prices 







Formal disclosure using 
suppliers' own format  










One-sided disclosure from 
supplier to buyer 
- One-sided disclosure 
from supplier to buyer 
during supplier 
selection 
- Two-sided exchange 
of information about 
technical details and 
procedures throughout 





- Supplier selection (for non-
critical materials) 
- Price (re)negotiations 
- Ensure suppliers' profit 
margin (e.g. CarpetCo wanted 
suppliers to thrive) 
Supplier selection Ensure future 
contracts 





- Ensure future contracts 
- Ensure profit margin  






- Small suppliers often 
accepted  
- Some larger suppliers 
refused, reflecting power 
asymmetries (e.g. YarnsCoEU) 
- Some suppliers used globally 
traded commodities of which 
costs were well known to the 
buyer (e.g. Calcite and Latex) 
 No apparent 
reluctance 
 No apparent 
reluctance 
Table 10.1: OBA practices within CarpetCo 
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10.2 OBA practices in four suppliers (four mini case studies) 
 
As explained above, four of CarpetCo’s tier 1 suppliers of raw materials were 
interviewed as part of this research. This section explores the overall approach to 
OBA practices of each of these four suppliers with their own buyers and suppliers. 
 
10.2.1 Mini case study 1: BackCoJC 
 
BackCoJC was one of CarpetCo’s supplier of secondary backing materials, which 
were the materials that formed the back of the carpets. BackCoJC was a Brazilian 
family business based in the same region in which CarpetCo operated. As explained 
in chapter 6, in terms of installation CarpetCo divided their product lines into tufted 
carpets (sold in rolls) and modular carpets (sold in tiles), and for tufted carpets 
there were two different backing materials: primary and secondary backings. 
BackCoJC supplied secondary backing materials to CarpetCo. For these materials 
CarpetCo had three active suppliers, one based abroad (BackCoEU), and two based 
in Brazil (BackCoBR and BackCoJC). 
 
Two participants within BackCoJC were interviewed, and the interviews lasted 
approximately one hour each. The interviewees were the sales manager (SM) and 
the HR manager. This mini case study provided valuable insights about the 
dynamics of inter-firm relationships across supply chains in textiles industry in Brazil. 
 
BackCoJC operated in the textiles industry, manufacturing mainly sacks of raffia 
(commercially named as “big bags”).  BackCoJC also sold technical fabrics used for 
the production of packaging, and threads used for the production of carpets and 
rugs. The distribution of the company’s turnover by product line according to 
information given by the SM is shown in the table below. 
 
Product line % Sales 
Big Bags (raffia sacking) 70% 
Technical fabrics for packaging 23% 
Threads for carpets and rugs 7% 




CarpetCo was one of BackCoJC’s biggest customers of threads for carpets, 
representing around 22% of total sales within this segment, as explained by the SM. 
However, as shown in the table above, threads for carpets and rugs represented 
only 7% of BackCoJC’s business. Therefore, it can be calculated that CarpetCo 
represented around 2% of BackCoJC’s business. 
  
The SM said that BackCoJC’s main competitors were BackCoBR and the imported 
material. In other words, besides BackCoBR, their competitors were all from abroad. 
BackCoBR was a national firm operating in the same segment as BackCoJC, who also 
supplied the same backing material to CarpetCo. As explained in chapter 7, 
CarpetCo bought the same material from two different suppliers in order to keep 
two active suppliers and reduce uncertainty. 
 
10.2.1.1 Accounting and cost information 
 
In general, BackCoJC did not disclose accounting and costs information either to its 
customers or to its suppliers.  
 
“We don’t [share cost information with customers], but there is no 
secret because everyone knows it comes from PPBR and their price is 
fixed” (BackCoJC_SM) 
 
BackCoJC did not request accounting and costs information from their customers 
and suppliers either. 
 
“They [PPBR] are the only ones [who supply polypropylene in Brazil]. 
They have two arguments to build their price on: the dollar [exchange 
rate] and the price of the raw material abroad. So, if the global price 
of the raw material is high and the dollar [exchange rate] is high, 
imports are discouraged. There is no other option. And bear in mind 
that we are a large buyer - the company group as a whole. But even 




10.2.1.2 Technical and procedural information 
 
In general, BackCoJC exchanged information about production process both with 
its customers and its suppliers, mainly during factory visits. According to the SM, 
exchange of this type of information was two-sided both with their customers and 
with their suppliers. 
 
“I have a customer in Sao Paulo, for example, who implemented, 
about four years ago, the Kanban system. I thought that their system 
was fantastic. I talked to my director back then about this. We 
conducted a study at the time, and we did not copy [the customer’s 
system], but we were inspired by it. So this is common” 
(BackCoJC_SM) 
 
“The interaction with my customers is high - with the customers who 
enter the factory. We end up influencing them on some things” 
(BackCoJC_SM) 
 
10.2.1.3 Information about approach to managing social issues 
 
BackCoJC did not have a formal policy for requesting suppliers to disclose 
information about their partners’ approach to managing social issues. However, the 
SM admitted that, although they did not monitor these practices, it would be a 
good practice if they did. 
 
“We should, but we don’t monitor this. Of course that, for example, 
if I contract a new supplier I need to visit them; and if they don’t have 
[a good] structure, if they work under inhumane conditions, with no 
illumination, this or that, we start questioning it. But this is only just 
starting. And at the end of the day what matters is the price. And 
results, of course. The supplier must have at least the ISO certification, 
but the ISO doesn’t mean that they have the best system of world. 
The ISO only guarantees that they apply the process that they 
developed… But anyway, if the product delivers and the price is 
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reasonable, we end up buying” (BackCoJC_SM) 
 
On the other hand, some of BackCoJC customers had recently started requesting 
them to share information about their approach to managing social issues across 
the supply chain. 
 
“Sometimes we do [share information about social practices], when 
the customers ask for it. Some companies now have certain social 
responsibility and environmental certifications. So they end up asking 
[for information], and we pass them on” (BackCoJC_SM) 
 
“I have noticed that our customers are starting to [require disclosure 
of information about approach to managing social issues]. For 
example [client name] requires this from the entire supply chain, so 
we need to pass this on to our own suppliers. But this is very new. 
There should be more of this, I think that most companies should be 
concerned with that” (BackCoJC_SM) 
 
Moreover, according to the sales manager some of BackCoJC customers had 
recently started to share information about their own social practices, which had 
the potential to disseminate best practices across the supply chain.   
 
“Indirectly they do [share information about their social practices]. 
This is because I am always with them and I have access to their 
installations. So I end up seeing some things which inspire us” 
(BackCoJC_SM) 
 
10.2.2 Mini case study 2: YarnsCoEU 
 
As explained in chapter 6, YarnsCoEU was one of CarpetCo’s main suppliers given 
that they supplied critical materials to CarpetCo (yarns and fibre). YarnsCoEU was 
based in Europe and had family links in terms of ownership (as explained in chapter 
6).  The sales manager (SM) within YarnsCoEU gave one interview which lasted 
approximately 3 hours, in which he provided important insights in relation to the 
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inter-firm relationship dynamics between his firm and its customers (including 
CarpetCo).  
 
The SM at YarnsCoEU said that he did not share cost information with his customers 
(including CarpetCo). He explained that one of the reasons why he avoided sharing 
costs was because YarnsCoEU had relatively high labour costs compared to 
companies that were based in other countries.  
  
“I try not to [share cost information with my customers]. Firstly I don’t 
see the reason why I would. I don’t want the customer to make 
calculations. We’re in EuroCountry1, not the cheapest labour in the 
world. We lost [market] to Turkey purely for labour cost. [But] we are 
the Rolls Royce of yarns. Some customers told me that their 
machinery run 15% faster with our yarns, so you can be faster and 
your cost gets lower. And they can use less yarns in the carpet; if you 
have a good yarn you can use less. We treat our machines right, with 
good maintenance, so we have good quality” (YarnsCoEU_SM) 
 
YarnsCoEU’s SM further explained that his customers did not share cost information 
with him either. He added that most of his customers were carpet manufacturers 
and, given that YarnsCoEU and CarpetCo had family links in terms of ownership 
(YarnsCoEU was part of DutexCorp) and some of the firms from within DutexCorp 
also were carpet manufacturers, his customers were concerned about sharing costs 
and accounting information with YarnsCoEU. In other words, they did not want to 
share information with a supplier that had family links with their competitors. 
 
“The main shareholder of DutexCorp was from (company name), so he 
used to be a competitor of YarnsCoEU, because one of (company name) 
plants is of yarns. We have divided the market by countries so we don’t 
compete anymore like we did 10 years ago… We [YarnsCoEU] are 
independent yarn manufacturers. At the beginning my customers were 
nervous because we are from the DutexCorp group, and DutexCorp group 
also produces carpet, so the group compete with my customers. So I 
learned not to ask questions. They know I sell to competition, and I don’t 
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want to make them nervous…being a potential competitor in the past they 
don’t want to give information. I avoid [asking] by choice and I know they 
like that. They don’t want to say” (YarnsCoEU_SM) 
 
One possible explanation for such reluctance for sharing accounting and costs 
information may be economic trend for the product market, as defined by Caglio 
(2017). In the same interview the SM at YarnsCoEU said that the carpets market 
was facing a downturn globally. Caglio (2017, p.7) suggested that in times of 
recession, both in the country and/or in the market in which the company operates, 
behavioural uncertainty may increase.  
 
The sales manager at YarnsCoEU also showed reluctance in relation to sharing 
technical and procedural information. He revealed that there were some technical 
details about his production process that he did not want to share with his 
customers (including CarpetCo). The manager explained that the type of technical 
information that he did not want to share was related to adaptations that 
YarnsCoEU had done in their machinery. In other words, YarnsCoEU purchased the 
machinery that was used for the production of yarns from an external supplier, and 
then YarnsCoEU made some modifications in this machinery in-house.  
 
“We have machinery that we don’t show anyone. We have machinery 
that we made in-house adaptations. Year after year we come up with 
new developments. In Brazil there’s a lot of cheap machinery; I don’t 
have much competition in Brazil, my competition in Brazil is mainly 
from the US. On the product side, I share whatever they [customers] 
want to know, all the details - the technical details - like thickness, 
fillets… In the production process, not everything. We used to take 
people to the factory and they started taking pictures… the new 
management doesn’t want to show [the factory]. I walk with the 
clients [in the factory] where I want to walk. They don’t need to know 
everything. We don’t have anything to hide, except for a few things – 




Such reluctance in sharing technical and procedural information could also possibly 
be explained by Caglio’s (2017) hypothesis of increased uncertainty during 
unfavourable economic trend for the product market, as explained above. 
 
10.2.3 Mini case study 3: LatexCo 
 
As explained in chapter 6, LatexCo was based in Brazil and supplied latex, which 
was a non-critical material to CarpetCo. The Business director at LatexCo explained 
that he did not ask his suppliers to disclose cost information. However, the main 
raw materials used by LatexCo were commodities traded globally at global market 
prices (e.g. chemical products derived from petroleum); therefore, LatexCo had 
access to publicly available information on the global prices of these commodities, 
as explained by the Business director below. 
 
“We don’t go into details of costs with any supplier. But we are always 
monitoring the costs of the main raw materials. First because they 
are essential for our operations, I cannot run out [of these materials]. 
If I don’t have butadiene, the factory stops. If I don’t have styrene, 
the factory stops. If I don’t have PP (polypropylene), the factory stops. 
I can’t slip with them... Given that they are commodities, the market 
is international. There are various sources of public information, like 
the CMI, the IHS. You need to buy access, to have access to the 
reports, but they are public entities, they are publicly available 
information, you buy the report and you have access to the 
information. So the market is driven by these sources. So I know 
what’s happening. For example, all these materials that I mentioned, 
they come from the petroleum. So we monitor not only the final 
material, but our internal intelligence looks at the previous too, in 
order to see what is happening at the previous [stage] and why. For 
example, petroleum is down, but the [price of] polypropylene is 
increasing. How can you explain that? …we don’t [ask the supplier to 
explain], we have an internal intelligence that chases that. With this 
source of information, they analyse everything in order to 
understand what is happening” (LatexCo_BusDir) 
201 
 
As for LatexCo’s customers (including CarpetCo), the business director explained 
that LatexCo disclosed cost information in order to justify price increases. In the 
same way as CarpetCo and CalciteCo, the cost information disclosed by LatexCo was 
partial, limited to the costs of the raw materials which, in the case of LatexCo, were 
commodities traded globally with publicly available prices as explained below. 
 
“...if you are going to plea a price increase, you need to be very well 
justified. For example, I take the cost curve that comes from ICIS, 
CMAI and HIS. These are international sources of data, so we use 
these references. In fact, we buy these raw materials with the 
indexed prices, either to one of these indexes or to a combination of 
them. We have customers that are indexed to the same format too, 
and some that are not. There are prices that are spot, which are 
market prices” (LatexCo_BusDir). 
 
10.2.4 Mini case study 4: CalciteCo 
 
As explained in chapter 6, CalciteCo was based in the same region where CarpetCo 
operated, and they supplied calcite which was a non-critical material to CarpetCo. 
The CEO at CalciteCo said that he only disclosed cost information with his customers 
(including CarpetCo) when he needed to explain eventual price increases, as 
explained below. The CEO further explained that such occasional disclosure of cost 
information was merely to inform his customers of the reason for the price increase. 
In other words, the information disclosure was not intended for joint discussions, 
but simply for justification. 
 
“We avoid [sharing information], especially costs. Right now, at this 
moment, we are transferring the increase in energy [to sales price], 
which was 26%. And we pass only the cost of energy. We are 
informing, actually, that this increase is just related to the energy that 
is being transferred” (CalciteCo_CEO) 
 
CalciteCo seemed to have a rather transactional relationship (as defined by Agndal 
and Nilsson, 2010) not only with CarpetCo but with all of its customers. The CEO 
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explained that he chose to have many small customers rather than having a few 
customers who represented a large part of his business because in this way he 
would not be “in the hands” of any customers. 
 
“…our sales strategy was to avoid big customers, because if a big 
customer leaves you, they break you. So we prefer to diversify [our 
customer base]. There are many customers, all small… [The 
relationship is] the same with all [customers]. They are all dealt with 
in the same way. Same price... it’s not because it’s a small customer 
that we will charge more. We have a rule of keeping a level in the 
market, because if the small ones pay too much, they won’t compete 
with the big ones, and the big ones will break the small ones. So we 
try to keep it at a level for everyone to survive in this market… There 
isn’t [a different relationship depending on the customer]. It doesn’t 
matter if they take 300 tons or 30 tons, they will pay the same price, 
because otherwise the one that takes 300 breaks 20 out of 30, then 
he will be alone in the market and I will be in their hands” 
(CalciteCo_CEO). 
 
10.3 Factors that shaped the OBA practices across the supply chain 
 
This section explores the factors that shaped the OBA practices across the case 
study supply chain. In other words, it investigates the reasons why firms shared (or 
did not share) information, and the factors that influenced the scope of information 
exchange across the supply chain. In line with previous literature (Caglio, 2017; 
Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005), the factors that shaped the OBA practices across the 
supply chain in this study included environmental (external) factors (e.g. related to 
the country and industry in which the companies operated), inter-organisational 
factors (inter-firm relationship dynamics and supply chain related factors) and 
internal factors (intra-firm dynamics, including institutions at both organisational 





10.3.1 Internal factors (intra-organisational) 
 
Internal factors that shape the institutionalisation of routines within organisations 
involve institutions both at the individual level, such as the individual actors’ taken-
for-granted assumptions (ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014); and at the organisational level, 
such as the internalised practices and the organisational discourses (Dambrin, 
Lambert, & Sponem, 2007). Accordingly, the internal factors that impacted upon 
the OBA practices observed in this study’s supply chain included institutions both 
at individual and at organisational level, which are explored in the next sub-sections.  
 
10.3.1.1 Individual actors’ beliefs:  perceived lack of purpose 
 
Previous empirical studies on OBA practices suggest that one of reasons for failure 
in the implementation of OBA may be the individuals’ perception of lack of purpose 
in sharing accounting information with their buyers and/or suppliers (Kajuter & 
Kulmala, 2005). This argument may help to explain what appeared to be the case 
in this study’s findings. It seemed that of the reasons why CarpetCo did not share 
accounting and costs information with its customer and suppliers was because they 
did not see any reason for this practice. For example, when the supply chain 
manager was asked whether he shared accounting and costs information with his 
suppliers, it seemed that he did not see any purpose for doing so. 
 
“I don’t think that [sharing cost information] is important” 
(CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
Similarly, when the external trade manager was asked about the impediments for 
sharing accounting and costs information with customers and suppliers, it seemed 
that she did not see any purpose for doing so either. 
 
“I don’t think there is a difficulty [for sharing information with 
customers and suppliers]. There is simply no interest. No opportunity 




Although these findings could support the claim by Kajuter & Kulmala (2005), there 
were some differences apparent in this study. Firstly, this case study did not engage 
in or observe a project of OBA implementation, but rather explored the institutions 
that shape (or had shaped) the existing rules and routines in terms of OBA practices. 
What is more, Kajuter & Kulmala (2005) argue that the perceived lack of purpose 
of engaging with OBA practices is an endogenous firm-specific factor. The evidence 
in this study suggest that the perceived lack of purpose for sharing information may 
not only be an endogenous factor but also exogenous environmental factors. For 
example, the accountants within CarpetCo seemed to believe that disclosing 
accounting and cost information was not a common practice in Brazil in general, 
not only within CarpetCo. The accounting manager suggested that CarpetCo’s 
suppliers would not be willing to share information, and he expressed disbelief that 
this practice could work in the Brazilian context.  
 
“… here in Brazil if you ask a supplier: ‘open your costs’ [laughter]. I don’t 
know…” (CarpetCo_Acc) 
 
From an institutional perspective, it seemed that the idea of sharing accounting and 
cost information challenged the taken-for-granted assumptions of the individual 
actors within the organisation. In other words, OBA practice was not internalised 
(Dambrin, Lambert, & Sponem, 2007) within CarpetCo.  
 
10.3.1.2 Accounting and costing systems 
 
Previous studies on OBA practices suggest that the implementation of OBA requires 
sound cost accounting systems and reliable cost data (Caglio, 2017; Kajuter & 
Kulmala, 2005; Seal et al., 1999). Caglio (2017) argues that a certain level of 
sophistication of the internal management accounting information flows is 
essential (a prerequisite) for the implementation of OBA practices. Seal et al. (1999) 
argued that commonly understood management accounting systems play an 
important role in developing strong inter-firm relationships. Seal et al. (1999) 
suggested that accounting practices such as ABC and Balanced Scorecard have the 
same philosophy. Simply defining, ABC offers a better understanding of costs and 
cost drivers (Seal et al., 1999). Balanced Scorecard offers a better understanding of 
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financial and non-financial performance (Seal et al., 1999). Thus, they both offer 
solutions to cost management and reveal the benefits of the inter-firm 
relationships. 
 
The suggestions in these previous studies (Caglio, 2017; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; 
Seal et al., 1999) may help to explain the shape of the OBA practices in this case 
study. CarpetCo seemed to lack a sophisticated accounting system. For example, 
the accounting manager admitted that they had only recently started to compute 
accounting figures such as EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortization), and indicators such as stock turnover ratio, receivables settlement 
period and working capital. The accounting manager explained that the practice of 
calculating these indicators had been implemented within the past three years 
prior to the interview, and that this was an initiative from the headquarters. He 
explained that there was a new manager at the headquarters who was, in his words, 
“friends with the owner” and who had started to implement several management 
controls across the entire group (not only in the Brazilian affiliate). The accounting 
manager said that CarpetCo was also seeking to implement the computation of 
payables settlement period as part of the same project, however this was still a 
work in progress because CarpetCo previously had the practice of recording all 
payables in the same ledger account, therefore they did not know the amount 
owing to suppliers of raw material alone. In other words, the current accounting 
system did not differentiate between accounts payable to suppliers of raw 
materials and accounts payable to other suppliers and/or service providers. 
 
“Everything is mixed in the payables account in our books. We don’t have, 
for example, one separate account for suppliers of raw material and 
another for miscellaneous suppliers. We are still adapting to these are 
things” (CarpetCo_Acc) 
 
Arguably, another indication of the lack of sophistication of CarpetCo’s accounting 
systems was the lack of use of a Balanced Scorecard. When the accounting manager 
was asked whether CarpetCo used Balanced Scorecard system, he admitted that 




“First of all, I don’t quite know what this [Balanced Scorecard] is” 
(CarpetCo_AccM_Fup) 
 
When the finance director was asked whether CarpetCo used Balanced Scorecard 
system, she said that although they did not have a system, she would like to see it 
implemented in the near future. However, she said that she did not want to get 
involved with the implementation process. Research shows that the lack of 
alignment between managers and employees’ objectives is one of the main reasons 
for failure in implementation of Balanced Scorecard systems (Fernandes, Raja, & 
Whalley, 2006; Nørreklit, 2000). Therefore, the finance manager’s response 
suggests that she too was unfamiliar with the practice. 
 
“We don’t [use Balanced Scorecard] yet. But I would like to. I don’t know 
why we still don’t [use it]. But we have recently changed some systems... 
I want us to start going into this direction... it is more professional… it is 
something interesting. But I don’t want to get involved. I just want to see 
it done” (CarpetCo_FinDir) 
 
Moreover, she admitted that she wanted to see a Balanced Scorecard system 
implemented within CarpetCo just for show. These findings suggest that she 
wanted to see the practice implemented with the sole purposes of achieving 
legitimacy (or appear professional) (Dambrin, Lambert, & Sponem, 2007; Scapens, 
2006). 
 
“[I would like to implement BSC] just for showing to the auditors... I find 
it very interesting, but we do not have it. It really does leave a little bit of 
frustration not to [have BSC], but... But I believe that within a year - 
because we installed this new programme now, and it is a very important 
tool, it will have BI and such. So within a year I think we will be a lot 
better already... we're heading this way. But we still consider ourselves ... 
as we are talking about a group of more than 70 years and we are 15 
years old, so we still have the right to... but we are moving towards this 




In terms of costing systems, CarpetCo used the absorption method for allocating 
overhead costs. The accounting manager said that they had contemplated to 
implement ABC in the past, but it had been concluded that it would not work, 
signalling lack of reliable cost data. 
 
“I know it [ABC], but we don’t use it. We use the absorption cost 
method... ABC we even… we contemplated it here once, but at the very 
beginning” (CarpetCo_Acc)  
 
Previous studies show that difficulties in the implementation of OBA may be related 
to the weakness of both firms’ internal cost systems. For example, Seal et al. (1999) 
conducted an action research project seeking to building closer ties between a 
manufacturer and one of its supplier, and they found that one of the difficulties for 
the implementation of OBA between the two firms was the weakness in both firms’ 
internal cost systems. Some of CarpetCo’s buyers and suppliers were small or 
medium sized firm (e.g. BackCoJC, CalciteCo), and these suppliers were likely to use 
less sophisticated accounting systems as well. 
 
Possible explanations for CarpetCo’s lack of a sophisticated accounting system may 
be related to external factors, including the firm’s industry and country of operation. 
Previous studies on OBA practice have so far focused on industry sectors which are 
more likely to adopt new accounting methods and implement sophisticated cost 
accounting systems, such as the automotive industry (Windolph & Moeller, 2012; 
Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 
2005; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the information technology and 
telecommunications industry (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Mouritsen, 
Hansen, & Hansen, 2001), and the mechanical engineering industry (Kajuter & 
Kulmala, 2005; Mouritsen, Hansen, & Hansen, 2001; Seal et al., 1999). Furthermore, 
empirical studies on OBA practice so far have largely focused in developed 
countries, such as Japan (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the UK (Seal et al., 1999), 
and northern European countries such as Germany (Windolph & Moeller, 2012; 
Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005), Denmark (Mouritsen, 




Another possible explanation for CarpetCo’s lack of sophistication in its cost 
accounting systems is the firm size. Although CarpetCo was part of a large corporate 
group, the Brazilian affiliate was a medium sized firm. The reasoning being that 
large companies tend to use cost accounting systems that are more advanced than 
those of small companies, and that larger companies tend to be more willing to 
adopt new accounting techniques, given their greater ability to commit resources 
on their management accounting and control systems (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). 
 
10.3.1.3 Intra-organisational dynamics and the role of the accountants 
 
Surprisingly, while the middle management (e.g. accountants and the supply chain 
manager) said that CarpetCo did not share accounting information with their 
buyers or suppliers, the industrial director suggested that CarpetCo occasionally 
required its suppliers to partially disclose cost information in order to justify 
occasional price increases. One possible reason for this controversy could be that 
such occasional and partial exchange of costs and accounting information between 
CarpetCo and its suppliers occurred only at higher hierarchical levels, given that the 
use of this practice was suggested by the industrial director (senior management), 
whereas the accountants and the supply chain manager (middle management) 
affirmed that they did not disclose or require accounting information.  
 
One possible explanation for this is the limited role of accountants within CarpetCo 
and, arguably, in Brazil in general. The accounting manager role in the management 
control system seem to be limited to computing the figures and reporting them to 
the headquarters. He admitted that he did not know exactly how the senior 
management used the information that he provided to them. The manager said 
that the new management control system had been implemented across the entire 
group in search for standardisation, and he believed that these figures were used 
to compare the Brazilian affiliate with other affiliates across the group.  However, 
he did not know whether these indicators were used to compare the firm’s 
performance with, for example, industry benchmarks.  
 
“They have the company on their hands. I participate up to a certain 
point. But I imagine that it is well-managed” (CarpetCo_Acc) 
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Another possible explanation may be related to the notion of “ambiguous 
coexisting ideals” (Dambrin, Lambert, & Sponem, 2007, p. 174). Dambrin, Lambert, 
& Sponem (2007) argue that ambiguous coexisting ideals form part of the process 
of institutionalisation of rules and routines. In this case study, it seemed that the 
idea of sharing cost information was perceived as weird, but the idea of sharing 
cost information when it comes to justifying occasional price increases was seen as 
normal. The broadening of the role of accountants (e.g. with a more frequent 
involvement with purchasing and development teams) could arguably create a 
wider scope for institutionalising SCA practices such as OBA. 
 
10.3.2 Inter-organisational factors (inter-firm relationship dynamics) 
  
Inter-organisational factors that impacted upon the OBA practices observed in this 
case study involved inter-firm relationships factors such as criticality of the material 
involved in the transaction (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), the levels of uncertainty 
involved in the relationship (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 
2010; Dekker, 2008; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005), and previous partner experience (Xie, 
Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Dekker, 2008; Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie, 2003). For 
example, Kajuter & Kulmala (2005) show that one of the main reasons for failure of 
OBA practice is the lack of trust and/or fear of opportunistic behaviour (behavioural 
uncertainty). In common with these findings, within CarpetCo one of the reasons 
for not disclosing costs and accounting information with suppliers appeared to be 
the fear that the information disclosed would put the company at disadvantage 
when negotiating price of materials with suppliers. For example, the accountant 
said that CarpetCo did not share accounting and cost information with their 
suppliers because they did not want their suppliers to know the company’s profit. 
The SCM suggested that if his suppliers knew their profit, the suppliers would want 
to increase the price of the materials.  
 
“I don’t think it’s important. I think that it could even cause some kind 
of problem” (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
In the second phase of interviews, whilst describing the changes in the inter-firm 
relationships across CarpetCo’s supply chain between the first and the second 
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round of interviews, the accountant said that CarpetCo had not changed their view 
on OBA practice.  
 
“…we remain closed. We remain in our cocoon. We remain keeping 
[accounting] information just for ourselves” (CarpetCo_Acc_Fup) 
 
Conversely, while the SCM wanted to avoid encouraging his suppliers to increase 
their prices, he also wanted to avoid pushing them into decreasing their prices too 
much. More specifically, he did not require his suppliers to disclose cost 
information because he wanted to avoid a fight for prices between his suppliers 
(what he called “auctions”). He explained that the prices charged by his suppliers 
were very similar, and that he would rather ensure that his suppliers “thrived” 
(taking a longer-term perspective). In this way he could keep more than one 
supplier active.  Therefore, this practice seemed to be related to levels of 
uncertainty (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 
2008; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005), given that the SCM wanted to keep more than one 
supplier active in order to reduce uncertainty in relation to alternative suppliers.  
 
“I don’t ask my suppliers [for cost information] because... there are 
suppliers that have practically the same price, it’s the same product... 
They probably buy for the same price, and all. So I have to choose 
between them. So sometimes one is one cent cheaper, the other one is 
2 cents, so I keep buying from both of them to keep two suppliers active. 
But I never make “auctions”. I don’t ask the supplier to lower their price 
up to the point where they won’t make any profit, because they need to 
prosper, they need to thrive… Then maybe once they thrive they might 
later have a better margin and pass it on to me as a discount. That’s why 
I don’t ask, I don’t make bids...” (CarpetCo_SCM)  
 
From an institutional perspective, it seems that the main focus of attention 
(Dambrin, Lambert, & Sponem, 2007) of the SCM was to ensure availability of 
material, and this was encoded into routines such as keeping high levels of stock 
and keeping more than one supplier active for the materials. The existing routines 
institutionalised their taken-for-granted assumptions about the nature of their job, 
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and these routines and institutions shaped their view on SCA. For example, they did 
not see the purpose of sharing information with buyers and suppliers. OBA seeks 
cost reduction opportunities, and cost reduction was not the main focus of the SCM. 
In other words, the SCM had a production-oriented view, and SCA was not 
institutionalised in his department. 
 
The SCM echoed this same point in the second phase of interviews. On this occasion 
he mentioned that his supplier of latex (LatexCo) shared costs of raw materials 
(which were commodities traded globally with publicly available prices), but the 
supplier did not break down its other costs, and the SCM supported this practice by 
his supplier. 
  
“...I have a supplier, of latex, who opens [his costs]. He informs [me 
about] the cost of butadiene, the costs of styrene, [and] the cost of 
production. Because the butadiene and the styrene are indexed in the 
global market, so it’s a global price. And his cost of production includes 
everything, since the use of his plant, labour, transport, everything that 
is within this process within that cost… profit… that’s the point, because 
from the moment that I know how much I can bargain with the supplier, 
it becomes an auction. I could say: ‘if you don’t lower your price I’ll buy 
from someone else’… I think this is a strategy of the company. For your 
company to survive it needs to have this secret” (CarpetCo_SCM_Fup) 
  
As for sharing accounting and costs information with customers, the SCM suggested 
that it was not “feasible” because the costs varied for every purchase of materials. 
He said that the cost variations would only impact on CarpetCo’s returns (profit), 
but it would not impact on the price to the customers, so he believed that this 
information was useful only for CarpetCo.  
 
“...it’s not even fixed, you know? There are, say, for every purchase of 
material, for every receiving, because it’s... because there is the dollar 
variation, the euro variation, the import duties, the cost of... sea freight 
varies for each order. So for you to be able to say to say: it’s this much. 
In 15 days it’s not that much anymore... it changes. So, what will be 
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varying is my... my return which will... in the end it will be either bigger 
or smaller according to what is happening. But that is a... our own 
management…”  (CarpetCo_SCM) 
 
However, it is important to note that CarpetCo used the cost-plus pricing method 
to determine sales prices, and prices were revised every six months (as explained 
in chapter 9). Therefore, although the monthly variation in costs did not have an 
immediate impact for customers, they did affect customers in the long run. 
Therefore, justification given by the SCM seemed to be associated to the lack of 
perceived purpose of OBA. 
 
Interestingly, another reason for not practicing OBA was the demonstration of 
trust, or the partners’ reputation. For example, some interviewees suggested that, 
although CarpetCo did not directly monitor the social impact of its customers, they 
were at rest because they trusted that their customers had good practices (in the 
same way that they did with their suppliers).  
 
“Look, honestly we don’t [take into account HR practices for selecting 
customers]. We don’t get there... We say no, but of course we take into 
account because the ones who have a bad behaviour in terms of HR, they 
pay their debts badly, it’s a matter of sustainability, it’s all connected, 
you know? So... rascals are always the same ones, aren’t they? The lad 
who doesn’t pay their employees won’t pay their suppliers. They 
probably don’t pay their supplier first, and then don’t pay the employee. 
So if they don’t pay, we don’t sell to them. If they don’t pay, if there’s 
anything overdue, we don’t invoice them" (CarpetCo_SD) 
 
Therefore, while lack of trust may be an impediment for OBA because of fear of 
opportunism behaviour, the presence of trust may also be an impediment for OBA 






10.3.3 Environmental factors (External environment) 
 
10.3.3.1 Market pressures 
 
Market pressures seemed to be one of the factors that shaped OBA practices across 
the supply chain. One possible explanation for the reluctance in sharing information 
across the supply chain seemed to be the fierce competition faced by the Brazilian 
textiles industry in general. Previous studies found similar findings (Caglio, 2017; 
Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). For example, Caglio (2017) 
argues that the environmental factors that influence OBA practices include both 
cost-based competition (the intensity of the market pressure to reduce costs) and 





There was some disclosure of information about firms’ approach to managing social 
issues that were required by legislation. Thus, characterised as coercive 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For example, in some cases companies 
were required to confirm if their suppliers were up-to-date with payments of taxes 
on payroll, thus CarpetCo regularly required this documentation from its suppliers. 
This type of information exchange had characteristics closer to monitoring practices 
rather than collaborative exchange of information, where CarpetCo required 
information from its suppliers but did not disclose any information in return.  
 
10.3.3.3 “Brazil Cost”  
 
According to the business manager within the regional development bank, 
employers did not monitor other practices apart from those that were compulsory 
because they already had too much bureaucracy to deal with and they did not have 
time and resources to do anything beyond what was compulsory. The manager 
further explained that the regional development bank, which was a branch of the 
national and state-owned development bank, was required to vet firms before 
granting loans, and she said that the bank only looked at the practices that were 
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required by regulation. For example, she explained that, as per the bank’s 
procedures, she had to ensure that the firms applying for loans did not have forced 
labour, but she did not look into the practices across the firm’s supply chain 
because this was not required by bank’s procedures.   
 
“…one of our obligations before providing funding is to ensure there 
is no slave labour, not reported as such... there are several rules. I 
also have to look at environmental issues, if the company is licensed, 
if there isn’t an environmental problem, if there aren’t any 
environmental liabilities. So I end up looking at all that and I only 
finance them if they look good. But even so I believe that it might 
happen. I don’t know if it's a big concern yet in the supply chain, to 
check if the entire supply chain looks good, and all, the source of 
supply... A brand or two perhaps. But I believe it’s not like that yet... 
This is differentiated, even because it is difficult to add this cost that 
exists to trace the supply chain into the product. So I think it still isn’t 
something... it's a very specific niche… It depends a lot on the chain. 
For example, the lumber chain is more organized. In that chain, one 
of the obligations I have is to ensure the client buys certified wood... 
In the textiles chain I think there is no such thing. Because it largely 
depends on the requirements that the federal government enforce. I 
need, necessarily, to check if the company has no reported slave 
labour and has no environmental restrictions… Whether it is buying 
or selling [from a firm with forced labour], it’s not up to me… there is 
no way to track it.  Unless they have any reports because they are 
buying from... Co-responsibility, something like that. Otherwise I 
ignore it. I'll ask who the suppliers are and to whom they sell. I will 
see who these people are. But I will not do this screening because I 
end up not having time, and the funding becomes so difficult that ... 
They already have to meet our criteria, lots of things. However, as a 








This chapter examined the OBA practices between buyers and suppliers across the 
case study supply chain. Firstly, the characteristics of the OBA practices in the case 
study were explored, including the type of information disclosed (e.g. financial 
and/or non-financial information), the extent of disclosure (e.g. data fully or 
partially disclosed), the frequency of information exchange (e.g. continuous or 
occasional), the form in which the information disclosure took place (e.g. formal 
and/or informal disclosure), and the direction of information disclosure (e.g. one-
sided or two-sided). The chapter then explored the factors that influenced these 
practices, including the internal (intra-organisational), external (external 
environment) and inter-organisational (inter-firm relationships dynamics) factors. 
Simultaneously, the chapter analysed the effects of the OBA practices in the case 
study and their potential impact on the economic and social upgrading of Brazil. 
Each of these three dimensions (characteristics, influences and effects) will be 
discussed below with reference to the case analysis and to previous theoretical and 
empirical studies. 
 
Previous studies argue that firms tend to adopt OBA when the relationship between 
the buyer and the supplier is at a mature stage, characterised as a relational 
relationship (e.g. Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Cullen & Meira, 2010). The empirical 
evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the adoption of OBA practices 
varies according to the type of information exchanged rather than the inter-firm 
relationship arrangement. In this study, willingness to share information seemed to 
be lower when information exchange involved financial data, irrespective of the 
type of relationship with the partner. The findings in this indicate that the variations 
in the rules and routines in terms of OBA included the extent of disclosure (e.g. data 
fully or partially disclosed), the frequency of information exchange (e.g. continuous 
or occasional), the form in which the information disclosure took place (e.g. formal 
and/or informal disclosure), and the direction of information disclosure (e.g. one-
sided or two-sided).  
 
In terms of accounting and costs information, the findings indicate that disclosure 
of information was only partial and occasional, usually when suppliers had to justify 
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eventual price increases. Accounting and cost information were generally seen as 
sensitive data, and firms across the supply chain were not willing to fully disclose 
this type of information. One of the reasons for such resistance to disclosing 
accounting and cost information across the supply chain was the fear of 
opportunistic behaviour. In common with findings from previous studies (e.g. 
Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; Dekker, 2004), interviewees in 
this study feared that disclosing financial data could put them in disadvantage when 
negotiating prices. Another reason for the lack of willingness to disclose accounting 
and costs information was the perceived lack of purpose. Previous studies found 
similar findings (e.g. Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). However, while Kajuter & Kulmala 
(2005) argue that lack of purpose is a firm-specific (internal) factor that influences 
OBA practices, in this study it was also noticeable that the perceived lack of purpose 
can be both an internal (intra-organisational) and an external factor that influence 
OBA practices. For example, the accounting manager within CarpetCo said that OBA 
was not a common practice in Brazil in general. One possible explanation for these 
findings may be the role of accountants in Brazil, which seemed to be a more 
traditional one. While previous studies found that the institutionalisation of new 
organisational routines is influenced by the institutions in the industry in which the 
organisation operates (Dambrin, Lambert, & Sponem, 2007), the findings in this 
study indicate that the adoption of sophisticated SCA practices such as OBA may 
also require a change in the institutions of the accounting profession, towards a 
more strategic role. 
 
In terms of technical and procedural information, in most cases it seemed that 
there was no resistance to the idea sharing information. The findings show that 
there was occasional exchange of information, usually during site visits both from 
buyers and suppliers. In some cases, such exchange of information seemed to 
contribute to processes improvements across the supply chain which, in turn, may 
contribute to increased competitiveness and economic upgrading across the supply 
chain. For example, BackCoJC had implemented a new process inspired by their 
customer’s process These findings suggest that OBA practices have the potential to 
promote both economic and social upgrading in the external environment in which 
an organisation operates. While organisational rules and routines are influenced by 
institutional factors, these rules and routines can become institutionalised through 
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implementation and repetition over time (Burns & Scapens, 2000). The findings 
presented in this chapter indicate that, while the OBA practices were influenced by 
the institutional factors discussed above, the effects of the OBA practices can 
become part of the institutional environment in which these practices occurred.  
 
In terms of information about approach to managing social issues, the findings 
show that information exchange varied according to both the type of information 
disclosed and the type of the inter-firm relationship. For example, close 
relationships with main suppliers and customers facilitated exchange of 
information at an informal level of what was perceived as “non-sensitive” 
information, mainly related to employment practices (e.g. work conditions, 
benefits provided to employees). There was some formal exchange of information 
as well, but this was typically limited to that required by legislation. For example, in 
some cases companies were required to confirm if their suppliers were up-to-date 
with payments of taxes on payroll. The findings in this study also suggest that, 
where observed, the exchange of information between buyers and suppliers had 
the potential to promote better work conditions across the supply chain. This was 
observed in the relationship between CarpetCo and its provider of freight services. 
Through the informal exchange of information CarpetCo became aware that its 
main freight service provider (carrier) did not have forklifts for moving products, 
putting workers’ safety at risk. As a result of this, CarpetCo provided safety 
equipment for the freight service firm’s employees. Furthermore, the findings in 
this study suggest that the exchange of information between buyers and suppliers 
had the potential to promote dissemination of best practices in terms of managing 
social issues across the supply chain. This was observed during the interview with 
the SM within BackCoJC, who said that he was “starting to think” about their 
approach to managing social issues after some of his customers asked him to 
disclose information about his company’s social responsibility actions.  In 
conclusion, these findings imply that OBA has the potential to promote 
improvements in the broader social context in which the organisations operate and, 





CHAPTER 11: CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This chapter offers a concluding discussion of the main findings of this study using 
the conceptual framework proposed for this thesis. This chapter also discusses the 
main contributions and implications of this study. This chapter is structured as 
follows. The first section offers an overview of the study and the concluding 
discussions in light of the main aims and objectives. The second section discusses 
the theoretical contributions and the practical implications of this study. The third 
section discusses this study’s limitations and provides recommendations for further 
research. Finally, this chapter ends with a personal reflection of my PhD journey. 
 
11.1 Overview of the study and concluding discussions 
 
This study explored the potential of supply chain accounting (SCA) to promote both 
economic and social upgrading. In pursuit of this aim, this study examined the SCA 
practices used by a case study focal organisation in the textiles industry Brazil and 
across its supply chain. Drawing on institutional theory, this study investigated the 
impact of the SCA practices used in the case study supply chain on the wider 
economic and social environment in which the organisations operated. By doing so, 
this study makes an important contribution to the body of research on accounting 
as a mechanism for development, which has so far been neglected (Hopper, Lassou, 
& Soobaroyen, 2017; Hopper & Bui, 2016; Hopper et al., 2012). 
 
This research is based on an in-depth case study in Brazil. Data collection included 
in-depth interviews with senior and middle managers within the focal organisation 
and five of their main suppliers, and within other organisations that represented 
the wider Brazilian institutional context (national and regional industry federations, 
trade union, and a development bank), totalling 32 interviews across 11 
organisations. The case study focal organisation (referred to as CarpetCo) operated 
in the textiles industry in Brazil in the household segment, specialising in floor 
covering products (mainly carpets). By using a case study in Brazil, this research also 
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contributes with empirical evidence to the under-research literature on 
management accounting in developing countries (Hopper & Bui, 2016) 
 
In order to achieve this study’s main purpose of exploring the potential of SCA to 
promote both economic and social upgrading, four specific objectives were 
developed. The first specific objective of this study refers to identifying the SCA 
practices used by a case study focal organisation in Brazil and across its supply chain. 
SCA here refers to the domain of management accounting and controls in inter-
organisational settings. Accordingly, the SCA practices analysed encompass all 
forms of controls in inter-organisational settings, including control archetypes, 
management control mechanisms and cost and accounting controls (Caglio & Ditillo, 
2008). In order to achieve the objective of identifying the SCA practices used in this 
case study, initially a wide range of SCA practices were explored and, after 
preliminary analysis of data collected, greater focus was given to the SCA practices 
that were more relevant to the case study and that offered richer empirics to 
achieve this study’s purpose and objectives. Thus, in common with previous 
exploratory case study studies (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the preliminary case 
analysis helped to identify the SCA practices to focus on in the course of the 
research. This study identified four SCA practices used to a greater extent by the 
case study focal organisation and across its supply chain: 1) inter-firm governance; 
2) make-or-buy decisions; 3) customer accounting; and 4) open book accounting 
(OBA). It is important to note that this list is not exhaustive; and that the line that 
separates these practices may sometimes be blurred. For example, the rules and 
routines in relation to customer accounting (e.g. customer relationships) could be 
regarded as one of the mechanisms for managing inter-firm relationships within 
inter-firm governance. Another example is concerned with OBA. Considering that 
OBA refers to the exchange of information between buyers and suppliers across 
the supply chain (Caglio, 2017; Caglio & Ditillo, 2012; Windolph & Moeller, 2012; 
Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005), OBA is inevitably embedded in 
all four SCA practices identified. By identifying and describing in details the SCA 
practices used in a case study in Brazil, this study also contributes to the body of 




In relation to inter-firm governance, this study described the relationship 
arrangements between the case study focal organisation (CarpetCo) and its 
suppliers, and explored the rules and routines in terms of supplier selection within 
CarpetCo. Make-or-buy decisions were discussed with regards to the decision-
making process within CarpetCo in relation to outsourcing and/or insourcing in 
general and, more specifically, with regards to a process of insourcing through 
which CarpetCo was undergoing during the data collection. In relation to customer 
accounting, this study described the relationship arrangements between CarpetCo 
and its customers, and explored the techniques used by CarpetCo to measure and 
manage its customers. Finally, this study explored the OBA practices between 
buyers and suppliers across the case study supply chain. Firstly, this study explored 
the characteristics of OBA practices between CarpetCo and its customers and 
supplier. Secondly, given that some of CarpetCo’s suppliers were interviewed as 
part of this study, the OBA practices of four of these suppliers with their own 
customers and suppliers were explored in the context of four mini case studies. 
More specifically, the OBA practices across the case study supply chain were 
explored in relation to the exchange of three types of information: accounting and 
costs, technical and procedural, and information about approach to managing 
social issues. The findings derived from achieving this first objective enabled the 
achievement of the other three specific objectives, as will be explained below. 
 
The second specific objective of this study refers to investigating the factors that 
shaped the SCA practices used across the case study supply chain using the lens of 
institutional theory. In order to achieve this objective, a conceptual framework was 
devised drawing on concepts of two strands of institutional theory: OIE and NIS. 
Drawing on these strands of institutional theory enabled this study to obtain an in-
depth understanding of all the core factors that shaped the rules and routines in 
terms of SCA across the case study supply chain, including the external, inter-
organisational and internal (intra-organisational) factors. Figure 11.1 consolidates 
the conceptual framework for SCA practices derived from the case analysis. In other 
words, the conceptual framework devised in chapter 3 is taken forward here by 
incorporating this study’s findings. The empirical evidence in this study confirmed 
the expectations that there were three types of institutional factors that impacted 
upon the SCA rules and routines: external environment factors, inter-organisational 
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(supply chain related) factors and internal (intra-organisational) factors. Although 
inter-organisational factors may also be regarded as an external factor, this 
approach to the case analysis was undertaken seeking to differentiate the factors 
that shaped the SCA practices observed in this study that may be specific to this 
case study supply chain from those factors that may be regarded as relevant to the 
Brazilian industry in general. It is important to note that the line between these 
types of institutional factors may sometimes be blurred. For example, technological 
uncertainty may be referred to as both an external and an inter-organisational 
factor that impacted upon the SCA rules and routines. In other words, technological 
uncertainty may refer to uncertainty in relation to the technological capability of 
the suppliers and/or to uncertainty in relation to the technological development of 
the organisational field/industry or country. The three types of institutional factors 
that impacted upon SCA (external, inter-organisational and internal) in this study 
are represented in the three boxes to the leftmost in Figure 11.1. Each of these 
factors will be discussed below with reference to this study’s empirical findings as 
well as with previous theoretical and empirical studies. 
 
In relation to the external environment factors, the evidence in this study suggest 
that SCA practices are shaped by environmental uncertainties, which refer to the 
lack of predictability and/or control over the broader context in which the firms 
operate (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008). 
For example, the lack of technological development in the textiles industry 
impacted upon the SCA practices in terms of inter-firm governance. This was 
observed in CarpetCo’s partner selection process for the suppliers of primary 
backings. As explained in chapter 7, CarpetCo chose to import these materials even 
though they involved higher costs because the quality of the national material was 
inadequate. Interestingly, the local supplier in question (BackCoJC) was interviewed 
as part of this study and he revealed that his company was facing difficulties to 
purchase modern machinery to be used in their production process, due to the lack 
of manufacturers of that kind of machinery in Brazil, and to the difficulty of his 
company in getting access to financing to import the machinery. Moreover, the 
manager within BackCoJC explained that the importing process in Brazil was too 
complex, onerous and unpredictable, adding to their difficulty in achieving modern 
machinery. These findings also suggest that another environmental uncertainty 
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factor which shaped the SCA in this study refers to the importing process in Brazil. 
The findings here confirm the arguments put forward in chapter 5 in relation to the 
‘Brazil cost’. As explained in chapter 5, ‘Brazil Cost’ was a widely used term 
throughout the country to refer to all the factors that increased the costs of 
operating in Brazil and that consequently decreased competitiveness, which 
included the high tax burden and bureaucracy. The onerous and burdensome 
importing process may therefore be regarded as ‘Brazil cost’ factor that shaped the 
SCA practices in the textiles industry in Brazil. 
 
Another external factor that shaped the SCA practices in terms of inter-firm 
governance in this study refers to government initiatives such as incentives for local 
content. This was observed in CarpetCo’s selection of suppliers of secondary 
backings. As explained in chapter 7, CarpetCo had the option to procure secondary 
backings either from local or from external suppliers. Both the external and the 
local suppliers attended the minimum quality requirements, but the cost of the 
imported material was slightly lower. Nonetheless, rather than buying the materials 
with the lower cost, CarpetCo decided to buy these materials from both external 
and local suppliers and keep a mix of national and imported secondary backings in 
stock. This decision was driven by a government incentive for local content which 
determined that exports to the countries within the Mercosur bloc would be free 
of taxes as long as 60% of the sales price was related to Brazilian products and/or 
to cost incurred within Brazil. By buying a mix of national and imported products, 
CarpetCo took advantage of both the lower cost and of the government incentive. 
Therefore, the findings here suggest that government initiatives such as incentive 
for local content may impact organisations’ SCA practices. On the other hand, the 
findings in this study also suggest that when product criticality was high, 
government initiatives did not have an impact on inter-firm governance. This could 
be observed in the case of yarns and fibre, which were the most critical materials 
for CarpetCo. CarpetCo chose to import yarns and fibre because the quality of the 
national material was inadequate, despite the government incentive for local 
content. 
 
A further external factor that shaped the SCA practices in this case study was 
concerned with regulations. This was observed in the OBA practices between 
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CarpetCo and some of its suppliers in relation to information about approach to 
managing social issues. For example, in some cases the regulation established that 
companies were co-responsible for the employment practices of their suppliers, 
including for the payment of taxes on payroll. In this cases CarpetCo regularly 
required documentation from the suppliers confirming that they were up-to-date 
with payments of taxes on payroll. Therefore, CarpetCo’s practice of requiring 
information was a result of a coercive pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This 
information disclosure can be characterised as a means for monitoring practices, 
rather than as a collaborative exchange of information. In other words, CarpetCo 
required information from its suppliers but did not disclose any information in 
return. Therefore, this practice also exerted coercive pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) on CarpetCo’s suppliers.   
 
The evidence in this study suggest that the factors that shaped the SCA practices 
also included inter-organisational factors such as behavioural uncertainties, which 
refer to difficulties in predicting and controlling how the exchange partner will 
behave in the future (Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). For 
example, the findings here confirm the assumptions in previous studies that SCA 
practices in terms of inter-firm governance are impacted by behavioural 
uncertainties arising from the characteristics of the transaction involved in the 
inter-firm relationships, such as the criticality of the product for the buyer (Kumra, 
Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), the levels of switching costs 
(Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Håkansson 
& Lind, 2004; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), and the number of 
alternative suppliers (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; 
Dekker, 2008; Håkansson & Lind, 2004), or lack of suppliers’ competition (Dekker, 
Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). The findings in this 
study suggest that behavioural uncertainties also shaped the SCA practices in terms 
of OBA. For example, in common with previous studies (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; 
Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; Dekker, 2004), one of the reasons for not disclosing 
accounting and costs information across the case study supply chain was the fear 
that the partner would use the information to their advantage (fear of 




Also in common with previous literature (Xie, Liang, & Zhou, 2016; Ding, Dekker, & 
Groot, 2013; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Buskens, Batenburg, 
& Weesie, 2003), another inter-organisational factor that shaped the SCA practices 
in this study was the social embeddedness between buyers and suppliers. Social 
embeddedness refers to information about the supplier held by the buyer acquired 
from the buyer’s own previous experience with the supplier and/or from the 
supplier’s previous experience with other partners (Buskens, Batenburg, & Weesie, 
2003). Perhaps not surprisingly, the evidence in this study further suggests that 
social embeddedness may also be linked to firms’ ownership structure. For example, 
CarpetCo was part of an international business group (TexCorp) and CarpetCo had 
closer and more personal relationships with its suppliers from within the same 
group. In other words, the ownership structure of the suppliers seemed to 
influence social embeddedness, whereby uncertainties were reduced by the fact 
that the buyer and supplier had ties in common. Social embeddedness impacted 
SCA practices in terms of inter-firm governance, both in relation to partner 
selection and relationship arrangements, and in terms of OBA practices. 
 
Being part of an international business group also seemed to have shaped 
CarpetCo’s SCA practices in terms of make-or-buy decisions. For example, CarpetCo 
was undertaking a process of insourcing the production of one of its raw materials 
(asphalt backing). As explained in chapter 8, this material was already made in-
house by another firm within the same company group (TapisCo), which was also a 
carpet manufacturer but operating in a different country (Eurocountry2). The 
decision for CarpetCo’s change may be explained by different isomorphic pressures. 
One of these pressures refers to mimetic isomorphism, which occurs when an 
organisation imitates the systems in use by other organisations perceived to be 
more legitimate or successful (Brandau et al., 2013; Tsamenyi, Cullen, & González, 
2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The findings in this study suggest that CarpetCo 
seemed to be imitating the process used by TapisCo which seemed to be perceived 
as more successful. This was evident in the interviews with the supply chain 
manager (SCM) within CarpetCo. Simultaneously, the process change within 
CarpetCo may also be explained by an account of normative isomorphism. 
Normative isomorphism relates to the adoption of internal structure and 
procedures encouraged by influential actors (Brandau et al., 2013; Tsamenyi, Cullen, 
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& González, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The findings here may suggest that 
the firm from within the same company group that made the asphalt backing in-
house (TapisCo) may have played a role as an influential actor. Moreover, Brandau 
et al. (2013) suggest that normative isomorphism may also be a reaction to 
normative pressures from the networks in which an organisation is embedded. 
Therefore, the findings in this study suggest that an organisation which is part of a 
larger company group may face both mimetic and normative pressures to adopt 
similar structure and/or practices to those of other firms from within the same 
group. 
 
In relation to the internal factors, the findings in this study suggest that the SCA 
practices used by the organisations across the supply chain were influenced by 
factors such as individuals’ previous institutions (or taken-for-granted assumptions). 
For example, in common with previous literature (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005), the 
perceived lack of purpose of OBA was a barrier for firms to fully engage with the 
practice. On the other hand, while Kajuter & Kulmala (2005) argue that the 
perceived lack of purpose is a firm-specific (internal) factor that influences OBA 
practices, the findings in this study seem to suggest that the perceived lack of 
purpose may be both an internal (intra-organisational) and an external factor that 
influence OBA practices. For example, the accounting manager within CarpetCo 
said that OBA was not a common practice in Brazil in general. One possible 
explanation for these findings may be the role of accountants in Brazil, which 
seemed to be a more traditional one. While previous studies found that the 
institutionalisation of new organisational routines is influenced by the institutions 
in the industry in which the organisation operates (Dambrin, Lambert, & Sponem, 
2007), the findings in this study seem to suggest that the institutionalisation of new 
organisational routines may also be influenced by the institutions of the accounting 
profession in the country where the organisation operates. Thus, the adoption of 
sophisticated SCA practices such as OBA may also require a change in the 
institutions of the accounting profession towards a more strategic role. 
 
Another internal factor that shaped the SCA practices used across the supply chain 
was the organisations’ internal accounting and cost systems. For example, previous 
studies on OBA argue that the adoption of OBA practices requires sound (or 
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sophisticated) cost and accounting systems (Caglio, 2017; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; 
Seal et al., 1999). The suggestions in these studies may help to explain the shape of 
the OBA practices in this case study. CarpetCo seemed to lack a sophisticated 
accounting system. For example, the accounting manager admitted that they had 
only recently started to compute accounting figures such as EBITDA (Earnings 
Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization), and indicators such as stock 
turnover ratio, receivables settlement period and working capital. He also revealed 
that they were seeking to implement the computation of payables settlement 
period as part of the same project, however this was still a work in progress because 
CarpetCo previously had the practice of recording all payables in the same ledger 
account, therefore they did not know the amount owing to suppliers of raw 
material alone. In other words, the current accounting system did not differentiate 
between accounts payable to suppliers of raw materials and accounts payable to 
other suppliers and/or service providers. Another indication of the lack of 
sophistication of CarpetCo’s accounting systems was the lack of use of a Balanced 
Scorecard. When the accounting manager was asked whether CarpetCo used 
Balanced Scorecard, he admitted that although he was aware of, he not familiar 
with the practice. A further indication of the lack of sophistication of CarpetCo’s 
accounting systems was the fact that they had contemplated to implement ABC in 
the past, but it had not worked (thus they still used the absorption method for 
allocation of overhead costs), signalling lack of reliable cost data. 
 
Possible explanations for CarpetCo’s lack of a sophisticated accounting system may 
be related to external factors, including the firm’s industry and country of operation. 
Previous studies on OBA practice have so far focused on industry sectors which are 
more likely to adopt new accounting methods and implement sophisticated cost 
accounting systems, such as the automotive industry (Windolph & Moeller, 2012; 
Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 
2005; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the information technology and 
telecommunications industry (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Mouritsen, 
Hansen, & Hansen, 2001), and the mechanical engineering industry (Kajuter & 
Kulmala, 2005; Mouritsen, Hansen, & Hansen, 2001; Seal et al., 1999). Furthermore, 
empirical studies on OBA practice so far have largely focused in developed 
countries, such as Japan (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the UK (Seal et al., 1999), 
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and northern European countries such as Germany (Windolph & Moeller, 2012; 
Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005), Denmark (Mouritsen, 
Hansen, & Hansen, 2001), Sweden (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), and Finland (Kajuter & 
Kulmala, 2005). 
 
The third specific objective of this study refers to examining the impact of the SCA 
practices used across the case study supply chain on the external economic 
environment in which the organisations operated, exploring the potential of SCA to 
promote economic upgrading. The findings in this study suggest that the SCA 
practices used across the supply chain impacted upon the external economic 
environment in many ways. These are represented in Figure 11.1 in the upper 
rightmost box. Firstly, as explained above, CarpetCo chose to import primary 
backings materials rather than to purchase from a local supplier (BackCoJC) 
because the quality of the national material was inadequate. Choosing the 
imported over the national material resulted in a loss of business to the local 
supplier (thus in reduced economic activity for the national industry). From an 
institutional perspective (ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014; Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; 
Burns & Scapens, 2000), the previous institutions (e.g. lack of technological 
development) shaped the SCA practices (e.g. supplier selection), which impacted 
upon the external economic context (i.e. reduced economic activity). Moreover, as 
explained above, the local supplier in question (BackCoJC) was interviewed as part 
of this study and he revealed that financial difficulties were a barrier for his 
company to purchase modern machinery to be used in their production process. 
Therefore, by losing the bid to supply primary backings to CarpetCo, the supplier’s 
inability to purchase modern machinery may have been reinforced. Thus, the 
findings here suggest that the lack of technological development in the textiles 
industry in Brazil seemed to be both a factor that impacted upon the SCA practices 
and an effect of the SCA practices. In other words, by choosing to import the 
material (rather than, for example, engaging in collaborative actions with the local 
supplier to help them to get access to the technology and to improve quality), 
CarpetCo may have played a role in the reinforcement of the lack of technological 
development in the textiles industry in Brazil (and arguably consequently, in the 
reinforcement of the low quality of the national material). From an institutional 
perspective (ter Bogt & Scapens, 2014; Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Burns & 
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Scapens, 2000), the previous institutions (e.g. lack of technological development) 
shaped the SCA practices (e.g. supplier selection) which impacted upon the external 
economic context (e.g. lack of technological development). Therefore, the evidence 
in this study shows that the SCA practices within the focal organisation impacted 
upon the wider economic environment in which the organisation operated. 
Consequently, these findings imply that the use of SCA (e.g. collaborative efforts) 
may have the potential to increase competitiveness of the textiles industry in Brazil 
(e.g. improved quality) and, in turn to contribute to the economic upgrading of 
Brazil (e.g. technological development).  
 
The fourth specific objective of this study refers to examining the impact of the SCA 
practices used across the case study supply chain on the social context in which the 
organisations operated, exploring the potential of SCA to promote social upgrading. 
The findings in this study suggest that the SCA practices used across the supply 
chain impacted upon the wider social environment in which the organisations 
operated in many ways. The effects of the SCA practices on the social context are 
represented in Figure 11.1 in the lower rightmost box, and each of them will be 
explained below. 
 
Firstly, the findings in this study show that SCA has the potential to promote better 
work conditions across the supply chain through collaborative relationships 
between buyers and suppliers. This was observed in the relationship between 
CarpetCo and its provider of freight services (carrier). CarpetCo used customer 
accounting techniques in order to make strategic decisions in relation of which 
customers to be prioritised. The main customer segment (region) was prioritised in 
relation to product delivery (next day delivery). In order to be able to provide next 
day delivery, CarpetCo built a strong long-term relationship with a freight services 
provider (carrier). Such close relationship with the carrier facilitated information 
exchange. Through the exchange of information CarpetCo became aware that the 
carrier did not have forklifts for moving products, putting workers’ safety at risk. In 
response, CarpetCo provided the forklifts and other safety equipment for the 
freight service firm’s employees, improving the work conditions. Therefore, the 
findings here suggest that the use SCA practices (both customer accounting and 




The findings in this study also imply that SCA has the potential to impact upon 
employment practices across the supply chain, such as employment security and 
employee’s wages. In terms of employment security, this was observed in 
CarpetCo’s choice of supplier of primary backings. As explained above, CarpetCo 
chose to import these materials over purchasing from a local supplier (BackCoJC). 
As mentioned above, the sales manager within BackCoJC was interviewed as part 
of this study and he revealed that his company was facing financial difficulties. 
During the interview, the manager also revealed that BackCoJC’s owner had 
recently considered shutting down the production in Brazil altogether and starting 
to import the finished products from China to resell in Brazil. Therefore, the SCA 
practices in terms of supplier selection here had the potential to impact the 
employment security in the Brazilian industry. In terms of the impact of CarpetCo’s 
SCA on employees’ wages, this was observed in the case of supplier selection for 
secondary backings. CarpetCo had recently changed the supplier for these 
materials because the new supplier offered a lower price (both suppliers achieved 
the minimum quality requirement). The HR manager within the new supplier for 
this material (BackCoJC), who was also interviewed as part of this study, revealed 
that he was aware that his company paid lower salaries compared to CarpetCo’s 
previous supplier. It has been argued that low-paid work poses challenges for a 
country’s social and economic development (Fontes, Pero, & Berg, 2012). The 
findings here imply that CarpetCo’s lack of awareness of the suppliers’ accounting 
information (e.g. labour costs) may have led to changing to a supplier with worse 
employment practices which, in turn, may impact upon the social upgrading of 
region and/or country.  
 
The findings in this study suggest that SCA practices may also impact workers in 
terms of skill development. This was observed in the case of insourcing which 
CarpetCo had recently undertaken. As explained in chapter 8, the new process of 
manufacturing asphalt backing in-house required specific skills, thus CarpetCo’s 
employees allocated to work on the new process went to EuroCountry2 for training. 
These findings partly support the assumptions made by Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi 
(2011) in relation to the implications of economic upgrading for workers. The 
findings within CarpetCo are consistent with Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi’s (2011) 
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assumption that when economic upgrading involves the introduction of more 
advanced products (product upgrading), it may require more skilled labour. 
However,  the findings here do not support Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi’s  (2011) 
assumption that when economic upgrading involves process improvements 
(process upgrading) it may reduce work through automation. The findings within 
CarpetCo show that the new production process, which was seen as both a product 
and a process upgrading, both required (and resulted in) skill development and job 
creation (given that CarpetCo had hired one new employee to work on this process). 
 
The findings in this study also suggest that SCA may have the potential to promote 
social upgrading in the environment in which an organisation operates through the 
dissemination of best practices across the supply chain.  This was observed in the 
analysis of the OBA practices within BackCoJC, one of CarpetCo’s suppliers (mini 
case study 1 in chapter 10). During the interview with the sales manager within 
BackCoJC, the manager said that he was “starting to think” about their approach to 
managing social issues after some of his customers asked him to disclose 
information about his company’s social responsibility actions.  Therefore, these 
findings suggest that OBA may have the potential to promote dissemination of best 
practices in terms of managing social issues across the supply chain, resulting from 
mimetic isomorphism (Brandau et al., 2013; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In other 
words, in this case the supplier seemed to be inclined to imitate the (good) practices 
within their customers.  
 
Finally, the evidence in this study suggest that SCA has the potential to complement 
the role of trade unions in monitoring and enforcing compliance with the 
employment regulations across the supply chain and, consequently, promoting 
social upgrading in the environment in which the organisation operate. As reported 
in chapter 5, one of the roles of the trade unions in Brazil was to highlight where 
employment regulations were not being observed. However, the president of the 
regional trade union explained that, due to lack of resources, the trade union had 
the practice of auditing employers only when someone reported that the employer 
was not compliant with the regulations. The potential of SCA to complement the 
role of trade unions in monitoring compliance with the employment regulations 
was observed in CarpetCo’s supplier selection process, whereby CarpetCo required 
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the suppliers to provide documentation showing that they were in compliance with 
employment regulations. In other words, CarpetCo’s SCA practices (supplier 
selection) may have promoted social upgrading through a process of coercive 
isomorphism (Brandau et al., 2013; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
In conclusion, the evidence in this study shows that the SCA practices used by the 
case study focal organisation in the textiles industry in Brazil and across its supply 
chain impacted upon the wider social and economic context in which the 
organisations operated. Although the intention of this was study was to find best 
practices, the findings revealed instances in which the SCA practices impacted upon 
the external environment both in positive and in negative ways. Nonetheless, the 
evidence that SCA impacts upon the economic and social context in which the 
organisations operated imply that SCA may have the potential to promote both 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11.2 Contributions and implications of the study 
 
This section discusses the main contributions and implications of this study. This 
section is divided into two sections. The first section discusses this study’s main 
contributions to theory. The second section discusses the implications to practice 
and policy of this study. 
 
11.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
 
In order to locate this study’s contributions to theory, this thesis uses the distinction 
between domain theory and method theory put forward by Lukka & Vinnari (2014). 
Domain theory is regarded as “a particular set of knowledge on a substantive topic 
area situated in a field or domain such as management accounting” and method 
theory is regarded as “a meta-level conceptual system for studying the substantive 
issue(s) of the domain theory at hand” (Lukka & Vinnari, 2014, p. 1309). This study 
is located within the domain theory of SCA which refers to the topic area of 
management accounting and controls in inter-organisational settings. The method 
theory used for studying SCA is institutional theory. In other words, institutional 
theory is the method theory used as an auxiliary to enable this study’s contributions 
to the domain theory of SCA. Although both domain theory and method theory 
tend to be moving fields, domain theories tend to change more often, and method 
theories can help advance knowledge in a particular domain theory even when the 
method theory is applied as an instrument and does not change itself (Lukka & 
Vinnari, 2014). Accordingly, this study uses institutional theory as an instrument to 
advance knowledge in the domain theory of SCA.  
 
In relation to the domain theory of SCA, this study makes several contributions. 
Firstly, by using a case study in the textiles industry in Brazil, this study contributes 
to the under-researched literature of management accounting in developing 
countries (Hopper & Bui, 2016). More specifically, by providing empirical evidence 
of the use of SCA practices in a case study in Brazil, this study also makes several 
contributions to the literature of SCA. As explained above, this study examined four 
SCA practices which were the most relevant for this case study: inter-firm 
governance, make-or-buy decisions, customer accounting and open book 
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accounting (OBA). The main contributions of this study to the body of literature of 
each of these practices will be discussed below.  
 
In terms of inter-firm governance, the findings in this study make several 
contributions to the literature. One of these contributions is the fact that this study 
extends some of the findings from previous studies conducted in developed 
countries to the context of a developing country. For example, the evidence in the 
textiles industry in Brazil agrees with previous studies that propose that one of the 
key determinants of inter-firm governance choices is the level of uncertainty 
involved in the exchange transaction (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Ding, 
Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; 
Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008; Håkansson & Lind, 2004; van 
der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). In common with the findings in these 
studies, CarpetCo had different types of relationship arrangements with its tier 1 
suppliers depending on the transaction characteristics such as the levels of 
uncertainty. The findings in the textiles industry in Brazil confirm that behavioural 
uncertainties may be significantly affected by product criticality (Kumra, Agndal, & 
Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), the number of alternative suppliers (Dekker, 
Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; 
Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2008), and the level of switching costs 
(Agndal & Nilsson, 2010). Also in common with previous literature, the exchange 
transactions between CarpetCo and its suppliers involved environmental 
uncertainty, such as unpredictability and/or lack of technological development 
(Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008). With 
the exception of the study by Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson (2012) which was conducted 
in India, all the above-mentioned studies were conducted in developed countries.  
 
Another important contribution of this study to the literature of inter-firm 
governance is concerned with the influence of asset specificity on partner selection 
and governance structure. In contrast with previous studies (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & 
Kawai, 2013; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Dekker & Van 
den Abbeele, 2010; Dekker, 2004, 2008), asset specificity did not seem to impact 
the relationships between CarpetCo and its suppliers. One possible explanation for 
this may be CarpetCo’s industry and/or product characteristics. Many studies which 
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discussed the influence of asset specify on inter-firm governance were conducted 
in industries that involve high technology development, such the information 
technology industry (Kumra, Agndal, & Nilsson, 2012; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 
2010; Dekker, 2008), the telecommunications industry (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), 
the automotive industry (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), rail infrastructure (Dekker, 2004), 
and other complex manufacturing industries (Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kawai, 2013). In 
this study, conducted in the industrial textiles industry, the materials did not involve 
customisations or high levels of technological development. Therefore, the findings 
in this study may suggest that asset specificity has little or no influence on inter-
firm governance within industries that do not involve high levels of technological 
development.   
 
This study also makes several contributions to the literature on OBA, which is still 
in its infancy (Caglio, 2017). OBA refers to the exchange of both financial and non-
financial information across the supply chain (Caglio, 2017; Caglio & Ditillo, 2012; 
Windolph & Moeller, 2012; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). Given 
this study’s aim of exploring the potential of SCA to promote both economic and 
social upgrading, the rules and routines in terms of OBA practices in this study were 
analysed by the type of information disclosed, which were divided into: accounting 
and costs information, technical and procedural information, and information 
about approach to managing social issues. The case analysis here revealed that the 
extent to which firms exchanged information with their buyers and suppliers varied 
according to the type of information exchanged. These findings differ from previous 
studies which argued that the extent to which firms engage in OBA practices varied 
according to the type (or maturity) of the inter-firm relationship (Möller, Windolph, 
& Isbruch, 2011; Cullen & Meira, 2010). In this study, willingness to share 
information seemed to be lower when information exchange involved financial 
data, irrespective of the type of relationship with the partner. The findings show 
that accounting and costs information were generally seen as sensitive data, and 
firms across the supply chain were not willing to fully disclose this type of 
information. 
 
This study also contributes to the literature on OBA by extending some of the 
findings from previous studies conducted in developed countries to the context of 
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a developing country. Empirical studies on OBA so far have largely focused in 
developed countries, such as Japan (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), the UK (Seal et 
al., 1999), and northern European countries such as Germany (Windolph & Moeller, 
2012; Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 2011; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005), Denmark 
(Mouritsen, Hansen, & Hansen, 2001), Sweden (Agndal & Nilsson, 2010), and 
Finland (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005). Furthermore, previous studies on OBA practice 
have so far focused on industry sectors which are more likely to adopt new 
accounting methods and implement sophisticated cost accounting systems, such as 
the automotive industry (Windolph & Moeller, 2012; Möller, Windolph, & Isbruch, 
2011; Agndal & Nilsson, 2010; Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; Cooper & Slagmulder, 
2004), the information technology and telecommunications industry (Agndal & 
Nilsson, 2010; Dekker, 2008; Mouritsen, Hansen, & Hansen, 2001), and the 
mechanical engineering industry (Kajuter & Kulmala, 2005; Mouritsen, Hansen, & 
Hansen, 2001; Seal et al., 1999). Therefore, this study also extends the literature to 
the context of the textiles industry.  
 
Finally, by examining the impact of the SCA practices used across the case study 
supply chain on the broader social context in which the organisations operate and 
exploring the potential of these practices to promote social upgrading, this study 
also addressed calls for accounting research that deals with social issues (Hopper & 
Bui, 2016), and for further research exploring ways of managing social issues in 
supply chains (Yawar & Seuring, 2017). The findings in this study suggest that OBA 
had the potential to promote better work conditions across the supply chain. This 
was observed particularly in the relationship between CarpetCo and its provider of 
freight services. Through the informal exchange of information CarpetCo became 
aware that its main freight service provider (carrier) did not have forklifts for 
moving products, putting workers’ safety at risk. As a result of this, CarpetCo 
provided safety equipment for the freight service firm’s employees. Yawar & 
Seuring’s (2017) work show that labour conditions and health and safety are areas 
of much debate in term of social issues in supply chains, and the authors called for 
further research identifying ‘responsible supply chain actions’ for managing social 
issues in supply chains. CarpetCo’s reaction to the carrier’s poor health and safety 
practices can be regarded as an example of a responsible supply chain action. 
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Therefore, these findings suggest that SCA may be used as a means for managing 
social issues in supply chains. 
 
11.2.2 Practical implications 
 
This study also has implications for policy and practice. Firstly, by examining the 
impact of SCA on the wider economic environment in which the organisations 
operated, this study has elucidated some of the factors that impacted upon the low 
competitiveness of the textiles industry in Brazil. Furthermore, the evidence in this 
study suggest that SCA has the potential to promote increased competitiveness 
(and, by promoting increased competitiveness, SCA may ultimately promote 
economic upgrading). Therefore, these findings may help inform policy and 
organisational practices aimed at increasing the competitiveness of the industry.  
 
For example, the findings in this study suggest that the Brazilian textiles industry 
was “stuck in the middle”, given that it could neither compete in quality with high 
technological countries nor in cost with low cost countries. The findings in this study 
further suggest that one of the reasons for the textiles firms to struggle to compete 
in quality was the difficult access to modern machinery. One of the reasons for the 
difficult access to modern equipment was the lack of manufacturers of certain 
types of machinery in Brazil, which forced the firms in the textiles industry to import. 
The Brazilian importing process itself was another barrier to firms’ access to 
modern equipment, given that importing the process was complex, onerous and 
unpredictable. Thirdly, the textiles firms faced financial difficulties and lack of 
access to credit, adding to their inability to import machinery since external 
suppliers usually required upfront payment. These findings could influence policies 
aimed at developing the textiles industry in Brazil. For example, during the 
interview with the manager of the regional development bank, the manager 
revealed that although the bank had some specific initiatives to help other 
industries in the region, they did not have any initiatives targeted to help textiles 
firms to achieve equipment. The findings here may influence future initiatives by 
the development bank. For example, in light of these findings, and considering the 
importance of the textiles industry to the Brazilian economy, the development bank 
might consider facilitating credit for firms in the textiles industry to buy modern 
238 
 
machinery. Another suggestion (and perhaps more ambitious) is for the 
development bank (or the government) to consider initiatives to stimulate the 
establishment of manufacturers of those types machinery in Brazil. A third and 
perhaps even more ambitious suggestion is for the government to revise the 
burdensome importing process in Brazil. 
 
The findings in this study also suggest that SCA had the potential to promote better 
practices in terms of managing social issues across supply chains. For example, the 
findings suggest that the exchange of information between buyers and suppliers 
had the potential to promote dissemination of best practices in terms of approach 
to managing social issues. This was observed during the interview with the SM 
within BackCoJC, who said that he was “starting to think” about their approach to 
managing social issues after some of his customers asked him to disclose 
information about his company’s social responsibility actions. It has been argued 
that social responsibility can be influencing factor in inter-firm relationships 
decisions both for moral reasons and for financial performance reasons (Yawar & 
Seuring, 2017; Klassen & Vereecke, 2012; Dibben et al., 2002). Yawar & Seuring 
(2017). suggest that ensuring labour rights and providing safe conditions and a 
healthy workplace can help firms to attract and retain skilled labour in the long run 
which, in turn, may influence firms’ reputation and economic performance (Yawar 
& Seuring, 2017). In other words, besides the moral reasons for firms to tackle these 
social issues in supply chains, there seems to be a business case for managing 
labour conditions and health and safety across a firm’s supply chain. Therefore, the 
findings in this study may also have practical implications, as these findings may 
influence companies’ practices, policies and codes of conduct. Promoting better 
practices in terms of managing social issues across supply chains is particularly 
important in the context of a low enforcement country such as Brazil. Given the 
weak capacity of enforcement in Brazil (as explained in chapter 5), monitoring of 
bad practices down the supply is less likely to be achieved through regulations. 
Therefore, by promoting better practices in terms of managing social issues across 
supply chains, SCA may consequently contribute both to the social upgrading of the 
region and/or country (e.g. by ensuring workers earn a living wage, promoting 
better work conditions and equality) and to the economic upgrading of the region 
and/or country (e.g. by attracting and retaining skilled labour in the long run). 
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11.3 Limitations of the study and future research 
 
This study has limitations. Firstly, it is important to mention that, as it usually is the 
case with qualitative case studies, the generalisability of this research is limited. 
Nonetheless, what may appear to be a limitation from a particular philosophical 
perspective; from another perspective, may be seen a strength. Researchers with a 
predilection for a positivist epistemology tend to criticise case study research for its 
limitation of producing generalisations (Lee and Saunders, 2017). On the other 
hand, this view downplays the important role of case study research for theorizing 
about the case through particularization. As argued by Lee & Saunders (2017, p.9), 
“a case may be interesting in its own right and does not require wider inferences to 
give it greater value”.   
 
Other limitations of this study refer to the lack of access to some type of 
information and to a wider range of participants. Firstly, the focal organisation and 
its suppliers were not willing to share accounting and costs information. Secondly, 
the focal organisation was also not willing to involve employees at lower 
hierarchical levels within the organisation.  
 
A further limitation refers to the lack of access to some of the other organisations 
that formed part of the entire case study supply chain. Firstly, the focal organisation 
did not want their customers to participate in the research. Secondly, although the 
focal organisation was happy to involve all their suppliers in the research and 
provided their contact information, some of the suppliers were not willing to 
participate.   
 
This study gives rise to avenue for future research, which concerns the replication 
of this study’s design into different contexts. For example, future research could 
further explore the impact of SCA practices on the economic and social context in 
which an organisation operates using case studies in different industries, in order 
to explore the potential of SCA to promote social and economic upgrading in Brazil 




Finally, future research could be done exploring the role of accounting and of 
accountants in Brazil. The findings in this study suggest that the limited role of the 
accountants in the case study focal organisation was an impediment for the use of 
more sophisticated SCA practices. It would be interesting to conduct further 
research investigating whether a change in the institutions (rules and routines) 
around the role of accountants in Brazil could help the Brazilian industry to achieve 
increased competitiveness through the use of more sophisticated SCA practices. In 
terms of the role of accounting, by suggesting that SCA impacts upon the external 
economic environment, the findings in this study also imply that SCA could be used 
as a means for identifying what needs to be changed in order to improve 
competitiveness of the Brazilian industry. Thus, this study seems to have opened 
an avenue for addressing calls for research on the role of management accounting 
as a tool for identifying need for change (Hiebl, 2017). 
 
11.4 Personal reflections: a journey towards becoming a researcher 
 
This study is part of a wider ESRC funded project that investigates supply chain 
accounting and employment practices in emerging economies. Undertaking a PhD 
as part of a wider research project brings many opportunities, but it also comes 
with challenges. Being a team member of an ESRC project provided me with the 
opportunity to work with experienced researchers from an early stage in my 
academic career. I attended project meetings and participated in decisions related 
to the project such as timeline, project deliverables (academic publication plans and 
toolkit development). I fed suggestions into the survey questionnaires and 
interview protocols, and I played an active role in the sampling design and obtaining 
access to organisations within Brazil. I participated in dissemination workshops and 
symposium, playing a role as a facilitator in group discussions, taking notes for later 
compilation and chairing presentation sessions. I undertook research beyond my 
own case study and co-authored papers. For example, I played a significant role in 
the study undertaken in the automotive industry in Brazil. I obtained access to two 
automotive manufacturers through my own contacts, and I conducted interviews 
within these organisations. I later transcribed and translated the scripts and helped 
write-up findings. This study successfully resulted in a publication in The 




Nevertheless, doing a PhD as part of a wider research project also comes with 
challenges. For example, it can be challenging to take ownership of one’s own PhD 
when it is part of a wider project. In my journey, for a period of time I thought that 
my PhD had to fit tightly within the overall aims of the ESRC project (as set out in 
the project’s original proposal), and within the overall aim set out in my scholarship 
proposal. In other words, I was feeling constrained by the ESRC project’s aims, and 
this was stopping me from developing my own ideas freely. For example, the overall 
aim set out in the PhD scholarship proposal was to ‘promote better employment 
practices and gender equality through SCA’. However, as I progressed with my PhD 
studies, I realised that I wanted the main focus of my PhD to be around the aspect 
of the project which I was most passionate about: to explore the potential of SCA 
to promote both economic and social upgrading, particularly in Brazil. In other 
words, I wanted my main focus to be around accounting and development, rather 
than on employment practices and gender equality. Although this main focus 
slightly shifts away from the main focus set out in the initial PhD application, it still 
fits within the ESRC project’s overall aims. I discussed this with my supervisors, and 
we agreed that I could align my PhD research objectives with my own aspirations. 
Thereafter, I took full ownership of my PhD and started developing my ideas freely. 
 
Another crucial part of my PhD journey that helped me develop as a researcher was 
my presenting at conferences and attending research seminars throughout my PhD 
studies. Presenting at conferences allowed me to communicate my preliminary 
findings during initial stages of my data analysis which was extremely helpful for 
me owing not only to the valuable feedback that I received during my presentations, 
but also to the opportunity that these presentations gave me to make sense of my 
data. In order to communicate my findings, I had to elaborate my thoughts. 
Speaking is a way of thinking. Lastly, by attending these conferences I met 
exceptional academics in my field, who have inspired me to develop further as a 
scholar and to look forward to doing collaborative research. Moreover, meeting 
accomplished academics who have influenced practice and policies throughout 





Last but not least, an important part of my journey towards developing as a 
researcher was my undertaking an academic position at the end of the third year 
of my PhD studies. I undertook a full-time position as a Teaching Fellow at the 
University of Leicester and, after a year in this role, I have undertaken a position as 
a Lecturer (tenure track). My role as a Teaching Fellow involved not only teaching 
related activities, but also personal tutoring and undergraduate dissertation 
supervision. By supervising students throughout their research projects, I realised 
that I had become a researcher. I was apprehensive at first because I had to 
supervise students doing projects in different domain theories, in which I did not 
necessarily had an expertise. Throughout the process, I realised that in order to be 
a researcher I did not need to be an expert on all topics within management 
research, nor on all research methods (e.g. quantitative). Being a researcher 
requires an inquisitive mind, combined with an ethical approach to doing 
academically rigorous research. In my interaction with students, I have learned that 
everyone’s journey towards producing a piece of research is different. This thesis is 
an account of my journey towards producing my PhD research. This is not the end, 
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APPENDIX I: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
Phase Organisation Interviewee's role  Length  Interview Code 
1 CarpetCo  Accounting manager 01:17 CarpetCo_Acc 
1 CarpetCo  Accountant 
1 CarpetCo  Supply chain manager 01:44 CarpetCo_SCM 
1 CarpetCo  HR manager 01:55 CarpetCo_HRM 
1 CarpetCo  Quality manager 01:29 CarpetCo_QM 
1 CarpetCo  Industrial director 00:25 CarpetCo_IndDir 
1 CarpetCo  Sales director 00:22 CarpetCo_SD 
1 CalciteCo  CEO (Owner) 00:28 CalciteCo_CEO 
1 TrUn  President 01:14 TradeUnion_Pres 
2 YarnsCoEU  Sales manager 02:30 YarnsCoEU_SM 
3 FedBR  CEO 00:34 FedBR_CEO 
3 FedReg  Social affairs manager 01:17 FedReg_SaM 
3 FedReg  Social affairs manager 
3 FedReg  Development manager 01:03 FedReg_DevM 
3 FedReg  Social affairs consultant 01:03 FedReg_Cons 
3 Edu  Course coordinator 00:16 Edu_GCM 
3 Edu  Course coordinator 00:20 Edu_PCM 
3 Edu  Course tutor 00:12 Edu_PCT 
3 Bank  Business manager 00:59 Bank_BusM 
3 CarpetCo  HR manager 00:28 CarpetCo_HRM_Fup 
3 CarpetCo  Accountant 01:13 CarpetCo_Acc_Fup 
3 CarpetCo  Supply chain manager 01:09 CarpetCo_SCM_Fup 
3 CarpetCo  External trade coordinator 01:04 CarpetCo_Comex 
3 CarpetCo  Sales coordinator 00:34 CarpetCo_SC 
3 CarpetCo  Quality manager 00:57 CarpetCo_QM_Fup 
3 CarpetCo  Finance director 01:26 CarpetCo_FinDir 
3 CarpetCo  Accounting manager 00:43 CarpetCo_AccM_Fup 
3 LatexCo  Business director 01:22 LatexCo_BusDir 
3 BackCoJC  Sales manager 01:07 BackCoJC_SM 
3 BackCoJC  HR manager 00:52 BackCoJC_HRM 
3 FloorCo  Sales coordinator 01:10 FloorCo_SM 
3 FloorCo  Sales supervisor 
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Logotipo        
QUESTIONÁRIO PARA HABILITAÇÃO DE 
FORNECEDOR 
 
FOR - GA - 01 
 
   
 
   
 
AVALIAÇÃO BEAULIEU 
1. Teste do produto: 
                    
 Satisfatório          Não Satisfatório      Não Exigido 
 
2. O fornecedor está: 
 
         HABILITADO                                          NÃO HABILITADO        NOTA OBTIDA 
          
 
Responsável pela avaliação:     
 





Contato:                                                          E-mail:                                                                             Telefone: 
CRITÉRIOS PARA HABILITAÇÃO 
Possui algum sistema de Gestão certificado? 
                
 SIM Qual:                                                                                                  NÃO (Preencher questionário abaixo, atribuindo 2 pontos 
                                                                                                                                              para cada resposta positiva) 
 Órgão Certificador:              
   
1 - Possui algum sistema de controle de produção?                                   SIM (descreva)            NÃO                                                                                                            
 
 
2 - Possui algum sistema de rastreabilidade do produto?                         SIM (descreva)            NÃO   
 
 
3 - Existe alguma sistemática de controle de produto não conforme?     SIM (descreva)           NÃO        
                                   
 
4 - Sua empresa possui assistência técnica?                                                 SIM                               NÃO    
     
 
5 - Os produtos são transportados em veículos rastreáveis?                    SIM                               NÃO      
 
 
Defina sua capacidade Logística 
 
- Prazo mínimo de entrega: ------------------ horas 
 









OBS: Junto a este questionário deve-se enviar cópia dos seguintes documentos: 
Certidão negativa de débitos INSS – FGTS- IBAMA e Municipal;   Licença ambiental de Operação; declaração assinada pelo Executivo Sênior da 
Empresa  quanto ao atendimento a regulamentos trabalhistas, anti-discriminatórios e de segurança  

















Possui algum sistema de Gestão certificado?
Qualificação/experiência dos funcionários 
Estrutura:  
Dispositivos de medição: 
Manutenção/Calibração dos dispositivos
Referências (informar outros clientes):
A documentação necessária para a prestação do serviço foi entregue? Está atualizada?
Q ual o nível de conhecimento técnico exigido para a prestação do serviço?
Qual é a norma e/ou legislação atendida?
A empresa oferece prazos para pagamento?




FOR - GA - 04
Responsável pela Avaliação: Função: 
Importante: O prestador de serviço deve enviar os registros/documentos necessários, sempre que preciso, junto a esse questionário.




Sim - qualNão aplicável
NãoSim 
Sim - QualNão














Company Document 6: Corrective and preventive action form 
